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I. INTRODUCTION
Subprime home equity lending is probably one of the most important
public policy issues that America will have to address during the coming years,
as evidenced by the number of studies devoted to this issue in 1999 alone. The
number of high-rate, high-cost home-secured loans has exploded over the past
seven or eight years, and the consequences of some subprime lending are now
starting to be felt through record numbers of home foreclosures, victimization
of some borrowers through inappropriate lending and lending practices, 2 and
concerns over lender liquidity and investor security.
The challenge in the coming years will be to find a balance between the
need to make reasonable amounts of credit available to borrowers with varying
credit backgrounds and the need to protect borrowers from credit that is
unjustifiably expensive, inappropriate for certain borrowers, or tainted by fraud
and other misconduct. One of the most difficult questions that must be
answered is whether and what kind of government regulation might be
required to assure progress in addressing these issues.
1. See, e.g., NATIONAL TRAINING AND INFO. CTR., PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS:
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDERS AND CHICAGOLAND FORECLOSURE (1999) [hereinafter PREYING
ONNEIGHBORHOODS] (studying the subprime market in the Chicago area); DANIEL IMMERGLUCK
& MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., Two STEPS BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET,
PREDATORYLENDING, ANDTHEUNDOINGOFCOMMUNITYDEVELOPMENT (1999) [hereinafter Two
STEPS BACK] (studying the exploitation of homeowners by subprime lenders in the Chicago
area); Deborah Goldstein, Understanding Predatory Lending: Moving Toward a Common
Definition and Workable Solutions (Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University,
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, October 1999).
2. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman Robert Pitofsky has been quoted as
saying that the subprime home equity market demonstrates "some of the most abusive practices"
he has ever seen. Christine B. Whelan, FTC Is Targeting Abuses In Subprime Home Loans,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 1999, at CIO.
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One of the key historical developments, without which the high-rate first-
mortgage lending that pervades the subprime home-secured lending industry
would not be possible, was the adoption by Congress in 1979 and 1980 of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIIDMCA)? DIDMCA, which was adopted in an era of high market rates for
conventional mortgages, preempted state usury ceilings in most loans secured
by a first lien on the borrower's home.4 Case law interpreting DIDMCA later
held that DIDMCA preempted such state regulations even with regard to
nonpurchase loans, as long as the lender secured a first lien on the home.5
This Article examines the history of federal regulation and deregulation of
home-secured lending rates, the market and political environment in which
DIDMCA was adopted, the deregulation of interest caps on Federal Housing
Administration and Veterans' Administration insured loans, and the almost
inadvertent deregulation of usury laws as they relate to nonpurchase home-
secured loans. This Article further describes the subprime mortgage lending
industry that developed in DIDMCA's wake, including the predatory lending
practices that have emerged in the market and recent regulatory efforts at
addressing these problems.
Finally, this Article discusses the need for better information about the
subprime home equity industry, argues that policy makers rethink usury
deregulation of the subprime home equity market, and suggests possible
regulatory curbs on predatory subprime lending that might be appropriate and
necessary.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: EARLY FEDERAL INTEREST RATE AND
MORTGAGE RATE REGULATION
A. The National Bank Act
Interest rates are generally regulated by the states, not the federal
government. Indeed, until the late 1970s, Congress made only a few forays into
the area of rate regulation. The first of these ventures occurred in 1864, when
Congress adopted the National Bank Act6 in order to "restore to the still young
federal government control of the monetary system."' The National Bank Act
provided (and the current codification still provides) that national banks may
3. DIDMCA is discussed in full in Section lI.B. of this Article. It was adopted twice,
once in temporary form in late 1979, Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233
(originally codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. §1735f-7), and again in 1980, Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501 (a), 94 Stat. 132, 161
(originally codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7, now codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a).
4. See infra Section III.B.
5. See infra Section IV.B.
6. National Bank Act of June 3, 1864, § 30,13 Stat. 99, 108 (current version codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994)).
7. KATHLEEN E. KEEsT, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT:
REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES, § 3.4.1 (1995).
Vol. 51: 473
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charge the interest rate allowed by the state in which the bank is located, or a
rate of one percent above "the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper
in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the
bank is located," whichever is greater, for loans originated by the bank.'
From this enactment in the 1860s until the Great Depression of the early
1930s, the federal government stayed out of matters involving interest rates.9
The federal government also did not get involved in regulating matters of home
ownership. However, when the Great Depression of the 193 Os hit, homeowners
began defaulting on their loans in record numbers,"° and savings institutions
found themselves unable to operate." In response to this crisis, Congress
enacted several statutes in order to preserve and encourage home ownership
and to provide relief to homeowners who found it difficult or impossible to
make their mortgage payments. With the adoption of these statutes, the federal
government entered the arena of mortgage rate regulation.
B. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act
The first of the three major Depression-era congressional enactments
relating to home-secured lending was the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of
1932.2 That statute created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 3 and a
system of regional Federal Home Loan Banks 4 that were authorized to make
secured advances to member and nonmember banks for a percentage of unpaid
8. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). The discount rate is set by each Federal Reserve District
and can be obtained from a number of sources, including the web page of each of the Federal
Reserve Districts. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta website (visited Mar. 10, 2000)
<http://www.frbatlanta.orgt>; Federal Reserve Bank of New York website (visited Mar. 10,
2000) <http://www.ny.frb.org/>.
9. THOMASB. MARVELL, THEFEDERALHoMELOANBANKBOARD 18 (1969); see also
126 CONG. REc. 7069 (1980) (statement of Sen. Morgan of North Carolina that usury laws
historically were the province of state governments).
10. At the start of the Depression, there were approximately 11 million nonfarm
homeowners. Of those, 60% had mortgages on their homes, and the average mortgage was for
"well over half the value of the property." MARVFLL, supra note 9, at 18. During the Depression
between one-fifth and one-half of all homeowners could not meet their mortgage payments. Id.
11. Savings and loans, which made home mortgage loans, were hurt by the inability
of borrowers to make payments on their loans, the rapid decline in property values (which made
foreclosure an ineffective way to collect on defaulted mortgages), and customer demand for their
cash deposits. Id. "In the 1930's, some 1,700 savings and loan associations failed, with losses to
their savers estimated at about $200 million, or about one-third the value of the savings in these
associations." Id.
12. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304,47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1994)).
13. § 17, 47 Stat. at 736. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was dissolved and its
responsibilities were taken over by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in 1989. Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 401(a)(2),
101(6), 201(b), 103 Stat. 183, 354, 187, 188. The Board's regulations and determinations were
to remain in effect until OTS modified or repealed them. § 401(h), 103 Stat. at 357.
14. § 3, 47 Stat. at 726.
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principal on loans secured by home first mortgages and first liens." The statute
also authorized any bank organized under the act to be a home equity lender of
last resort for borrowers "unable to obtain mortgage money from any other
source."' 6 The first federal mortgage rate regulation was also contained in this
statute, although the regulatory scheme deferred to state law usury limits,
setting a federal rate only if there was no applicable state law.
17
C. The Home Owners'Loan Act of1933
In 1933 Congress adopted the Home Owner's Loan Act, 8 which
authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to charter federal savings and
loan institutions that were required to participate in the Federal Home Loan
Bank System. 9 The statute also directed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
to create the Home Owners' Loan Corporation," which was authorized from
June 13, 1933 until June 13, 1936 to issue bonds and exchange them for "home
mortgages and other obligations and liens secured by real
estate.., recorded.., or executed prior to the date of the enactment of this
Act," to provide cash advances to homeowners whose mortgage holders
15. §§ 10(a), 2(6), 47 Stat. at 731, 725.
16. § 4(d), 47 Stat. at 727.
17. § 5, 47 Stat. at 727. The statute provided that:
No institution shall be admitted to or retained in
membership, or granted the privileges ofnonmember
borrowers, if the combined total of the amounts paid
to it for interest, commission, bonus, discount,
premium, and other similar charges, less a proper
deduction for all dividends, refunds, and cash credits
of all kinds, creates an actual net cost to the home
owner in excess of the maximum legal rate of interest
or, in case there is a lawful contract rate of interest
applicable to such transactions, in excess of such rate
(regardless of any exemption from usury laws), or, in
case there is no legal rate of interest or lawful
contract rate of interest applicable to such
transactions, in excess of 8 per centum per annum in
the State where such property is located.
Id.
18. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (formerly
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1934)).
19. § 5(a), 48 Stat. at 132.
20. § 4(a), 48 Stat. at 129. The Corporation was created as "an instrumentality of
the United States." Id.
21. § 4(d)(1), 48 Stat. at 130. In order to qualify for the exchange under subsection
(d) or payments in lieu thereof under subsection (f), the home had to be used as a dwelling for
not more than four families and have a value not exceeding $20,000. § 4(d)(2), 48 Stat. at 131.
In April 1934 Congress further restricted mortgage exchange and payments program to loans
where the applicant was "in involuntary default on June 13, 1933" and "unable to carry or refund
his present mortgage indebtedness" unless a default after that date was "due to unemployment
or to economic conditions or misfortune beyond the control of the applicant, or in any case in
Vol. 51: 473
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would not accept the Corporation's bonds in exchange for their mortgages and
who could not find other lenders,' to redeem property already foreclosed
upon,23 and to make mortgage loans for 50% of the value of unencumbered
property.24
Once the Corporation became the holder of a mortgage, the homeowner
was entitled to many benefits not available in any other mortgage relationship.
For example, homeowners whose mortgages were bought by the Corporation
were relieved of their obligation to make principal payments for three years
from the effective date of the ActY Furthermore, the Corporation was
permitted to allow home owners to make quarterly, semi-annual, or annual
payments if the homeowner's situation so warranted and to grant an extension
on any payment of principal or interest owed by the homeowner if "the
circumstances of the home owner and the condition of the security justify such
extension.' 26 The Corporation was also directed to credit to the homeowner's
outstanding balance the difference between the amount still owed by the
homeowner on the mortgage and the face value of the bonds (plus any cash)
given for the property, thereby reducing the homeowner's debt obligation.
Finally, the Corporation was authorized to advance taxes and assessments on
the mortgaged property and to maintain and repair the property.28
Unlike the 1932 statute, which deferred to state interest ceilings where
appropriate, the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 set loan terms, including a
maximum interest rate, for all mortgages that were to be held by the
Corporation.29 Loans held by the Corporation through the mortgage exchange
program, or secured by previously unencumbered property, or made to redeem
homes in foreclosure were required to be for a term of not more than 15 years,
to be amortized over the term of the loan, and to carry an annual interest rate
which the home mortgage or other obligation or lien is held by an institution which is in
liquidation." Act of April 27, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-178, § 2,48 Stat. 643, 644. Just one month
later Congress eliminated from eligibility borrowers whose home mortgage or other obligations
or liens were held by an institution in liquidation. Act of May 28, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-76, § 14,
49 Stat. 293, 297.
22. § 4(f), 48 Stat. at 131. The cash advances were limited to 40% of the value of the
property. Id.
23. § 4(g), 48 Stat. at 131. This section originally applied to mortgages that had been
foreclosed upon subject to a trustee sale or were voluntarily surrendered within two years prior
to the Corporation's exchange or advance. Id. This was later changed to cover any home which
had been foreclosed upon subject to a trustee sale or was voluntarily surrendered after January
1, 1930. § 4, 48 Stat. at 645.
24. § 4(e), 48 Stat. at 131.
25. § 4(d)(2), 48 Stat at 131.
26. § 4(d)(2),48 Stat at 130-31.
27. § 4(d)(2), 48 Stat. at 130. The Corporation could not exchange bonds and cash
worth more than the smaller of $14,000 or 80 percent of the value of the real estate, as
determined by an appraisal performed by the corporation, for each mortgage. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
2000
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of not more than 5%.30 Loans made to enable homeowners to pay their own
mortgage holders were to "bear interest at a rate of interest which shall be
uniform throughout the United States, but which in no event shall exceed a rate
of 6 per centum per annum."3 These interest rate ceilings were not changed
during the life of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which in 1953 was
authorized to dissolve and transfer to the United States Government its property
interests.32 The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 was repealed in 1966.a3
D. Federal Housing Administration Insured Loans (FHA Loans) and
Veterans' Administration Insured Loans (VA Loans)
The third mortgage-related Depression-era statute adopted by Congress,
the National Housing Act of 1934,34 has had the most lasting impact on federal
mortgage interest rates of all the Depression-era statutes. The National Housing
Actprovided for establishment of the Federal Housing Administration 3 and for
the insurance by that agency of first mortgages"' made by lenders approved by
the Federal Housing Administrator. 7 Among the qualifications for a mortgage
to be eligible for insurance was a requirement that the mortgage "[b]ear interest
30. Id. The amortization requirement was changed from 15 to 25 years in 1939. Act
ofAug. 11, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-381, § (a), 53 Stat. 1403, 1403. The Corporation was also given
the ability to revise the terms of a mortgage to reflect a 25-year amortization, in addition to
granting an extension on payments of principal and interest, if the circumstances of the
homeowner and condition of the security so warranted. § (b), 53 Stat. at 1403.
31. §4(f),48Statat131.
32. Act of June 30, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-94, § 21, 67 Stat. 121, 126-27.
33. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 8, 80 Stat. 378, 632, 648.
34. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479,48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
35. § 1, 48 Stat. at 1246.
36. § 201(a), 48 Stat. at 1247 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1994) (defining the
term "mortgages" to mean first mortgages)).
37. § 203(b)(1), 48 Stat. at 1248 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (b)(1) (1994)). In
1968 HUD was also authorized to insure mortgages made to residential property lessees for the
purpose of purchasing the property they were leasing. Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 304(a), 82 Stat. 476, 507 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z-5 (1994). The FHA also insures various other types of mortgage loans, some of which
were provided for in the 1934 Act, and some o fwhichbecame insurable at later times. See, e.g.,
12 U.S.C. § 1703 (1994) (providing for insurance of financial institutions); 12 U.S.C. § 1713
(1994) (insuring mortgages for rental housing); 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1994) (insuring mortgages
for cooperative housing); 12 U.S.C. § 1715k (1994) (insuring mortgages for rehabilitated
housing); 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (1994) (insuring mortgages for housing for moderate income and
displaced families); 12 U.S.C. § 1715n (1994) (insuring miscellaneous mortgages); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715v (1994) (insuring mortgages for housing for the elderly); 12 U.S.C. § 1715w (1994)
(insuring mortgages for nursing homes); 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1994) (providing mortgage
insurance for condominiums); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1994) (insuring mortgages for low income
cooperative membership); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1994) (insuring mortgages for rental and
cooperative housing forlowincome families); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-la (1994) (insuring mortgages
for troubled multi-family housing projects); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-6 (1994) (insuring supplement
loans for multi-family projects); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-7 (1994) (insuring mortgage loans for
hospitals).
Vol. 51: 473
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(exclusive ofpremium charges for insurance) at not to exceed 5 per centum per
annum on the amount of the principal obligation outstanding at any time, or not
to exceed 6 per centum per annum if the Administrator finds that in certain
areas or under special circumstances the mortgage market demands it."3
In 1944 the Veterans' Administration began a similar mortgage insurance
program with the adoption of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944.
39
The Act allowed the Veterans' Administration to guarantee $2,000 of home
mortgage debt owed by an individual who had served in the armed forces.'
Only loans that bore an interest rate of 4% or less were eligible for a VA
guarantee.
41
Between 1958 and 1983 the methodology for setting maximum interest
rates for VA and FHA loans varied, sometimes setting maximum permissible
rates by statute, sometimes tying the VA loanrates to the maximum permissible
FHA rates, and sometimes giving the agencies the ability to set rates for their
respective loan programs.42 This last methodology-allowing the agencies to
set maximum rates that could be readily changed through publication in the
Federal Register-was a product of the first "credit crunch" of the sort that
ultimately lead to deregulation of FHA and VA loan rates, as well as other
38. § 203(b)(5), 48 Stat. at 1248.
39. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, §§ 500, 501, 58
Stat. 284, 291-92.
40. Id.
41. § 500(c), 58 Stat. at 291. This 4% cap was retained in the 1945 amendments to
the Servicemen's ReadjustmentAct. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-268, § 8,59 Stat. 623,
626-27. In 1958 the VA was also authorized to make direct loans to veterans in some instances
at an interest rate to be set by the Administrator of the VA, but not to exceed the rate for VA
guaranteed loans. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 1811, 72 Stat. 1105, 1208 (now
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3711 (1994); formerly codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1811 (1958)). Rates under
this section are set in 38 C.F.R. § 36.4503 (1999). In 1970 the VA was authorized to guarantee
loans to enable veterans to buy manufactured homes and lots. Veterans' Housing Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-506, § 5, 84 Stat. 1108, 1110 (now codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3712 (1994); formerly
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1819 (1970)). The Administrator of the VA was given the power to set
maximum rates for loans to be eligible for guarantee under this program. See. 5, § 1819(f), 84
Stat. at 1112 (now codified at 38 U.S.C. § 3712(f) (1994); formerly codified at 38 U.S.C.
§ 1819(f) (1970)). Rates under this section are set in 38 C.F.R. § 36.4212 (1999).
42. In 1958 the VA Administrator was given the power to set the maximum interest
rate as high as 4.75% as long as the rate set did not exceed the rate allowed to be charged on
FHA loans, less one-half of 1%. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 1803,72 Stat. 1105,
1205. In 1959 Congress eliminated the requirement tying the maximum interest rate for VA
loans to the maximum rate set by the FHA and raised the maximum rate that the VA
Administrator could set to 5.25%. Act of June 30, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-73, § 2, 73 Stat. 156.
In 1966 Congress removed the 5.25% cap on VA loans and authorized the Administrator to set
the maximum interest rate on VA loans based on market demands. Veterans' Readjustment
Benefits Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-358, § 5(b), 80 Stat. 12, 26. However, rates set for VA
loans were once again tied to FHA rates, and could not exceed the maximum rate set for FHA
loans. Id. FHA loans were still capped at "5 per centum per annum... or not to exceed 6 per
centum per annum if the Administrator finds that in certain areas or under special circumstances
the mortgage market demands it." National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 203(b)(5), 48
Stat. 1246, 1248 (1934).
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mortgage loan rates. By 1966 interest rates had risen, and Congress was
concerned about the effect prevailing market rates were having on VA and
FHA loan availability. When market rates rose above the maximum rate
permitted to be charged by the National Housing Act of 1934 (5% or 6%),
participating lenders were charging higher points to originate VA and FHA
mortgages to increase their yield to market levels.4 ' By October of 1966 points
had risen from a typical charge of 2 points up to 7.5 points.44 In 1966 FHA
applications had declined from 1965 application rates by 36.5% for existing
homes and by 18.4% for new homes.45
The congressional response came in 1968, when Congress authorized the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to set maximum interest
rates on FHA loans at any rate that the Secretary found necessary to meet the
mortgage market.' Implicitly this meant that VA permissible rates would also
rise, because VA rates were, at the time, tied to FHA rates.47 This right was to
expire on October 1, 1969.4 However, the right was extended 24 times,
meaning the Secretary actually possessed it until 1983. 4 In 1973 the Secretary
of the VA was given similar authority to set VA rates based on the market that
43. S.REP.No. 1090 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1923, 1926.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Act of May 7, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-301, §3,82 Stat. 113, 113 (formerly codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1709-1 (1970)).
47. S.REP.No. 1090 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1923, 1928.
48. Id. In the interim a commission was established to "study mortgage interest rates
and to make recommendations to assure the availability ofan adequate supply of mortgage credit
at a reasonable cost to the consumer." § 4(b), 82 Stat. at 114.
49. § 3(a), 82 Stat. at 113; Housing and Urban DevelopmentAct of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-448, § 315, 82 Stat. 476, 512; Act of Sept. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-78, § 3, 83 Stat. 125, 125;
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 401, 83 Stat. 379, 394;
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 601, 84 Stat. 450, 461; Act of
Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92- 213, § 1, 85 Stat. 775, 775; Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
335, § 1, 86 Stat. 405,405; Act of Aug. 10, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-85, § 2, 87 Stat. 220, 220; Act
of Oct. 2, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-117, § 3, 87 Stat. 421, 422; Flood Disaster Protection Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, § 208, 87 Stat. 975, 984; Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 309(e), 317, 88 Stat. 633, 682, 685; Act of June 30, 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-60, § 2,91 Stat. 257,257; Act of July 31, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95- 80, § 2, 91 Stat. 339,
339; Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 302, 91 Stat.
1111, 1131; Act of Sept. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-406, § 2, 92 Stat. 879, 880; Housing and
Community Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, § 302,92 Stat. 2080,2096;
Act ofSept. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-71, § 2, 93 Stat. 501, 501; Act ofNov. 8, 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-105, § 2, 93 Stat. 794, 794; Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-153, § 302, 93 Stat. 1101, 1112; Act of Oct. 3, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-372, § 3, 94
Stat. 1363, 1364; Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399,
§§ 302,332,94 Stat. 1614,1638-39,1652-53; OmnibusBudgetReconciliationAct of1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-35, § 332, 95 Stat. 357, 413; Act of Oct. 6, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-289, § 2, 96 Stat.
1230, 1231; Act of May 26, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-35, § 2, 97 Stat. 197, 197; Act of Oct. 1, 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-109, § 2, 97 Stat. 745, 746.
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were not capped at the FHA maximum," although the VA was instructed to
"consult with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development regarding the
rate of interest the Secretary considers necessary to meet the mortgage market"
for FHA loans, and to "carry out a coordinated policy on interest rates" on VA
and FHA loans.51 By giving the Secretary of HUD, and ultimately the Secretary
of the VA, the right to move rates in conformity with the market, Congress
hoped to increase participation in the VA and FHA programs and to eliminate
the high points being charged for FHA and VA loans.
Thus, after 1973, maximum rates for FHA loans were set by the Secretary
of HUD pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1709-1,52 and maximum rates for VA loans
were set by the Administrator of the VA pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1803(c)(1).
5 3
This policy stayed in effect until 1983 for FHA loans and until 1992 for VA
loans, when all effective interest rate caps on these loans were eliminated.
In 1983 Congress eliminated the FHA's regulation of interest rates charged
on FHA loans, changing the interest rate ceiling from any rate that the
Secretary found necessary to meet the mortgage market 4 to a maximum rate
as agreed upon by the mortgagor and mortgagee. 5
Similarly, in 1992 Congress gave the VA Secretary the power either to set
maximum interest rates after merely consulting with HUD regarding interest
rate caps for FHA loans, or to cap rates at the amount "agreed upon by the
veteran and the mortgagee."' 6 This change was made because Congress
perceived that an administered rate hurt veterans trying to purchase a home. 7
50. Act of July 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-75, 87 Stat. 176, 176. For an example of the
VA changing the maximum rate, see Increase in Maximum Permissible Interest Rate, Final
Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 56,343 (1980) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 36).
51. 87 Stat. at 176.
52. Act of May 7, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-301, §3,82 Stat. 113, 113 (formerly codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1709-1 (1970)).
53. 87 Stat. at 176. This section was recodified to 38 U.S.C. § 3703(c)(1) (1994), its
current placement, in 1991. Department of Veterans' Affairs Codification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
83, § 5(b)(1), 105 Stat. 378,406 (1991).
54. § 3, 82 Stat. at 113.
55. Act of Nov. 30, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 404(b)(3), 97 Stat. 1153, 1209
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(5) (1994)).
56. Veterans' Home Loan Program Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-547,
§ 10(a), 106 Stat. 3633,3643 (codified at38 U.S.C. § 3703(c)(4)(A)(i) (1994)). This statute was
originally set to expire on December 31, 1995. §10(a)(2), 106 Stat. at 3643. However, in
February 1996 Congress repealed the expiration provision. Act of Feb. 13, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-110, § 101(d), 110 Stat. 768, 768. The Secretary of the VA has continued to set rates for
direct loans pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 3711 (1994). See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 36.4503 (1999) (setting
the rate at 9% for home improvement loans from the VA and at 7.5% for direct VA loans).
57. S. REP. No. 102-405, at 14 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220,3229.
Congress perceived that when the market rate rose higher than the maximum VA rate, lenders
were charging substantial points, which the VA rules required the seller to pay. Thus, sellers
were raising the price of homes when they sold to buyers using VA loans. Id. Likewise, when
the market rate fell below the maximum VA rate allowed, a contract for sale was signed, and the
VA then adjusted its rates downward to below market rates, points were also required to be paid
on loans. Some sellers with the option to do so canceled contracts because the points, which the
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It was believed that a market rate standard would assure that sellers would
continue to sell to veterans using VA loans, and would "ultimately reduce
veterans' costs for housing.""8 Congress also sought to protect against
predatory interest rates by allowing the VA to adopt a maximum rate rather
than using the agreed-to rate rule if it became necessary,59 and the Committee
report expressed the Committee's belief that the highly competitive mortgage
market would serve to control interest rates.
6
0
The VA regulation allowing VA loans to bear interest at a rate agreed
upon by the veteran and the mortgagee was made final on July 26, 1995, and
the rate rule has not changed since that time. s'
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE INTEREST RATE REGULATION
A. Federal Preemption ofFHA Loans and VA Loans
1. State Usury Law and FIA/VA Loans
In addition to being controlled by agency-dictated rate ceilings, FHA and
VA loans were also subject to state interest rate caps between 1958 and 1979,
unless a state's usury provision specifically exempted such mortgages from the
state's usury laws. Thus, from the inception of these two loan programs until
1979, the interest rate that lenders could charge for FHA and VA loans was
effectively capped at whichever was the lowest rate, the VA/FHA rate or the
state usury rate.
2. The 1976 California Preemption
In 1975 the maximum rate that could be charged on a VA loan was
between 8% and 9%, and during the first half of 1976 the maximum rate was
between 8.5% and 9%.62 At the same time, contract mortgage rates on
conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgages varied between 8.82% and 9.43%
in 1975 and between 8.73% and 9.02% in 1976.63
At this time mortgage bankers in California were subject to a 10%
seller was obligated to pay, decreased the value to the seller. Id.
58. S. REP. No. 102-405, at 15 (1992) reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3230.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Loan Guaranty: Implementation of Public Law 102-547, Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg.
38,256 (1995). This, too, applied to both regularly guaranteed loans under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4311
(1999) and guaranteed loans for manufactured homes under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4212 (1999).
62. S. REP. No. 94-806, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1344, 1348.
Maximum FHA rates would have been approximately the same because rates were setby the VA
and FHA in consultation with each other. Act of July 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-75, 87 Stat. 176.
63. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Contract Mortgage Rates, 30-Year
Fixed-Rate Mortgage (visited September 19, 1999)
<http://www.mbaa.org/marketdata/data99/30fr-m_1.html>.
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constitutional usury ceiling that had been in existence since 1934. However,
commercial lenders such as banks and savings and loan associations were
exempt from this restriction.' As interest rates rose close to the 10% usury
ceiling in the 1970s, California mortgage bankers were forced out of the
mortgage industry, unable to compete with lenders not subject to the 10% cap.65
At the time, mortgage bankers were responsible for originating 80% of FHA
and VA mortgages."6 Thus, a reduction in the number of mortgage bankers
making loans in California had the effect of drastically reducing the total
number of FHA/VA loan originations in California.67
For its part, the State of California seemed unable to raise its usury limit.
Because the usury provision had been included in the constitution, rather than
in the state code, amending the usury provision required a statewide vote.6"
Furthermore, simply getting the matter on a ballot required a two-thirds vote
of the legislature or a referendum requested by a petition of at least 500,000
registered voters.6 9 Unable to get the matter on the ballot in the prescribed
ways,70 the California Legislature adopted a resolution on April 16, 1975
essentially asking for Congress's help in extracting California from its
constitutional shackles."
Congress's response to California's request was PublicLaw 94-324, which
preempted the provisions of any state constitution or law limiting the amount
of interest that could be charged for an FHA or VA loan by certain classes of
lenders.72 The statute specifically targeted the situation in California.73
64. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XX, § 22 (1934), now codified at CAL. CONST. of 1879,
art. XV, § 1 (1976); Committee Against Unfair Interest Limitations v. State, 157 Cal. Rptr. 543,
548 (Ct. App. 1979); S. REP. No. 94-806, at 17-18. The lenders exempt from the 10%
constitutional cap were nevertheless regulated by the legislature. Committee Against Unfair
Interest Limitations, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 549. In 1979 the people of California exempted real estate
brokers from the 10% rate cap in a statewide election held on November 6, 1979. CAL. CONST.
of 1879, art. XV § 1 (1976) (historical note).
65. S.REP.NO. 94-806, at 18.
66. Id.
67. Id. (indicating that "mortgage activity is reduced by 70 percent when the FHA/VA
interest rate reaches 9.5% in California").
68. Id. at 19.
69. Id.
70. Three attempts were made to amend the constitution, one in 1970 and two in
1976. All three failed. Committee Against Unfair Interest Limitations v. State, 157 Cal. Rptr.
543, 549 (Ct. App. 1979).
71. See S. REP. No. 94-806, at 19. The resolution specifically asked for preemption
of California's usury limit for all mortgages or deeds of trust that were insured by the FRA or
VA, or which were intended for delivery to a governmental secondary market support institution
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Id.
72. Act of June 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-324, § 8, 90 Stat. 720, 722 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1709-1a (1994) (effective June 30, 1976)).
73. S. REP. No. 94-806, at 17. Indeed, the Chairman and Ranking Minority members
of the Subcommittee on Housing and the Chairman and Ranking Minority members of the full
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee all assented to the bill being considered solely
by the Veterans' Affairs Committee based on their understanding that the bill affected only
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Interestingly, the statute gave states the ability to override the preemption by
adopting a new state statute limiting the amount of interest that could be
charged in VA and FHA loans.74 This, of course, had the effect of putting the
California legislature back in the driver's seat and allowing any other state
unexpectedly affected to escape the federal preemption.
3. The 1979 "Arkansas" Preemption
By the late 1970s interest rates had risen quite significantly.75 In response
to this rise in interest rates, the VA and FHA continually raised their rate
ceilings.76 By January of 1979 the maximum VA rate was 9.5%.77 Lenders were
still requiring an average of five discount points on 9.5% VA and FHA
contracts, which translated into higher prices being paid by buyers.7 ' At the
same time, several states had either constitutional or statutory rate ceilings near
10%. 7' As explained above, these state rate limits were also applicable to FHA
and VA mortgages, unless such mortgages were specifically excluded from the
state's usury laws. At the time, the State of Arkansas had a 10% constitutional
cap on all loans." It was this 10% cap in Arkansas that once again led Congress
down the road of state usury rate preemption."
California. Id. at 32.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1709-la(b) (1994).
75. For example, the Federal Reserve discount rate at which depository institutions
borrowed from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for 1975 was 6.25%. The rate was 5.5%
in 1976, 5.46% in 1977, and 7.46% in 1978. By 1979 it had shot up to 10.29%, in 1980 it was
11.77%, in 1981 it was 13.42%, and in 1982 it was 11.01%. Federal Reserve Board, Discount
Rate (visited Jan. 4, 2000) <http:llwww.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data/a/dwb.txt>.
Mortgage contract interest rates on thirty year conventional fixed mortgages averaged 9.04% in
1975, 8.86% in 1976, 8.84% in 1977, 9.63% in 1978, 11.19% in 1979, and 13.77% in 1980.
Federal Reserve Board, 30-Year Conventional Mortgages, Fixed-Rate (visited Jan. 4, 2000)
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/releaseslH15/data/a/cm.txt>.
76. For changes to the VA rate, see 41 Fed. Reg. 47,049 (Oct. 27, 1976) (lowering
the rate to 8%); 42 Fed. Reg. 28883 (June 6, 1977) (raising the rate to 8.5%); 43 Fed. Reg. 9274
(Mar. 7, 1978) (raising the rate to 8.75%); 43 Fed. Reg. 22717 (May 26, 1978) (raising the rate
to 9%); 43 Fed. Reg. 29,001 (July 5, 1978) (raising the rate to 9.5%); 44 Fed. Reg. 24,555 (Apr.
26, 1979) (raising the rate to 10%); 44 Fed. Reg. 56,330 (Oct. 1, 1979) (raising the rate to
10.5%); 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510 (Oct. 31, 1979) (raising the rate to 11.5%).
77. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,001 (changing the rate to 9.5% on July 5, 1978). The FHA rate
at the time would have been approximately the same since it was set after consultation with the
Administrator of the VA. See Act of July 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-75, 87 Stat. 176.
78. David F. Seiders, Recent Developments in Mortgage and Housing Markets, 65
FED. R s. BuLL. 173, 180 (1979) [hereinafter Seiders, Recent Developments].
79. For a chart setting forth mortgage interest rate limits in 1979, see Usury Lending
Limits: Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 96th
Cong. 164-70 (1979).
80. Anx. CONST. of 1874, art. XIX, § 13.
81. H. R. REP. No. 96-137, at2 (1979).
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In January of 1979, with conventional mortgage rates at 10.39%,82 VA
rates at 9.5%,83 and a home-state constitutional usury cap of 10%, Congressman
John Paul Hammerschmidt (R-Ark.) introduced H.R. 411 in the United States
House of Representatives. t The bill provided that constitutional-and only
constitutional--state usury limits, and corresponding statutes in those states
with constitutional limits, would not apply to loans guaranteed or made by the
VA's The bill also provided that the preemption contained in the bill would
remain effective until an affected state adopted a new statute specifically
limiting the amount of interest that could be charged on VA loans.86 Once
again, as with the 1976 preemption directed at California, the effect of this
bill's passage would have been to put the power to determine usury limits in the
hands of the state legislature, without state constitutional restraints.87
When H.R. 411 emerged from the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs
on May 10, 1979,88 VA rates had just been increased to 10%."9 The Committee
issued a report clarifying that the bill was intended to specifically address the
constitutional restriction in Arkansas. The report also emphasized that Arkansas
would be the only state affected by the bill.90 On June 25, 1979, the bill passed
the House after very little debate and with virtually no opposition. The lone
dissenter was Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.), who worried that
Congress was "authorizing exorbitant and usurious interest rates." After
adoption, H.R. 411 was referred to the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
Also in May of 1979, several Representatives introduced in the House a
bill providing that state usury laws, whether statutory or constitutional, would
not apply to FHA loans.9 An identical measure was introduced in the Senate.'
Both bills permitted states to override the federal preemption by adopting a
statute regulating FHA rates.93 In its report to the Senate, the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs indicated that the preemption was
necessary because state usury laws were limiting access to FHA programs for
82. Mortgage Bankers Association Contract Mortgage Rates, 30-Year Fixed-Rate
Mortgage Contract Rates (visited Sept. 19, 1999)
<http:llwww.mbaa.orglmarketdataldata99/30frm l.htil>. The rates in November and
December of 1978 were also above 10%, with a conventional thirty-year mortgage rate of
10.11% in November of 1978 and a rate of 10.35% in December of that year. Id.
83. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,001 (1978).
84. 125 CONG. REc. 443 (1979).
85. H.R. 411, 96th Cong. § 1 (1979).
86. H.R. 411 §2.
87. H.R. REP. No. 96-137, at2 (1979).
88. 125 CONG. REc. 10742 (1979).
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,554, 24,555 (1979).
90. H.R. REP. No. 96-137, at 2. Interestingly, the Veterans' Admin-
istration opposed the bill: "We do not believe it is appropriate for the Congress
to enact Federal legislation to remedy this problem which is caused by a State
constitution, and for which corrective procedures exist within the State." Id. at 4.
91. H.R. 3875, 96th Cong. § 311 (1979).
92. S. 1149, 96th Cong. § 319 (1979).
93. H.R. 3875 § 311; S. 1149 § 319 (1979).
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low and moderate income families.94 Regarding the effect preempting state
usury laws would have on protecting consumers, the Senate report states:
The primary purpose of these statutes, which is to protect
consumers from usury, is served by having the Secretary
administer the FHA interest rate, which is intended to assure
a rate that is fair to both lenders and consumers. As further
protection, the section would allow States to reenact a usury
limit applicable to FHA mortgages ......
The House bill containing the FHA usury preemption (H.R. 3875) passed
the House on June 7, 197996 after four days of debate and no mention of the
usury provision. 7
The Senate FHA preemption bill (S. 1149) passed the Senate as part of the
Senate's amendments to the House FHA bill on July 13, 1979.9s During debate
on the Senate bill, Senator Robert Morgan (D-NC) introduced an amendment
to strike the usury preemption provision." Senator Morgan's opposition to the
bill was based primarily on federalism, rather than consumer protection
concems."c But other Senators disagreed, believing that because state usury
limits had paralyzed mortgage lending and affected the FHA program, this was
an appropriate issue for the federal government."' Senator Pryor advocated the
need to act immediately because states such as Arkansas did not have time,
94. S. REP. No. 96-164, at 22 (1979).
95. Id. Senator Cranston made a similar assurance of rate regulation by the VA on
Nov. 15, 1979.125 CONG. REc. 32,592 (1979). The House conference committee made another
reference to FHA rate regulation atH.R. CoNF. REP.No. 96-706, at 61 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2402, 2420. However, the FHA stopped setting FHA rate limits in 1983. Act of
Nov. 30, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 404,97 Stat. 1153. The VA likewise stopped setting VA
rate limits in 1992. Veterans' Home Loan Program Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-547,
§ 10, 106 Stat. 3633, 3643.
96. 125 CONG. REC. 13,951 (1979).
97. Id. 13,166-73, 13,331-62, 13,616-48, 13,924-52.
98. The Senate preemption provision was originally contained in S. 1149,96th Cong.
§ 319 (1979). However, on July 13, 1979 the Senate took up the House FHA preemption bill
(H.R. 3875), struck the text as adopted by the House, and replaced it with several Senate bills,
including S. 1149. The FHA usury preemption provision thus emerged from the Senate on July
13, 1979 as § 320 of H.R. 3875, 96th Cong. (1979). Id. at 18,552-57 (1979). The Senate then
indefinitely postponed S. 1149. Id. at 18,560. Debate on the bill tookplace on July 12-13, 1979.
Id. at 18,211-20, 18,497-561.
99. Id. 125 CONG. REC. 18,542 (introducing amendment 348).
100. Id. (statement of'Sen. Morgan). Senator Morgan felt that ifstate usury laws were
impeding access to FHA programs, the proper remedy was to "let the Secretary of HUD go to
the Governors-most of ceilings are statutory enactments not constitutional matters-go and
persuade the people of the States to see that we need to remove these usury limitations." Id. at
18,543.
101. Id. at 18,544 (statement of Sen. Proxmire); id. at 18,548 (statement of Sen.
Pryor) (referring to Arkansas as a place in which mortgage lending had stopped because of a
10% usury cap and comparable VA and FHA rate limits).
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given the cumbersome constitutional amendment process, to remedy the
interest rate situation quickly enough."° Some Senators believed that if
Congress did not act there would be a financial crisis in states with a 10% usury
ceiling.0 3 Federalism concerns did not bother other Senators because states had
the right to reenact their own usury limits after adoption of the bill. es
Ultimately, the amendment to strike the preemption provision was defeated by
a vote of 62 to 20.105 A few days later the House disagreed with the Senate
amendments and the bill, with the preemption provision, was sent to a
conference conmnittee.'"
In the meantime, on June 14, 1979 the Senate Committee on Veterans'
Affairs began considering H.R. 411, the bill that had been introduced in
response to Arkansas' constitutional usury ceiling. 7 The Senate Committee
issued its report on H.R. 411 on July 27, 1979."8 Ultimately, the Senate
Committee expanded the constitutional VA preemption contained in H.R. 411
so that it preempted both constitutional and statutory usury provisions. 9 The
new, expanded version was included as part of another bill, S. 689, which
previously had no preemption provision. Senate bill 689 made preemption of
state rates for VA loans dependent on preemption of state rates for FHA
loans. "0 Thus, S. 689 provided that state usury limits would not apply to VA
loans if they did not apply to FHA loans."' The Committee explained that it
tied VA preemption to FHA preemption to promote "a coordinated Federal
policy with regard to the application of State anti-usury provisions to FHA and
VA home loans."". The full Senate adopted this provision on August 3,
1979. 13 Oddly enough, during debate on this bill-which now preempted usury
provisions that were both statutory and constitutional-several references were
made to the constitutional situation in Arkansas as if only that state would be
102. Id. at 18,543 (statement of Sen. Pryor). Senator Pryor indicated that, at the
earliest, Arkansas would have its constitutional usury limit fixed by November of 1980 and that
the citizens of Arkansas needed relief before that time. Id.
103. Id. at 18,544 (statement of Sen. Pryor) (stating that if the usury provision is
stricken "we will see a financial crisis in States that have a 10 percent usury ceiling, because we
will see mortgage money totally stopped. It is just about stopped right now, and in days or weeks
it will be cut off from some very deserving people.").
104. Id. at 18,543-44 (statements of Sens. Garn, Pryor, and Proxmire).
105. Id. at 18,545.
106. Id. at 19,072.
107. S. REp. No. 96-260, at 9 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1894, 1895.
108. Id. at I.
109. 125 CONG. REc. 21,114 (1979); S. REP. No. 96-260, at 9-11 (1979), reprinted
in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1894, 1895.
110. Id.
I ll. S. REP. No. 96-260, at 11.
112. Id. at 31; accord, 125 CONG. REc. 22,603 (1979) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
113. 125 CONG. REC. 22,606 (1979). The text of S. 689 was adopted by the Senate as
replacement text for another House Bill, H.R. 2282, that had no preemption provision. Id. The
preemption provision ended up as Section 401 of H.R. 2282, as adopted by the Senate, and S.
689 was indefinitely postponed. Id.
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affected by the bill.'14 Ultimately, the VA preemption provision, preempting
both statutory and constitutional usury limits and tying VA preemption to FHA
preemption, was adoptedby Congress in mid-November 15 after slight changes
by both the House and the Senate.'
114. Id. at 22,603. Senator Simpson stated:
The enactment of this provision together with
enactment of H.R. 3875 ... would permit veterans of
the State of Arkansas and other States to make use of
their loan-guaranty entitlement in fiscal year 1980.
The need for this legislation has evolved at this time
because of the anti-usury prohibition in the State of
Arkansas, where the State constitutional bar, which
can be removed only through cumbersome
amendatory procedures, has brought VA loan activity
in that State to a halt.
Id. A similar statement is contained in the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of costs of
the bill:
According to VA information, only the State of
Arkansas would be significantly affected by this
amendment. Other States either have State laws that
exempt Federal home loan programs from the
restrictions of their usury laws or have interest
ceilings high enough to avoid conflict with current
interest rates. Although enactment of the provision
would increase loan activity in Arkansas, the increase
should not significantly raise total program costs.
Id. at 22,595.
115. Veterans' Disability Compensation and Survivors' Benefits Amendments of
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-128, § 401(a), 93 Stat. 982, 986-87 (originally codified at 38 U.S.C.
§ 1828, now codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 3728 (1994)). The preemption portion of the
statute, as adopted, reads as follows:
If, under any law of the United States, loans and
mortgages insured under title I or title II of the
National Housing Act are exempt from the
application of the provisions of any State constitution
or law limiting the rate or amount ofinterest, discount
points, or other charges which may be charged, taken,
received, or reserved by lenders .... then loans
guaranteed or insured under this chapter are also
exempt from the application of such provisions.
38 U.S.C. § 3728. This statute has been amended twice since 1979. The first amendment, the
Veterans' Disability Compensation, Housing, and Memorial Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-66, § 501(b), 95 Stat. 1026, 1032, was adopted "to extend the exemption [of VA
guaranteed loans from state anti-usury laws] to include exemptions from state laws that restrict
the manner of calculating interest (including prohibition of the charging of interest on interest)
and require a minimum amortization of principal." S. REP. No. 97-153, at 55 (1981), reprinted
in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1595, 1640. The second amendment merely recodified the section.
Department of Veterans' Affairs Codification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-83, 105 Stat. 378 (1991).
116. On October 30, 1979 the House considered H.R. 2282 as passed by the Senate
and amended it slightly. 125 CONG. REc. 30,154-67 (1979). On November 15, 1979 the Senate
made its own slight changes to H.R. 2282. See id. at 32,589-99, a portion of which is reprinted
at 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1966-67. On November 16, 1979 the House agreed to the Senate
18
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The FHA preemption provision, on which the VA preemption provision
as passed by Congress depended, was still in conference committee at the time
that the VA preemption provision passed. Finally, in mid-December of 1979
the bill containing the FHA preemption provision (H.R. 3875) was reported out
of the conference committee and passed both Houses of Congress. 17 The only
mention of the usury provision in either House was a short statement by
Senator Williams that "[t]he conference report also overrides State usury
limitations for FHA programs. This is necessary to prevent the shutdown of
FHA in a number of States in which the FHA rate currently exceeds the State
usury ceiling.""' 8 Only the House Conference Report on the bill contained any
mention of consumer protection concerns following the preemption of state
usury laws, and this only addressed concerns about inclusion of installment
credit sales contracts for mobile homes in the preemption:
[T]he conferees note that with respect to ... contracts used to
finance mobile homes under Title I of the National Housing
Act, FHA regulations already provide significant protections
by prohibiting both the Rule of 78 and balloon payments, and
by limiting late charges. FHA also provides an interest rate
ceiling." 9
amendments and the bill was sent to the President for signature. 125 CONG. REc. 32,837 (1979).
117. Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
153, § 308, 93 Stat. 1101, 1113. The preemption portion of the statute as adopted reads as
follows:
(a)Theprovisions ofthe constitutionofany
State expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest,
discount points, or other charges which may be
charged, taken, received, or reserved by lenders and
the provisions of any State law expressly limiting the
rate or amount of interest, discount points, or other
charges which may be charged, taken, received, or
reserved shall not apply to any loan, mortgage, or
advance which is insured under title I or 11 of this
Act.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall
apply to loans, mortgages, or advances made or
executed in any State until the effective date (after the
date of enactment of this section) of a provision of
law of that State limiting the rate or amount of
interest, discount points, or other charges on any such
loan, mortgage, or advance.
Id. See H.R. 3875, as reported out of the conference committee, was debated by and passed the
Senate on December 18, 1979. Id.; 125 CONG. Rnc. 36,608-12 (1979). H.R. 3875, as reported
out of the conference committee, passed the House on December 19, 1979. § 308, 93 Stat. at
1113; 125 CONG. REC. 37,128 (1979).
118. 125 CONG. REc. 36,609 (1979) (statement of Sen. Williams).
119. H.R. CoNF.REP.No. 96-706, at6l (1979),reprintedin 1979U.S.C.C.A.N. 2402,
2420.
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Thus, by the end of 1979 state usury ceilings were preempted for both VA
and FHA loans. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, from 1979 until 1983 the
Secretary ofHUD set FHA maximum loan interest rates,'20 and from 1979 until
1992 the Administrator of the VA set VA maximum loan interest rates after
consultation with the HUD Secretary.' 2 ' Therefore, even though state rate
regulation was preempted, federal agencies still regulated FHA and VA rates
during this period.
The combined effect of the 1979 preemption of state usury ceilings and the
1983 and 1992 deregulation of FHA and VA interest rates was to remove any
cap on interest rates for FHA and VA loan interest rates. Such rates are now
set without regulation, except in states that adopted usury limits applicable to
VA and FHA mortgages after the 1976 or 1979 enactments.12
B. Federal Preemption of Non-FHA and VA Home-Secured Loans:
DIDMCA
1. Scope of DIDMCA Mortgage Rate Preemption
The third and final mortgage rate preemption adopted by Congress in 1979
was the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 (DIDMCA).'2 This statute was much more far-reaching than the FHA
and VA preemptions in scope, and is the statute that ultimately set the stage for
the subprime home equity lending industry of today. 24 DIDMCA provided for
the following:
The provisions of the constitution or the laws of any State
expressly limiting the rate or amount of interest, discount
points, finance charges, or other charges which may be
charged, taken, received, or reserved shall not apply to any
120. Act of May 7, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-301, § 3, 82 Stat. 113 (formerly codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1709-1).
121. Act of July 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-75, 87 Stat. 176. This section was re-
codified to 38 U.S.C. § 3703, its current placement, in 1991. Department of Veterans' Affairs
Codification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-83, § 5(b)(1), 105 Stat. 406 (1991).
122. Determining if a particular state has opted out of VA and FHA preemption is
sometimes a difficult matter. See generally KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART,
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES,
§ 3.6 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
123. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, § 501(a), 94 Stat. 132, 161-62 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a
(1994)). A temporary and almost identical version of this provision was adopted in 1979. Act
of Dec. 28,1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, § 105(a)(1), 93 Stat. 1233, 1234. This temporary provision
expired on March 31, 1980. § 105(d), 93 Stat. at 1235.
124. For a discussion of which preemption applies in VA/FHA/DIDMCA overlap
loans, see Burnis v. First Fin. Corp., 928 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1991); Doyle v. Southern Guar.
Corp., 795 F.2d 907 (1 th Cir. 1986), certfing questions to Georgia Supreme Court, Southern
Guar. Corp. v. Doyle, 353 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 1987).
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loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance which is-
(A) secured by a first lien on residential real property, by a
first lien on stock in a residential cooperative housing
corporation where the loan, mortgage, or advance is used to
finance the acquisition of such stock, or by a first lien on a
residential manufactured home;
(B) made after March 31, 1980; and
(C) described in section 527(b) of the National Housing Act
(12 U.S.C. 1735f- 5(b))...125
By its reference to section 527(b) of the National Housing Act,' 26 the
statute covers any mortgage, loan, or advance that:
(b)(2)(A) is made in whole or in part by any lender the
deposits or accounts of which are insured by any agency of
the Federal Government, or is made in whole or in part by
any lender which is itself regulated by any agency of the
Federal Government; or
(B) is made in whole or in part, or insured, guaranteed,
supplemented, or assisted in any way, by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development or any other officer or
agency of the Federal Government or under or in counection
with a housing or urban development program administered
by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or a
housing or related program administered by any other such
officer or agency; or
(C) is eligible for purchase by the Federal National Mortgage
Association, the GovernmentNational Mortgage Association,
or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or from
any financial institution from which it could be purchased by
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; or
(D) is made in whole or in part by any "creditor," as defined
in section 1602(f) of Title 15,27 who makes or invests in
residential real estate loans aggregating more than $1,000,000
per year.'
28
The statute also covers "any lender approved by the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development for participation in any mortgage insurance program under
125. § 501(a), 94 Stat. at 161. The final version clarified that the preemption also
applied to loans or credit sales secured by a first lien on residential manufactured homes and to
stock in coops. § 501(a)(1)(C)(ii)-(v), 94 Stat. at 161.
126. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5 (1994).
127. This refers to the definition of a "creditor" in the Truth in Lending Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17) (1999).
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5(b)(2) (1994).
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the National Housing Act."'29
This bill andits temporarypredecessor, enacted inNovember 1979,131 were
passed in an era of record-high interest rates.' At the same time, mortgage
interest rate ceilings, which were controlled by state law, were in some cases
far below market interest rates, although this was not the case in many states.1
32
Thus, lenders were unable to make loans at prevailing interest rates because of
usury ceilings that had been adopted before the advent of double-digit interest
rates and had not yet been amended. In some cases these state usury limits
were constitutional, but in most they were statutory. 33 The disparity between
interest rate ceilings and market rates above those ceilings made lenders unable
and unwilling to make mortgage loans in states with low ceilings. In some
cases lenders invested in mortgages in states with higher ceilings.1 34 This meant
that mortgage money was unavailable in states with low usury ceilings.
Some states responded to this crunch by raising or eliminating their usury
ceilings. 135 Nevertheless, not all states did so. It is this predicament that is most
129. § 501(a)(1)(C)(vi), 94 Stat. at 161.
130. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, § 105(a)(1), 93 Stat. 1233, 1234
(codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. § 1235f-7 (1994)).
131. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
132. Seiders, Recent Developments, supra note 78, at 180. One would think, based
on the DIDMCA congressional debate, that such limits were in place in a majority of states. In
fact, only about one-third of all states had rate ceilings "below national-average mortgage
yields." Id. at 180. Additionally, by October 1979 sixteen states had a residential rate limit that
floated above a designated market rate, eleven states had no rate limit on residential mortgages,
one state had a 21% limit, and four states had an 18% limit. Usury Lending Limits: Hearings on
S. 1988, supra note 79, at 164-70.
133. Usury Lending Limits: Hearings on S. 1988, supra note 79, at 164-70.
134. Seiders, Recent Developments, supra note 78, at 180-81.
135. S. REP.No. 96-368, at41 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236,272,277
(Additional Views of Sen. Morgan). Senator Morgan explained:
Reflective of state concern in this area is the fact that
during the period from December 1975 to June 1979
some 28 States liberalized their usury ceilings on
individual or corporate loans in efforts to meet
changing economic conditions. During this same
period some 15 States exempted from their usury
ceilings FHA and/or VA loans.
Id.; see also 125 CONG. REc. 29,111 (1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan) ("[D]uring the period
from 1975 to 1979, 28 States liberalized their usury ceilings ... in efforts to meet changing
economic conditions."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years oflneptitude: The Need
for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home
Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1107-08 & n.82 (1984) (reporting that in the
mid-1970s Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia responded to
rising interest rates by abolishing their usury ceilings and that Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois,
Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin did the same after 1979); id.
at 1108 & n.83 (reporting that by 1978 Alaska, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania had adopted
interest rate ceilings that floated above an identified market index, and that in the next two years
California, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and West Virginia did the same); Charles Luckett, Recent
Financial Behavior of Households, 66 FED. REs. BULL. 437, 439 (1980) [hereinafter Luckett,
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often remembered as the impetus for the 1979 and 1980 first-lien preemption
now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a, and most certainly this predicament
played a role in Congress's decision to preempt state usury laws in mortgage
loans. 36 However, the 1979 and 1980 preemptions were prompted primarily
by congressional concerns about the solvency of the savings and loan
industry.
137
2. The Legislative History of DIDMCA
The story of how the first-lien preemption provision became part of H.R.
4986, the bill that ultimately became DIDMCA, is fraught with political
wrangling between the House and the Senate. When H.R. 4986 was introduced
in the House of Representatives on July 27, 1979,' 38 it was meant to address
only those financial institution issues raised in the April 20, 1979 decision of
the D.C. Circuit in American Bankers Assoc. v. Connell.39 In that case, the
D.C. Circuit held that in authorizing several types of customer deposit accounts
at regulated financial institutions, federal regulators had exceeded their
statutory authority."4 Because many financial institutions had already set up
Recent Financial Behavior]. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 23, 1980, ch. 200, § 1, 1980 Ariz. Sess. Laws
567, 568 (repealing interest rate limitations); 1974 Pa. Laws 13, No. 6, §§ 301, 603 (repealing
41 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3 (1971), which setmaximum rates forresidential mortgages, and enacting
41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301 (1999), which set a floating rate ceiling for residential
mortgages).
136. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 28,316 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("This
legislation also preempts Statehome mortgage lending limits which are responsible formortgage
money drying up in many areas of the country.").
137. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
138. 125 CONG. REc. 21,052 (1979).
139. 686 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see also 125 CONG. REC. 23,791
(1979) (statement of Rep. St. Germain) ("H.R. 4986, as reported by your Banling Committee,
meets the court's instructions and assures that millions of consumer accounts will not be closed
down at 12:01 a.m., January 1 [1980].").
140. American Bankers, 686 F.2d at 954. The deposit accounts affected by the
opinion are described in the Senate Report to accompany H.R. 4986 as follows:
In order to provide the consumer with a more
competitive and efficient service, the regulatory
authorities by regulation permitted financial
institutions to offer interestbearing checking account
type services nationwide. The bank regulatory
agencies permitted insured banks to offer the
consumer automatic transfer service from savings
accounts to checking accounts ("ATS"); the F-LBB
permitted Federal savings and loan associations to
allow consumers to make savings deposits and
withdrawals from off-premises remote electronic
service units in some cases located in various retail
stores. The National Credit Union Administration
authorized Federal credit unions the power to offer
interest bearing checking accounts: These accounts
23
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the accounts that were declared unauthorized by Congress, the D.C. Circuit
gave Congress until December 31, 1979 to authorize the accounts before the
effects of the opinion would become operative. 4' If Congress failed to
authorize the relevant accounts before December 31, "millions of consumers
[would have had] their financial accounts abruptly terminated."'42
The House version of H.R. 4986 addressed only the issues raised by the
court's opinion in American Bankers.'43 It did not contain any provisions
relating to home mortgage loans. This bill was debated and passed by the
House on September 10-11, 1979. 4
When the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
reported H.R. 4986 out of committee on October 15, 1979141 it had attached to
it a host of other provisions, including the first-lien preemption.'46 As detailed
below, these other provisions explain in large part why the bill contained a
first-lien preemption provision.47
The bill as reported out of the Senate Committee contained several
are called share draft accounts and are equivalent to
the NOW [negotiable order-of-withdrawal] accounts
offered by banks and thrifts.
S. REP. No. 96-368, at 5.
141. 686 F.2d at 955. The court found the regulations outside of statutory authority,
but stayed the effectiveness of the judgment until January 1, 1980 "in the expectation that
Congress will declare its will upon these matters." Id.
142. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 6. The depositors affected included "900,000 individuals
with share draft accounts at nearly 1,000 federal credit unions; 750,000 individuals with $6
billion in automatic transfer accounts at commercial banks; and 700,000 individuals with
accounts accessible by savings and loan remote service units." Id. The urgent action required by
Congress is discussed at times during the floor debate on the various bills that are discussed in
this part of this article (H.R. 4986, S. 1347, H.R. 4998). See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. 30,288 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Morgan).
143. American Bankers, 686 F.2d 953.
144. 125 CONG. REc. 23,790-801 (1979); id. at 24,026-27.
145. S. REP.No. 96-368 (1979). H.R. 4986 hadbeen referred to that Committee from
the House on September 13, 1979. 125 CONG. REc. 24,391-92 (1979).
146. The first-lien preemption provision was reported outofcommittee as section 305
of H.R. 4986. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 23. The provision had originally been included as section
303 of S. 1347, which was introduced in the Senate on June 14, 1979 by Senator Cranston and
referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 125 CONG. REC.
14,866-67. Rather than report this bill out of committee, the Senate Committee attached the
provisions of S. 1347 to H.R. 4986. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 1, 4.
147. The House did not react well to the Senate's placement of the preemption and
other provisions with H.R. 4986. On October 17, 1979, Congressman St. Germain sent a letter
to Senators Proxmire and Cranston complaining that the Senate Committee had in essence taken
unfair advantage of the urgent need to address the D.C. Circuit's opinion by including in its
version of the bill a far-reaching restructuring of financial institutions that the House had not
adequately studied. He urged the Senate to only address the issues raised by the American
Banker opinion, stating, "I have repeatedly assured my Colleagues in the Subcommittee, the full
Committee and on the House floor that we were dealing with the share draft-NOW account issue
and not using this as a stalking horse for other issues." Letter from Rep. St. Germain to Sens.
Proxmire and Cranston (October 17, 1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. 29,106 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Morgan).
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provisions relating to savings and loan institutions which would significantly
increase their operating costs. First, the legislation as passed by the Senate
eliminated then-existing Regulation Q. Regulation Q limited the amount of
interest that banks and savings and loans could pay on deposit accounts, and
allowed savings and loans to compete for deposit funds by paying one-fourth
of 1% more than banks.'" At the time the bill was introduced, the rate cap for
savings and loans was 5.5 % and the rate cap for banks was 5.25%, 14 9 while
other depository and investment options were paying much more. This
provision would have increased costs to savings and loans, because after
elimination of Regulation Q they would have to pay higher interest on deposits
and would lose their one-fourth of 1% competitive edge over banks.
Additionally, the bill allowed deposit institutions to offer money market
certificates for $1,000. '50 Previously, the minimum investment required for a
money market certificate was $10,000.'"' This provision, too, would increase
costs to savings and loans because more depositors would invest in higher
interest money market certificates, requiring even more interest to be paid out
by savings and loans. Finally, the bill provided that savings and loans could
offer interest- bearing checking accounts.' 52
The stated reason for adopting these three measures was that with interest
rates so high, depositors were moving their funds into money market funds,
which paid higher interest than deposit accounts could.5 ' This had the effect
148. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong. § 107, as reported out of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, S. ReP. No. 96-368, at 21-22; 125 CONG. REc. 28,316
(1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
149. 125 CONG. REc. 29,108 (1979).
150. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong. § 107(e) (1979), as reported outof the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 96-368, at 22.
151. S. REP.No. 96-368 at2.
152. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong. §§ 101-106, as reported out of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; S. REP. No. 96-368, at21; 125 CONG.REc. 28,316 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Proxmire). During debate, Senator Morgan offered an amendment that would
have allowed federal savings and loans to offer NOW accounts only if state chartered banks in
the state were allowed to offer such accounts, thereby giving the decision-making power in
regard to such accounts to the states. The amendment was defeated. See id. at 30,654-55.
153. See S. REP. No. 96-368, at 3-4:
It is thus clear that regulation Q and its mandate of
below market rates to small savers is driving money
out of the financial system, out of housing, and into
noninsured intermediaries .... As market interest
rates have risen above the regulation Q ceilings,
depositors have withdrawn funds out of the
depository institutions and placed them in money
market instruments offering market interest
rates.... The committee believes that regulation Q
mustbephased outso that all savers may earn market
rates on their savings.
Id.; see also 125 CONG.REC. 29,112 (1979) (statementof Sen. Proxmire) ("The economicreality
is that Regulation Q is forcing thrifts to lose deposits because market innovators pay depositors
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of decreasing the funds deposited in savings and loans, and had the residual
effect of decreasing funds available for mortgage loans made by savings and
loans.'54 Given that at this time savings and loan associations were making
about 60% of all home mortgage loans, the diversion of deposit funds into other
investments caused extreme alarm in Congress regarding the availability of
mortgage funds.'55
Nevertheless, Congress realized that each of these measures meant that
savings and loans would be required to have more funds available to pay
more than thrifts can pay."); id. at 30,315 (statement of Sen. Heinz); id. at 30,660 (statement of
Sen. Williams).
154. See 125 CONG. REc. 29,905 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("Regulation
Q is driving money out of financial institutions and, therefore, out of the housing sector. Our
thrift industry will not be able to survive in the regulation Q atmosphere in the long run."); see
also id. at 29,930 (statement of Sen. Morgan); id. at 29,933-34 (statement of Sen. Morgan,
quoting from testimony of Henry Schecter in Senate hearings); id. at 30,311 (statement of Sen.
Riegle); id. at 30,315 (statement of Sen. Heinz); id. at 30,660 (statement of Sen. Williams). An
additional contributing factor to this problem was the fact that most of the mortgage loans held
by savings and loans carried interest rates below 7.5%. This meant that the income to savings
and loans was coming in at a lower rate than the rate at which the savings and loans would be
required to pay out to depositors. Id. at 30,641 (statement of Sen. Javits). Senator Javits believed
that one of the effects of this disparity in interest received and paid was that mortgage lenders
would be more likely to foreclose sooner so they could relend the money at higher interest rates.
Id. at 30,642 (statement of Sen. Javits).
Interestingly, a Federal Reserve Report issued in March 1979,just nine months before
DIDMCA was enacted, suggests that sources for mortgage money were quite stable:
During previous periods with similar increases in
market interest rates, residential mortgage lending
contracted markedly and housing activity was sharply
curtailed. While the mortgage and housing markets
still are likely to be more responsive to changes in
general credit conditions than are other major sectors
of the economy, the effect now appears to be related
more to the interest rate sensitivity of borrowers and
less to shifts in the availability of funds at depositary
institutions....
At the nonbank thrift institutions, net deposit
flows have become less sensitive to changes in
market interest rates, and thus the predominant source
of residential mortgage credit has been less volatile
than in the past.
Seiders, Recent Developments, supra note 78, at 173. On the other hand, the report does discuss
a decrease in deposits at thrift institutions and limits on lending in states with usury ceilings
lower than market rates. Id. at 174. In contrast, however, a 1980 report states: "With funds more
readily available to mortgage lenders than in past periods of high and rising interest rates, and
with ceilings on lending rates relaxed in some cases, mortgage flows remained near the large
1978 volume throughout most of last year [1979]." Luckett, Recent Financial Behavior, supra
note 135, at 439. The 1980 report does go on to indicate that mortgage funds tightened by the
end of 1979. Id.
155. Up to 1979 savings and loan institutions had made "about 60 percent of all of
the home loans in America." 125 CONG.REc. 29,930 (1979) (statementofSen. Morgan); see also
Seiders, Recent Developments, supra note 78, at 178 (finding that savings and loans made half
of the total net acquisitions of home mortgages in 1978).
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interest (1) to depositors, because interest rates would no longer be regulated;
(2) to money market investors, a group that would be made larger because
more individuals would be able to invest in higher-interest money market
certificates; and (3) to holders of interest bearing checking accounts. The
income to pay these moneys to consumers had to come to the savings and loans
from somewhere. The bill fixed this side of the balance sheet by allowing
savings and loans to diversify their investments beyond mortgage investments
and offer trust services."16 The bill also provided for more income to savings
and loans by preempting state limits on mortgage loan interest rates and
allowing them to charge whatever interest they could on first-lien home
mortgages."
The need to increase savings and loan income was the primary motivation
behind the state usury preemption provision. 58 The otherreason for preemption
156. The bill as reported out of committee allowed 10% of a savings and loan's assets
to be in consumer loans, commercial paper, corporate debt securities orbankers' acceptances and
to offer personal trust services. See H.R. 4986, 96th Cong. §§ 301, 303, 304 (1979) as reported
out ofthe Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 96-368, at 23;
125 CONG. REc. 28,316, 29100 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). However, during debate
Senator Tsongas proposed an amendment that would have permitted federally chartered mutual
savings banks to take deposits from anywhere and to invest up to 20% in nonmortgage
investments. Id. at 30,644-45. This amendment would have had only exemplary impact, as there
were at the time no federally chartered mutual savings banks, and the stated purpose for the
provision was to encourage states to adopt similarprovisions. See id. at 30,648. However, during
debate Senator Morgan proposed an amendment to the amendment extending its coverage to all
federally chartered savings and loans institutions. Id. at 30,648-49. This amendment was
adopted, thereby adding a provision that all federally chartered mutual savings banks and savings
and loans could diversify 20% of their investments. Id. at 30,650.
157. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong. § 305 (1979), as reported out of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 96-368, at 23; see also 125 CONG. REC.
30,315 (1979) (statement of Sen. Heinz) (citing the provision that would help savings and loans
"offset the elimination of the interest rate ceiling [that could be paid on deposits] and the
differential [between what banks and savings and loans could pay on deposits]" as one of three
important provisions of the bill). An amendment offered during debate also provided that the
savings and loans would, under some circumstances, be able to sell their low-interest mortgages
to GNMA, giving them more money with which to make mortgage loans. Id. at 30,640-43. The
rates on these new loans would have been limited by the FHA rate. Id. at 30,641. The Senate
instead adopted a provision requiring a study of whether the GNMA program would have a
positive impact. Id. at 30,643. During debate on this provision Senator Proxmire indicated that
the mortgage usury override would be enough to make savings and loans profitable again. Id.
at 30,642 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
158. See 125 CONG. REC. 29,099 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("The thrust of
H.R. 4986 is on deregulation and enhanced competition between financial institutions."); id. at
29,112 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ( "The fact is that thrifts need to pay market rates to
depositors and to be able to earn returns so that they will remain viable. This legislation doesjust
that and meets the needs of thrifts."); 126 CONG. REC. 6912 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston);
S. REP. No. 96-368, at 18-20. Indeed, the section of the report on the usury preemption cites as
one of the two justifications for the preemption the ability of savings and loans to "offer higher
interest rates on savings deposits." Id. at 18. The report goes on to say:
In addition to the adverse effects of usury ceilings on
credit availability, mortgage rate ceilings must be
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of state mortgage interest usury limits was that market rates had risen above the
usury limitations in some states, making it difficult or impossible to obtain a
mortgage loan in those states,'59 and causing an outflow of funds from states
removed if savings and loan institutions, as directed
by other provisions of H.R. 4986 as amended by the
committee, are to begin to pay market rates ofinterest
on savings deposits. Without enhancing the ability of
institutions to achieve market rates on both sides of
their balance sheets, the stability and continued
viability of our nation's financial system would not
be assured. Thus, Federal preemption of State usury
ceilings would not only promote national home
financing objectives but would provide the resources
with which savers could be paid more interest on
their savings accounts.
Id. at 19; see also 125 CONG.REc. 29,905 (1979) (statementof Sen. Proxmire). Senator Proxmire
stated:
H.R. 4986 provides for a 10-yearphase-out of interest
rate controls (regulation Q) along with augmented
asset powers for thrift institutions (interest-bearing
checking accounts, consumer loan powers, trust
powers and enhanced home mortgage lending
authority) all designed to maintain the viability of
thrift institutions and their commitment to home
mortgage lending while enabling depository
institutions to pay the depositor a market rate of
return on savings.
Id. In introducing the compromise bill to the full Senate, Senator Proxmire indicated that the
"three major and interrelated themes embodied in H.R. 4986" were deregulation and reliance on
market forces, equality among types of financial institutions, and fairness to small savers. 126
CONG. REC. 6893 (1980) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). He also indicated that the usury
preemption was tied primarily to relieving institutions from "unreasonable restrictions on their
earning capacity." Id. at 6900 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
159. 125 CONG. REc. 28,316 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("This legislation
also preempts State home mortgage lending limits which are responsible for mortgage money
drying up in many areas of the country"); see also S. REP. No. 96-368, at 18 (stating that the
preemption provision is intended, in part, "in order to ease the severity of the mortgage credit
crunches of recent years."). The Senate report continues:
The committee finds that where state usury laws
require mortgage rates below market levels of
interest, mortgage funds in those states will not be
readily available and those funds will flow to other
states where market yields are available. This
artificial disruption of funds availability not only is
harmful to potential homebuyers in states with such
usury laws, it also frustrates national housing policies
and programs.
Id. at 19. Senator Proxmire asserted:
We have a situation now where the rate is getting so
high that many banks and savings and loans simply
cannot offer mortgages or they violate the statute. In
some cases, it is embedded in the Constitution; in
other, it is very difficult for the legislature to meet
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with low usury limits.'6 ° Even though this is seemingly the more often
remembered reason for the 1979 preemption of state limits on mortgage interest
rates, it received surprisingly little attention during congressional debate.
Indeed, the most significant mention of the effect state usury laws were having
on mortgage fund availability occurred after debate on the bill was virtually
completed, but before the final vote on the bill. Two of these statements were
in the context of the Arkansas Senators thanking the bill managers for their
consideration. 6' Another of these statements was in connection with a late
amendment offered by Senator Proxmire allowing states to regulate discount
points on mortgages by enacting a state law any time after adoption of the
bill.
162
Two other extremely important aspects of the DIDMCA usury preemption
and act on it. This gives them a chance to start again.
125 CONG. REc. 29,100 (1979); see also id. at 30,299 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("With
respect to mortgage loans, we find there are a number of States in which the usury laws are going
to be just very quickly made so restraining it will be virtually impossible to get a mortgage
loan."). There is even a suggestion that the entire mortgage preemption provision was, as with
the FHA and VA preemptions, the result of the constitutional 10% usury limit in Arkansas.
At the present time we have a provision in the bill
that permits the usury rates applying to home
mortgage loans to be overridden. It provides, of
course, that that override by this legislation, however,
can be, in turn, reversed or modified in any way by
the State legislature. They can act any time before
1981 to provide that their usury law will stay on the
books. We do this because we found in the State of
Arkansas an absolute disaster, asfar as the financial
institutions were concerned, and particularly asfar
as the borrowers were concerned. Small
businessmen, farmers, and other mortgage borrowers
who wanted to borrow money simply could not get
the funds. At least, if interest rates are too high you
can decide whether to borrow at the high rate or not
borrow at all, but in the case of Arkansas they could
not borrow at all. In many States, as the Senator has
pointed out, that is the position in which borrowers
have found themselves.
Id. at 29,908 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (emphasis added).
160. 126 CONG.REc. 7071 (1980) (statementof Sen. Proxmire); id. at6965 (statement
of Rep. Reuss).
161. 125 CONG. REC. 30,656 (1979) (statement of Sen. Pryor) (thanking the bill
managers for their consideration and stating "in the last 2 months, to the best of his knowledge,
the savings and loan institutions in Arkansas have made fewer than 25 residential mortgage loans
to the citizens of our State."); see also 125 CONG. REc. 30,656 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers) (asking that a chart indicating which states would be affected by the usury preemption
and an article on mortgage fund unavailability be reprinted in the Congressional Record).
162. 125 CONG. REc. 30,659 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("I support this
mortgage usuary [sic] override in the bill because I believe the facts clearly demonstrate that
State laws which limit the rate of interest that can be charged on mortgage loans, although well
intended, have often had the unfortunate effect of shutting off or disrupting the flow of credit.").
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also received little attention in the congressional debates. First, even though
congressional attention was focused on the income needs of savings and loans,
the benefit of the usury preemption was extended to any mortgage lender
making more than $1 million worth of loans per year, whether the lender was
a deposit institution or not. ' In some places in the debate it seems as if certain
members of Congress were unaware of this fact.' In other places, only brief
references are made to the impact this legislation would have on loans made by
nondepository mortgage lenders. 65
163. DIDMCA extends the preemption to any lender who meets the other
requirements and is "described in section 527(b) of the National Housing Act." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7a(a)(1)(C) (1994). By this reference, DIDMCA applies to any lender who is a creditor
under the Truth in Lending Act and "who makes or invests in residential real estate loans
aggregating more than $1,000,000 per year." Id. § 1735f-5(b)(2)(D).
164. For example, in asking questions about how the first-lien interest rate preemption
provision of the bill would impact lenders in Arkansas, Senator Bumpers completely ignored the
fact that non-depository mortgage lenders would be exempt from state usury laws as well:
It is my understanding that section 305(a) (1)
preempts a constitutional or statutory usury limit on
any loan, mortgage, or advance on residential real
property made after the date of enactment of this act
if the loan or advance is described in section 527(b)
of the National Housing Act.
This preemption shall apply to loans,
mortgages, or advances on residential real property
made by State banks and State savings and loan
institutions, as well as national banks and Federal
savings and loan institutions provided they are
federally insured.
125 CONG. REc. 30,316 (1979) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). Senator Proxmire responded that
this was the correct understanding of the legislation. Id. at 30,316 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
But see id. at 29,932 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (recognizing that the DIDMCA preemption
would apply to mortgage bankers).
165. Nondepository mortgage lenders such as mortgage bankers were only mentioned
in a few places during the debate. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Morgan) ("I do not believe we should preempt State authority simply to make life easier for the
mortgage bankers."). The dissent in Mclnnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 767,
772-73 (Ark. 1981), recognized that Congress was focused on thebanking and savings and loan
industries, not on non-depository lenders, when it adopted DIDMCA.
The Senate may not have focused on nondepository mortgage lenders because they
were not a big apart of the market in 1979. David F. Seiders & Charles A. Luckett, Household
Borrowing in the Recovery, 64 FED. Rs. BULL. 155 (1978) [hereinafter Seiders & Luckett,
Household Borrowing] (explaining that finance and mortgage companies lent only 1% of all
home mortgage funds in 1977); Luckett, Recent Financial Behavior, supra note 135, at 437
(finding that finance and mortgage companies lent less than .5% of all home mortgage funds in
1979). Indeed, the possibility of such nondepository lenders was hardly considered by active
opponents of the bill such as Senator Morgan. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. 29,110 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Morgan) ("This bill exempts all banks from State usury limitations on
residential mortgage loans for specific lenders unless the state reenacts the ceilings within 2
years."). Itis likely thatbecause he was not considering nondepository mortgage lenders, Senator
Morgan feared that if thrifts went out of business the federal government, not private companies,
would become the mortgage lender of last resort. Id. at 29,930 (statement of Sen. Morgan); See
also id. at 30,661 (statement of Sen. Williams) (indicating his hope, as chair of the Senate
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Second, although the debate focused entirely on purchase money home
mortgages, the preemption apparently extended to any mortgage secured by a
first lien on residential real property.66 Thus, Congress failed to make any
distinction between purchase money loans and other home-secured loans.167
Supporters of the bill believed that the bill's net effect would be to make
more mortgage funds available by increasing deposits at savings and loans,
improving their viability, and allowing for market-related mortgage interest
rates.161 The usury provision was perceived as both relatively uninvasive and
essential to the whole package.1 69 Supporters of the bill also heralded it as an
aid to the "small investor," who would now receive interest on small deposits
Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, that new mortgage funding market participants
might be found in the future); 126 CONG. REc. 6972 (1980) (statement of Rep. St. Germain)
(indicating his belief that the usury preemption should be extended to all home financers).
166. For a discussion of cases interpreting the "first-lien" provision of DIDMCA, see
infra Part IV.A.
167. A purchase money loan may be thought of as one used to purchase residential
property. U.C.C. § 9-203(g) (1999). A more helpful definition can be found in the structure of
the Truth in Lending Act, which provides a right of recission to a borrower who obtains a
nonpurchase money loan secured by the borrower's principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)
(1994). Under that scheme, a purchase money loan is either:
1) "a residential mortgage transaction," 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(e)(1) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(1), in
which the loan on a dwelling "is created or retained
against the consumer's dwelling to finance the
acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling,"
15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24)
(1999); or
2) a loan that merely refinances the original purchase
money loan. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(2) (1994); 12
C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(2) (1999).
All other loans are nonpurchase money loans, giving the borrower the right to rescind under
some circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (1999).
168. See, e.g., 125 CONG.REc. 29,925 (1979) (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("The bill
... contains many new beneficial powers for thrifts that we hope will permit them to innovate
and compete without impairing the potential for achievement of national housing policy
objectives.").
169. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 19 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 255
("The committee believes that this limited modification in state usury laws will enhance the
stability and viability of our nation's financial system and is needed to facilitate a national
housing policy and the functioning of a national secondary market in mortgage lending."); 125
CONG. REc. 29,103 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Senator Proxmire asserted:
This legislation also contains provisions which will
alleviate the situations in many States whereby low
usury mortgage lending limits are inhibiting the flow
of funds into home mortgagee lending. H.R. 4986 as
reported preempts State usury limits on home
mortgage loans but allows the States to reimpose such
limits within a 2-year time period. This is not a
preemption by fiat but makes a reasonable
accommodation consistent with our Federal system.
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and be entitled to higher interest through the availability of money market
certificates in $1,000 denominations.
170
However, opponents of the bill, led by Senator Morgan, warned that
adoption of the bill would cause a net economic loss for small investors, who
would have to pay for any interest they received on small deposits with higher
mortgage interest rates, higher costs for products and services, and bank
service fees. 17 1 Opponents also argued that the bill would only serve to harm
170. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. 30,312-13 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire); 126
CONG. REc. 6967 (1980) (statement of Rep. LaFalce); id. at 6968 (statement of Rep. Stanton);
id. at 6984 (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
171. S. REP. No. 96-368, at 39-40 (Additional Views of Sen. Morgan). Senator
Morgan stated:
I believe that this bill inadequately addresses the
question ofearnings by financial institutions. It seems
clear that if institutions are going to pay higher
interest rates, and if market rate money market
certificates are going to be available in $1,000
denominations, that institutions are going to have to
charge more for the services they offer and the money
they lend. I believe this works against the interest of
the average citizen generally, and will be especially
damaging to housing finance.
Id. at 37 (Additional Views of Sen. Morgan) (asserting that H.R. 4986 "could seriously impair
the availability of mortgage credit and indeed other consumer borrowing at affordable rates, and
would be of dubious benefit to the average consumer.") (emphasis added); 125 CONG. REC.
29,109 (1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan) (quoting from a statement of Rep. Annunzio: "The
interest paid on [negotiable order-of-withdrawal] NOW accounts will have to come from
somewhere, and itwill most likely be from higher interest paid on loans and otherbank services.
Those charges will be borne by the small depositor while the rich guys happily collect interest
on their consumer-oriented NOW accounts.'); id. at 29,112 (statement of Sen. Morgan); id. at
29,923 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (admitting that increasing costs to savings and loans would
be likely to increase mortgage interest rates); id. at 29,923-24 (statement of Sen. Ford); id. at
29,934 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (quoting from testimony of Henry Schecter in Senate
hearings: "In absence of ceilings on savings interest rates, when money became tighter, thrift
institutions could compete more aggressively for funds by paying higher rates to attract savings.
The result would, of necessity, be higher mortgage interest rates."); id. at 30,285 (statement of
Sen. Morgan); id. at 30,285-86 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (quoting letter from the presidents
of the National Association of Home Builders and the National Association of Realtors that
expressed their fear that the bill would increase mortgage interest rates); id. at 30,286 (statement
of Sen. Morgan) (quoting from testimony of Henry Schecter in Senate hearings); id. at 30,298
(statement of Sen. Ford) ("So as we pound our fists and raise our voices in defense of the little
depositor, the small fellow out there, we find in the record that we are increasing his interest
rates .... "); id. at 30,311 (statement of Sen. Morgan); id. at 30,312 (statement of Sen. Riegle)
(supporting the amendment eliminating the reduction of money market minimums to $1,000:
"To price mortgage money out of reach with the notion that, somehow or other, we are doing
something that actually helps the little person, I think, is really not fair. I do not think itis honest
in the sense that it really portrays an inaccurate picture of what the effect would be."); id. at
30,312 (statement of Sen. Tower) (supportingthe amendment eliminating thereductionofmoney
market minimums to $1,000). But see id. at 29,906 (statement of Sen. Gain) ("Attracting
deposits back to savings institutions, coupled with other provisions in H.R. 4986 regarding the
earnings potential of such institutions, would also insure the increased availability of mortgage
credit at a more reasonable price than is now charged."). One estimate given on the floor of the
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individuals with no savings. 72 Senator Morgan pointed out that the individuals
who would be most adversely affected by the bill were senior citizens and those
with very low incomes.1 In short, opponents of the bill in the Senate and
House of Representatives preferred a measure that simply addressed the D.C.
Circuit opinion in American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell.74
The bill, with all of the Senate amendments just discussed, passed the
Senate onNovember 1, 1979. 75 By now, the December 31, 1979 deadline for
action on the D.C. Circuit's opinion in American Bankers was fast
approaching. When the bill as passed out of the Senate was returned to the
House of Representatives for action, the House replaced the text with its own
version of the bill, which now contained some of the provisions in the Senate
version, including the mortgage preemption provision.1 76 The House approved
the measure immediately without explanation or debate and voted to send the
bill to conference committee, hoping that something could be worked out by
Senate was that 75% of all checking accounts had average monthly balances of below $1,000,
and that these depositors would make about $50 per year in interest and would pay about $65
in service fees. 126 CONG. REc. 7073 (1980) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
172. 125 CONG. REc. 30,287 (1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan) Senator Morgan
explained that
[O]bviously the 37 percent of all families with no
savings accounts would have no benefits of increased
interest income from savings. However, they would
have to absorb the costs of higher loan interest rates,
directly in credit obligations assumed and indirectly
in the prices of purchased goods and services whose
production or marketing had been at least in part
credit-financed.
Id.
173. Id. at 30,287 (statement of Sen. Morgan) ("The nonsavers, as might be expected,
are a relatively high proportion of families with incomes of less than $10,000. It is interesting
to note also that among families with age of head 65 years or older, 50 percent were found to
have no savings."); Accord id. at 30, (statement of Sen. Morgan) (describing costs to families
with various levels of savings); id. at 30,311 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (noting that "[o]ver half
of the people over 65 in America have no savings accounts.").
174. 686 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1979); S. REP. No. 96-368, at37 (Additional Views of
Sen. Morgan) ("[A] wiser course for the Congress to follow would be to authorize the various
instruments declared illegal on April 20, 1979 by the U.S. Court of Appeals... while also
addressing the question of incentives for savings by giving small savers a long needed tax break
on interest income."); Letter from Rep. St. Germain to Sens. Proxmire and Cranston (October
17, 1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. 29,106 (1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan); 125 CONG.
REc. 29,107 (1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan). During debate Senator Morgan introduced, as
a potential substitute, an amendment (amend. No. 699) that merely addressed the D.C. Circuit's
opinion inAmerican Bankers, incorporated the provisions of the Truth in Lending Simplification
and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, § 601, 94 Stat. 168 (1980), and preempted for
eighteen months (later modified to six months) state usury restrictions on agricultural and
business loans in the amount of $25,000 or more. Id. at 30,289-301. However, the amendment
was laid on the table by a vote of 57 to 38 and never voted on. Id. at 30,301.
175. 125 CONG. REc. 30,662 (1979).
176. H.R. 4986, 96th Cong. § 205 (1979), as amended by the House of
Representatives on Nov. 7, 1979, 125 CONG. REc. 31,312 (1979).
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the December 31 deadline. 77 The House seemed less than pleased that the bill
had been augmented by the Senate to such a great extent, alluding to the Senate
additions as "Christmas-tree" provisions. 7 1 In response to this action by the
House, the Senate disapproved of the House version of the bill, and agreed to
the appointment of a conference committee.
79
By now it was November 28, 1979, just one month away from the date
when the D.C. Circuit's opinion would become operative, and the bill was
being consigned to conference committee with every expectation that coming
to an agreement would be difficult. It was in this climate that Senators
Cranston, Proxmire, and Gain offered an amendment to another, unrelated bill
in hopes of temporarily resolving the issues raised by American Bankers.18
The amendment authorized until March 31, 1980 those accounts declared as
void by the D.C. Circuit Court."' However, the Senators did not restrict their
amendment to those issues that needed to be addressed by the American
Bankers deadline. Instead they included several of the more contentious
provisions from H.R. 4986, including the preemption of state usury laws in
first-lien mortgage loans. 8 This amendment was approved in the Senate with
no debate. 83 In response to the Senate's action, Representative St. Germain
introduced legislation meant to address only the American Bankers opinion,8"
which was adopted by the House in place of the amendment adopted by the
Senate.' The House version omitted the preemption provision,8 6 and House
members criticized the Senate for taking advantage of an emergency situation
to turn the bill "into a Christmas tree of unrelated financial measures."'8 7
The Senate volleyed back the next day with a replacement version that
restored the preemption provision. 8 On December 19, 1979, the House
concurred in the Senate amendments." 9 Representative St. Germain
emphasized that the House had been forced into accepting the usury override
177. 125 CONG. REc. 31,309-27 (1979).
178. Id. at 31,325 (statement of Rep. Rousselot); id. at 31,326 (statement of Rep.
Stanton); id. at 31,326-27 (statement of Rep. Reuss).
179. Id. at 33,846-50 (1979). In defense of the usury preemption, Senator Cranston
talked about the ability of lenders to make higher interest mortgage loans to "those who can
afford them." 126 CONG. REc. 6912 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
180. H.R. 4998, 96th Cong. (1979). This bill had passed the House on September 17,
1979. 125 CONG. REc. 24,882 (1979).
181. 125 CONG. REc. 35,267 (1979) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
182. Id. at 35,265.
183. Id. at 35,264-68.
184. Id. at 35,481; H.R. 6100, 96th Cong. (1979).
185. 125 CONG. REc. 36,405 (1979) (adopting the text of H.R. 6100 as part of H.R.
4998).
186. Id. at 36,404 (statement of Rep. Reuss).
187. Id. at 36,392 (statement of Rep. St. Germain).
188. Id. at 36,613.
189. Id. 36,903-06. The House did make one slight change to the bill. Thus, the bill
went back to the Senate and was finally approved by the Senate on December 19, 1979. Id. at
37,050-51.
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by the D.C. Circuit's December 31, 1979 deadline.' 90
Oddly enough, during the entire debate in the Senate no one apparently
ever considered setting a national usury limit rather than simply preempting
state limits. 9 Furthermore, there was virtually no discussion of what might
prevent a covered lender from charging predatory rates once state limits were
preempted, except for one reference to rates being controlled by "the
market,"'" and two references to the bill as relying on market forces rather than
190. Id. at 36,905 (1979) (statement ofRep. St. Germain) ("I am not very happy with
the inclusion of the State usury ceiling provision, but we must have this bill. We are at the
deadline time.").
191. For example, the Senate could have adopted a usury limit such as the one in
effect for federal banks, which was 1% above the discount rate. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976); 126
CONG. REc. 6907 (1980) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). The Senate also could have adopted a
mortgage preemption similar to the temporary business and agricultural loan preemption it
adopted during debate on the bill, and upon which the Senate focused most of its preemption
attention. DIDMCA Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 511, 94 Stat. 132, 164 (1980); Act of Nov. 5, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-104, § 301, 93 Stat. 789 (intending application of a similar provision only to
Arkansas); see, e.g., 126 CONG.REc. 6906-07,7071 (1980); 125 CONG.REC. 29,906-12, 29,944-
45 (1979). Even the most active opponent of the bill, Senator Morgan, was not clear on this
failure to substitute a fluctuating national usury limit. 125 CoNG.REc. 29,111 (1979) (statement
of Sen. Morgan) (speaking of "imposition of a national usury norm" with no mention of an
adjustable rate). Of course, no federal usury structure was created to replace the existing state
usury structure.
192. This mention of market limitations took place during the following colloquy
between Senators Morgan, Cochran and Proxmire:
Mr. Morgan: If the Senator's amendment
is adopted, would there be any limitation on interest
for agricultural or business loans above $25,000?
Mr. Cochran: Yes. The amendment
provides for a 5 percent in excess of discount rate as
a limitation on loans of the type described in the
amendment. So there is an effective limitation.
It is not just carte blanche, that you could
go out and rip off the public, or that kind of thing. It
is a rate of interest which is not unlike that the banks
around the country are now charging as their prime
rate.
Mr. Morgan: In that connection, would the
distinguished chairman be willing to tell me whether
he knows this: If the bill passes with the preemption
in the bill with regard to housing, would there be any
limitation on usury for housing and items covered
under the bill itself?
Mr. Proxmire: The Senator knows the
answer to his question, of course. There is no
limitation in the bill with respect to mortgage loans.
Of course, there is a market limitation.
As the Senator knows, we always have had
a situation in which the mortgage rate is lower than
business rates, for a good reason, particularly when
interest rates are rising. The reason is that the
mortgage rate is for a long period of time. People are
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regulation.'93 Although Congress did consider potential market abuses in the
case of manufactured homes, it did not consider the same possibilities in the
nonmanufactured home market.' 4 Finally, not one Senator or Congressman
seems to have recognized that what might have appeared necessary for
purchase money mortgage loans might not be appropriate for nonpurchase,
home-secured lending. Indeed, the distinctions between these two types of
loans were never discussed.' 95
On March21,1980 the permanent version ofDIDMCA, H.R. 4986, finally
emerged from the conference committee. In its final form, the act preempted
"[s]tate usury ceilings on first mortgage loans made by banks, savings and
loans, credit unions, mutual savings banks, mortgage bankers and HUD-
approved lenders under the National Housing Act.'
96
The conference report was submitted to the House and Senate on March
24, 1980.' 97 The report passed the House on March 27, 1980 '98 and the Senate
on March 28, 1980.' 99 Consequently, the permanent preemption became
effective April 1, 1980.2"'
going to get that high interest rate for many years.
That is why the mortgage rate is well below prime.
We would rely on the market .... I am
sure [Sen. Morgan] ... agrees that the market should
work in this case.
125 CONG. REC. 29,911 (1979).
193. 126 CONG. REc. 6894 (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Senator Exon even
complained that "State usury laws will be rendered completely meaningless unless a State
legislature acts within 3 years to reestablish a usury ceiling. That is akin to Federal repeal of the
States' laws againsthorse thieves, butbeing magnanimous by allowing the States to reenact them
if they so desire." 126 CONG. REc. 7062 (1980) (statement of Sen. Exon).
194. 126 CONG. REC. 6900-01 (1980) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
195. Congress may not have taken this distinction into account because when
DIDMCA was adopted there was only a small market for nonpurchase money home equity loans.
For example, a Federal Reserve Board study showed that in 1977 only 5.4% of all homeovners
had a home equity loan. GlennB. Canner&CharlesA. Luckett, Home EquityLending, 75 FED.
REs. BULL. 333 (1989) [hereinafter Canner & Luckett, Home Equity Lending]. An earlier study
by the Federal Reserve showed that in 1977 only 6% of households with first mortgage debt also
had a junior mortgage, and only 7% of households had refinanced a first mortgage in order to
raise new funds. Seiders & Luckett, Household Borrowing, supra note 165, at 156. There was
an even smaller market for first-lien nonpurchase money loans, as most of these loans were
written as second mortgages. For a discussion of the growth in home equity lending in the 1980s
and 1990s see infra Part V.A.
196. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-842, at 78.
197. 126 CONG. REc. 6231-54, 6300 (1980); id. at 6300.
198. 126 CONG. REc. 6984 (1980) (recording a vote of 380 yeas, 13 nays, 11 present,
and 27 not voting).
199. 126 CONG. REc. 7073 (1980).
200. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, § 501(b) (1), 94 Stat. 132, 162. Section 501(a) of DIDMCA was originally
codified as a note to 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1994). Russell v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 72
B.R. 855,866 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Study of this Act [DIDMCA] is initially complicated by the fact
that it is not codified as such in the United States Code .... Rather, it appears only in the
'Historical Note' appearing inU.S.C. under 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7."); Bank ofNew York v. Hoyt,
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The statute gave states three years-until April 1, 1983-to opt out of the
mortgage preemption provision ofDIDMCA." However, opting out required
specific action by the state:
In order for a state to override a federal preemption of state
usury laws provided for in this title the override proposal
must explicitly and by its terms indicate that the state is
overriding the preemption. Under this requirement the state
law, constitutional provision, or other override proposal must
specifically refer to this Act and indicate that the state intends
to override the federal preemption this Act provides.2
The statute also allowed states to adopt "a provision of law placing
limitations on discount points or such other charges on any loan, mortgage,
credit sale, or advance described in subsection (a)(1) [the preemption
section]."2 3 Because states have a continuing ability to enact limitations on
discount points, "[a]ny [state] legislation, after March 31, 1980 which amends
or institutes limitations on points or charges other than the stated interest rate,
617 F. Supp. 1304, 1308 (D.11I. 1985) ("Section 501, for reasons not readily apparent to the
court, has never been codified in the United States Code, but its text does appear in the historical
note following 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7"); FirstSouth, F.A. v. Lawson Square, Inc. (In re Lawson
Square, Inc.), 61 B.R. 145, 149 (W.D. Ark. 1986). Ultimately, Section 501 of DIDMCA was
given its own section, and it is now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (1994). Smith v. Fidelity
Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 908 (3rd Cir. 1990).
201. § 501(b)(2), 94 Stat. at 162.
202. H.R. CoNF. REP.No. 96-842, at 79 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298,
309; S. CoNF. REP. No. 96-640, at 34 (1980); § 501(b)(2), 94 Stat. at 162. In order to effectively
opt out of DIDMCA, a state had to adopt a statute or constitutional provision that "states
explicitly and by its terms that such State does not want the provisions of subsection (a)(1) [the
preemption section] to apply with respect to loans, mortgages, credit sales, and advances made
in such State." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 96-842, at 79. Later cases recognized that the DIDMCA
usury preemption could notbe overridden by a state through simple readoption of, or amendment
to, a state's usury law after passage ofDIDMCA. Seiter v. Veytia, 756 S.W.2d 303,304-05 (Tex.
1988). Rather, to override DIDMCA a state had to explicitly state that it did not want DIDMCA
to apply. Id. Fifteen states and Puerto Rico eventually opted out of DIDMCA. See KEEST &
RENUART, supra note 122, at § 3.5.5.1 and n.258 (specifically, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Puerto
Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).
203. § 501(b)(4), 94 Stat. at 162; see also 125 CONG. REC. 30,659 (1979) (statement
of Sen. Proxmire) ("States should have flexibility to enact new laws placing limitations on
discount points or such other charges, without any time limitation."); Autrey v. United Cos.
Lending Corp., 872 F. Supp. 925, 928 (S.D. Ala. 1995) (finding Alabama had overridden
DIDMCA preemption of points limitation merely by adopting a points limitation statute after
DIDMCA was adopted); United Cos. Lending Corp. v. McGehee, 686 So.2d 1171, 1178 (Ala.
1996) (agreeing that Alabama had overridden DIDMCA preemption of points limitation).
Regarding whether preemption is a federal question, see Hardy v. Equisouth Financial Services,
1993 WL 764463 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 1993) (finding that determination of whether a state
overrode the DIDMCA points preemption is a question of state law); accord, Autrey, 872 F.
Supp. at 928.
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arguably constitutes opt-out legislation."2 However, readoption of a state's
points limitations may not always serve to override the DIDMCA
preemption.
205
C. Federal Preemption ofAlternative Mortgage Transactions
Two years after Congress adopted the DIDMCA preemption of state usury
ceilings for first liens, it adopted the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act (AMTPA).206 AMTPA preempts state statutes restricting the use of
alternative mortgage transactions2 7 such as variable interest rate loans,
2
1
balloon payments,2' and negative amortizations2 0 in any "loan or credit sale
secured by an interest in residential real property"' that is made, purchased or
204. KEESr & RENUART, supra note 122, at § 3.5.5.2.
205. Reed v. World Wide Financial Services, 1998 WL 852854 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
27, 1998) (finding that Illinois had not overridden the DIDMCA points preemption by merely
repeating in an amendment to the Illinois Interest Act the sections dealing with points that had
existed before DIDMCA). A contrary result appears to have been reached by an Ohio Court of
CommonPleas in anunpublished, unwritten decision. The Ohio courtreportedly found that Ohio
had opted out of the DIDMCA discount preemption when the Ohio Legislature made a 1988
technical amendment to Ohio's usury statute, even though the point provision in the Ohio statute
was unaffected by the 1988 amendment. Therese Franzen, Recent Developments in Consumer
Finance Law, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 350, 351 (1998).
There have been several regulations adopted pursuant to DIDMCA. 12 C.F.R.
§§ 590.1-590A, 590.100-590.101 (1999). Except for a section setting out consumer protection
rules covering mobile home loans, these regulations mostly restate the provisions of the statute.
12 C.F.R. § 590.4 (1999).
206. Gain-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3801-3806).
207. 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c)(1994). The statute also overrides section 501(c)(1) of
DIDMCA for mortgages covered by AMTPA. 12 U.S.C. § 3805 (1994).
208. 12 U.S.C. § 3802(1)(A) (1994). The maximum interest permitted to be charged
on an adjustable rate mortgage must be included in the loan. Id. § 3806(a). The Federal Reserve
is authorized to issue regulations in this regard. Id. § 3806(b). A violation of this section is
treated as a violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1611 (1994).
209. 12 U.S.C. § 3801(1)(B)(1994).
210. 12U.S.C. § 3801(1)(C). Anegativeamortizationoccurswhenperiodicpayments
made by the obligor on a loan are not large enough to cover the principal and interest due during
that period. KEEST & RNUART, supra note 126, at § 4.3.1.2. The result is that the total amount
owed by the obligor goes up rather than down at the end of the period, even though the obligor
may have made a regularperiodic payment. Id. If the lender uses the "actuarial rule," the unpaid
interest is added to the principal, and in the following period interest is charged on both the
outstanding principal and the unpaid interest. Id. at §§ 4.3.12, 4.6.1.1. In other words, any due
and unpaid interest is added to the principal, and interest is charged thereon. If the lender uses
the "U.S. rule," the borrower continues to owe the unpaid interest, but the interest is not added
to principal. Both methods are methods of calculating simple interest. Id. at § 4.6.1.1; Grunbeck
v. Dime Sav. Bank of New York, 74 F.3d 331, 344 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that a state statute
requiring interest to be calculated based on the simple interest method was not preempted by
DIDMCA or AMTPA).
211. 12 U.S.C. § 3802(l). The act also covers loans secured by an interest in "a
dwelling, all stock allocated to a dwelling unit in a residential cooperative housing corporation,
or a residential manufactured home (as that term is defined in section 5402(6) of title 42)." Id.
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enforced by a covered lender." 2 The statute applies to depository institutions
as defined in DIDMCA, 213 lenders approved by the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development forparticipation in any mortgage insurance program under
the National Housing Act,2" any person who regularly makes alternative
mortgage transaction loans, credit sales, or advances secured by an interest in
property, " and any transferee of any covered originator.216
The statute lists the factors that motivated its enactment, including
"increasingly volatile and dynamic changes in interest rates [that had] seriously
[impaired] the ability of housing creditors to provide consumers with fixed-
term, fixed-rate credit secured by interests in real property, cooperative
housing, manufactured homes, and other dwellings.""21 Congress also
articulated its belief that "alternative mortgage transactions are essential to the
provision of an adequate supply of credit secured by residential property.""21
The statute gave states a three-year window in which to opt out, by legislative
act or by popular vote, of the AMTPA preemption. 9
Although an extensive discussion of AMTPA is beyond the scope of this
article, AMPTA plays a role in the subprime home equity industry because it
allows lenders to make loans with terms that may obscure the total cost of a
loan (for example, by reducing monthly payments through a large balloon
payment at the end of the loan). '
IV. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF DIDMCA
A. Early Uses of DIDMCA To Make Non-Housing Related Loans At
Interest Rates Higher Than State Usury Limits
It didn't take long after DIDMCA was adopted for some second mortgage
lenders, and for other lenders who had been making high cost consumer loans,
to notice that DIDMCA appeared to allow them to charge an unlimited amount
of interest provided they took a first lien on the borrower's home. Thus a
number of lenders who would not have otherwise made first-lien home equity
212. Id. § 3803(a).
213. Id. § 3802(2)(A).
214. Id.
215. Id. § 3802(2)(C).
216. Id. § 3802(2)(D).
217. Id. § 3801(a)(1).
218. Id. § 3801(a)(2). Congress also intended to put nonfederally chartered housing
creditors on equal footing with federally chartered institutions, which were already permitted to
make alternative mortgage transactions. Id. § 3801(b).
219. Id. § 3804(a). Under this provision a state could express explicitly in legislation
or by certified vote that the state did not want the preemption provided in § 3803 to apply with
respect to alternative mortgage transactions subject to the laws of that state. Id. This action had
to be taken by a state between October 15, 1982-the effective date of AMTPA-and October
15, 1985. Id.
220. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see infra Parts VI.C.1 and V.D.I.
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loans before DIDMCA began to cast car loans, small consumer loans, and
second mortgage loans as very expensive home equity first-lien loans.
The case of Laubach v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co. provides an
example of this practice. In Laubach five customers of Fidelity Consumer
Discount Company-Herbert and Annabelle Smith, John Coplin, Tito Manor,
and Gloria Young-sued the nondepository Pennsylvania lender for violating
Pennsylvania's usury law." Mr. Smith's trouble began in December, 1983
while shopping for a used car.' In order to obtain a loan to pay for the car, Mr.
Smith was referred by the car dealership to Fidelity. Fidelity informed the car
dealership that it would not make the loan to Herbert unless his 80-year-old
mother, Annabelle Smith, agreed to cosign the loan and secure it with a
mortgage on her home.' Mrs. Smith had owned her home since 1955, and it
was clear of unpaid liens. 4 Fidelity ultimately visited the Smiths at their home,
made them a loan for the amount of the car ($2,300), and took a mortgage in
the home.' The loan was then canceled after Herbert had trouble with the
car. 2 6 However, Fidelity continued to pursue a lender/borrower relationship
with the Smiths by offering them a $7,500 "line of credit" secured by the
home. 7 In January 1984 Fidelity made the Smiths another loan for $5,500
($4,216.59 of which was received by the Smiths) that was also secured by the
home. Along with this amount, Fidelity sold credit life insurance to the
Smiths for $154.80, and charged them for discharging liens that had been paid
but were still recorded on the property.29
Fidelity charged the Smiths an annual percentage rate of 36.57%, claiming
that Pennsylvania's usury statutes were preempted by DIDMCA because
Fidelity had taken a first position lien on the Smiths' property.uo If Fidelity had
written the Smiths' car loan as a standard consumer credit loan, taking a
security interest in the car, the interest rate would have been capped at no more
than 24% by Pennsylvania's usury law." If Fidelity had written the second
221. Laubach v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 686 F. Supp. 504, 507 (E.D. Pa.
1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nona, Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898
F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1990) withdrawn and replaced, 898 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1990).
222. Id.
223. Laubach, 686 F. Supp. at 507. At this time it was still quite unusual for a car
lender to take a lien on real estate as security for a car purchase. Canner & Luckett, Home Equity
Lending, supra note 204, at 337 tbl. 5 (finding that only 5% of traditional home equity loans in
1988 were used for car purchases).
224. Laubach, 686 F. Supp. at 505, 507.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. The "line of credit" offered was not a true line of credit because the Smiths
could not draw on the money at will. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Smith v Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 896, 909 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It
is undisputed that, absentpreemption, Fidelity will have violated these [usury] statutes, the most
generous of which allows lenders to charge up to 24% interest per annum.").
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consumer loan as a standard consumer loan without taking a mortgage on the
Smiths' home, the interest rate would likewise have been capped at no more
than 24/o.32 Additionally, because the loan was secured by Mrs. Smith's home,
Mr. and Mrs. Smith were charged an origination fee-which one would not
expect to see in a car loan or small consumer loanF3 -and other fees totaling
$275.08 associated with title to Mrs. Smith's house. 4 These fees would not
have been present if the loans had not been written as home-secured loans.
Thus, the cost to the Smiths of having their loans made as mortgage loans was
tremendous.
John Coplin's experience with Fidelity mirrored that of the Smiths'. In
October 1984 Fidelity made a car loan to Mr. Coplin, a 75-year-old who could
not read or write."3 As it did with the Smiths, Fidelity secured its car loan with
a mortgage on Mr. Coplin's home. 36 Mr. Coplin had owned his home since
1957."3 This transaction was similar to the Smith transaction in that Fidelity
assumed that taking a first-lien mortgage brought the loan under the DIDMCA
preemption of Pennsylvania's usury laws. Also like the Smith transaction, the
Coplin loan cost the borrower more simply because it was cast as a home-
secured loan. Mr. Coplin's loan bore an annual interest rate of4.10%," and
he was charged a $1,072 origination fee (20.5% of the loan proceeds) and
$91.00 in fees for recording lien documents." 9 Mr. Coplin's transaction also
contained another post-DIDMCA financing technique-that of the lender
paying off a less-expensive first lien as part of a new loan in order to take first-
lien position on the home.2' By refinancing all of Mr. Coplin's debt secured
by his home, Fidelity was able to take first-lien position and claim the right
under DIDMCA to ignore Pennsylvania's usury laws.241
Tito Manor's experience followed a similar pattern. In 1986 Mr. Manor
and his mother and stepfather went shopping for a used car 42 The car salesman
232. Id.
233. Laubach, 686 F. Supp. at 513. The origination fee was $1,008.34 on an amount
financed of $5,500, which is a little more than 18% of the loan proceeds. Id. The Smiths also
paid pre-paid finance charges of $990, also about 18% of the proceeds. Id. This sort of cost is
exorbitant even by today's standards.
234. Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 U.S.L.W. 2055,1989 WL 106695
at *2 (3d Cir. 1989), withdrawn and replaced, 898 F.2d 907 (3rd Cir. 1990).
235. Id. at *8.
236. Id.
237. Laubach, 686 F. Supp. at 506.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Smith, 898 F.2d at 909 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Julia Patterson Forrester,
Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's
Promotion ofHome Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REv. 373,418 (1994) ("[A] lender can obtain
a first lien simply by requiring the borrower to pay off existing liens with proceeds of a home
equity loan."). In Mr. Coplin's case, the car loan part of his loan was only $1,761.50. Laubach,
686 F. Supp. at 506. The majority of the loan proceeds ($3,429.50) went to paying off various
other lien holders, including three lenders and the tax authorities for delinquent real estate taxes.
Id.
241. Smith, 1989 WL 106695, at *8.
242. Laubach, 686 F. Supp. at 508.
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informed Mr. Manor that he would need a cosigner for his loan. 3 Ultimately
Mr. Manor's Aunt, Gloria Young, agreed to cosign the loan.2' The car
salesman passed Ms. Young's loan application on to Fidelity.24 The car
salesman later notified Mr. Manor and his aunt that the loan had gone through
and instructed them to come to the car dealership, telling Ms. Young to bring
the deed to her house to verify that she was a homeowner. Ms. Young was not
informed that her home would be used as security for the loan.2"
Once at the car dealership, Mr. Manor and his aunt were driven by an
employee of the car dealership to the Fidelity offices to sign the loan
documents.247 Fidelity took a first mortgage on Ms. Young's home at an interest
rate of 36.617%, far in excess of the state usury limit.4 Fidelity also took an
origination fee of $544.44 on the $3,613.87 loan (approximately 15% of the
loan). ' 9
None of the borrowers discussed in this case would have been permitted
to take loans from Fidelity without giving a first-lien security interest in a
home." Thus it seems clear that Fidelity was using DIDMCA as a device to
get around Pennsylvania's usury limits.
B. Early Court Decisions Interpreting DIDMCA
1. Was the DIDMCA Usury Preemption within Congress's Power to
Regulate Commerce?
Soon after DIDMCA was adopted, the Arkansas courts decided a case in
which the borrower challenged Congress's authority to preempt state usury
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. The court found:
The evidence is undisputed that Fidelity customers do
not have the option of keeping prior liens on their
property if they want to obtain a loan from Fidelity.
This is evidenced by the following deposition
testimony:
Q: Ordinarily do you leave it
up to the customer to decide
between a consumer discount
loan and the first mortgage
loan?
A: There is no decision. It is
our decision to make.
Q: It is basically a take it or
leave it proposition; correct?
A: Yes.
Smith, 1989 WL 106695, at *16 n.1 1.
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restrictions on first-lien mortgages."s ' The Arkansas Supreme Court initially
held that the first-lien preemption contained in DIDMCA "was an invalid
legislative exercise of congressional power pursuant to the Commerce
Clause."' s2 The court reversed itself on rehearing, holding that Congress did
have the authority to preempt Arkansas's usury limit on first-lien mortgages.
The court noted that the testimony during the congressional hearings was that
state usury laws have a significant impact on the economy by diverting credit
out-of-state and by stagnating the housing industry, all of which distorts and
adversely affects local and national economies. 3
One of the issues raised by the dissenting judges, sua sponte, was whether
lenders making $1 million in loans were making federally related loans simply
by taking a first lien on land.s 4 In the dissenting judge's opinion, if taking a
lien on local land by a local lender who makes $1 million in local mortgage
loans was "'federally-related' then brushing your teeth is federafly-related." 2
2. Was DIDMCA Meant to Preempt State Usury Laws in
Nonpurchase Money Loans?
Laubach v. Consumer Fidelity Discount Co., introduced in the previous
section,2' 6 provided courts with the first opportunity to interpret DIDMCA's
first-lien preemption. At issue was whether any lender who took a first-lien
position was entitled to the DIDMCA preemption, even if the loan was not a
purchase money loan and was made by a lender who, but for the unlimited
interest possibility under DIDMCA, would likely not have secured the loan
with a first lien. On its face the statute appeared to clearly entitle all first liens
made by covered lenders to the preemption, yet the legislative history strongly
suggested that Congress was focused almost entirely on purchase money
mortgages. Furthermore, in the parlance of the time, first mortgages were
generally thought of as those used to purchase a home, while second mortgages
were generally thought of as those taken out using equity accumulated in the
home as security, whether the lender took first-lien position or not.
257
If DIDMCA's purpose was to promote home ownership through the
251. Mclnnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Ark. 1981)
(regarding a purchase money loan made by a developer to purchasers of a residential lot at 12%
per year, during a time when the state constitutional limit was 10% per year.).
252. Id. at 770.
253. Id. at 772, cited with approval in Troutt v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Hot
Springs, 659 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Ark. 1983).
254. Mclnnis, 611 S.W.2d at 773 (ieckman, J., dissenting).
255. Id.
256. See supra Part V.A.
257. See, e.g., Canner & Luckett, Home Equity Lending, supra note 195, at 344 n.2
(noting that "[t]raditional home equity loans are sometime called second mortgages, although
legally they may involve a first lien"); see also 24 C.F.R. § 3500.5 (1979) (defining a"Federally
Related Mortgage Loan" for purposes of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act as a loan
secured by a first lien, including purchase money loans but excluding home improvement,
refinance, or other nonpurchase money loans).
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continued availability of mortgage funds in the face of high interest rates and
low usury ceilings, this purpose certainly could have been accomplished by
restricting DIDMCA's application to purchase money mortgages.
Counsel for the Fidelity borrowers argued that in deregulating home
mortgage interest rates inDIDMCA "Congress never intended to preempt state
interest rate limitations in used car financing-a traditional area of state
regulation.""8 The words "first lien" in DIDMCA, they argued, should be read
to mean purchase money mortgages, not simply any loan where the lender, by
whatever means and for whatever purpose, takes first-lien position." 9 This
interpretation, they argued, would be consistent with both congressional
interest in facilitating national housing policy and the reference in the statute
to the National Housing Act, a purpose of which was to enable every American
family to have a "decent home."2" On the other hand, an interpretation that
allowed car lenders to make loans at any interest rate they desired merely by
taking a first mortgage would not "further... national housing goals." Indeed,
such an interpretation would harm national housing goals by creating the risk
that consumers taking out non-home-related consumer loans might lose their
homes.26 Plaintiffs' counsel thus maintained that Fidelity secured its car and
small loans with first-lien home mortgages instead of traditional secured loans
purely to avoid the state usury statute.262
On the other hand, Fidelity's counsel argued that the term "first lien," as
used in DIDMCA, was not ambiguous, and thus it was inappropriate for the
courts to interpret the term.263 They argued further that administrative agency
interpretations contained in regulations, official staff interpretations, unofficial
staffinterpretations, and an Office of Thrift Supervision amicus brief supported
their position.2
Initially the Third Circuit held that based on the legislative history and
goals of DIDMCA, DIDMCA did not preempt the loans made by Fidelity:
258. Reply Brief for Appellants on Rehearing at 1, Smith v. Fidelity Consumer
Discount Co., 898 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1990) (No. 88-1444). Later commentators on DIDMCA
have argued that although the articulated purpose of DIDMCA was to increase the available
credit for home ownership, the failure to limit DIDMCA to purchase money and home
improvement home equity loans has actually had the effect of channeling funds that would have
been available to consumers for nonhome-secured transactions into the mortgage market, rather
than an increase in home ownership. Forrester, supra note 240, at 436.
259. Reply Brief for Appellants on Rehearing at 4, Smith v. Fidelity Consumer
Discount Co., 898 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-1444). Appellants argued that the term "first
lien" had already been interpreted in another context-the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2602 (1994)-as meaning only purchase money mortgages. Id.
260. Id. at 4-5 (quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 1441(1994)).
261. Id. at 6. They also argued that, "[biased on the clear expression in the legislative
history, to permit a loan which lacks any nexus to our national housing policy to be preempted
would pervert the goals Congress intended to achieve in DIDMCA." Id. at 5-6.
262. Id. at 6.
263. Id. at 4, 7.
264. Id. at 11.
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Viewed with the congressional aims in mind, Congress
cannot be said to have intended to preempt state usury laws
where a creditor is able to obtain a first priority mortgage
against a debtor's house in a transaction in which the debtor
is seeking financing to purchase a used car, but is required by
the lender to refinance all previous and prior liens against his
or her residence. In the instant case, Fidelity wrote loans with
disclosed annual percentage rates ranging from approximately
31% to 41%. At a time when market interest rates hover at
10-12%, the congressional purpose of'promoting the stability
and viability of financial institutions, by allowing them to
charge realistic interest market interest rates [sic], cannot be
said to be furthered.
More importantly, the omnipresent congressional goal of
assisting homebuyers to secure homes is frustrated rather than
implemented by applying DIDMCA to the instant case.
Application of DIDMCA to used car financing, such as in the
instant case, encourages lenders to obtain first priority
security for their loans against the borrower's homes [sic] in
order to avoid state usury restrictions. Thus, lenders are
encouraged not only to take a mortgage against a borrower's
residence but also to lend and require that the debtor borrow,
sufficient funds to satisfy all the debtor's prior obligations
against their home. The end result: a car buyer's home is at
a significantly higher risk of foreclosure because the size of
the lien against it is increased by the value of the car and the
finance charges associated with its purchase, and the
refinanced prior debt is at a rate not subject to usury
limitations. Moreover, the lender is able to foreclose on the
borrower's home for a default, rather than repossess the car
for which the loan was sought. Indeed this is preferable for
the lender. Witness the Young/Manor transaction.
Uncontradicted deposition testimony reveals that when
Manor was unable to continue making loan payments he
suggested that Fidelity take the car, at which time a Fidelity
representative responded: "we don't want your car; we want
your aunt's house." Deposition of Tito Manor, App. at 241.
We cannot believe that this anomalous result was within
the congressional intent when it enacted DIDMCA. It seems
absurd to find that Congress intended lenders to be able to
short circuit state usury limitations and increase the risk of
foreclosure in order to enable the borrower to purchase a used
car.
265
265. Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., Nos. 88-1406, 88-1444, 1989 WL
106695, at *16-17 (3d Cir. Jun. 27, 1989), withdrawn and superceded by Smith v. Fidelity
Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1990).
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The court went on to say that it was not interpreting DIDMCA to be limited to
purchase money mortgages, but rather its interpretation was limited to the facts
of the particular case.266 Thus the court held Fidelity had violated
267Pennsylvania's usury statute.
However, in a subsequent opinion the court reversed itself by essentially
adopting the opinion of the dissent in the original, withdrawn opinion .26 In this
new opinion, the court found that the DIDMCA first-lien preemption applied
to all first-lien loans, and that this was consistent with a literal reading of the
statute-legislative history showing no intent to exclude car loans or other
nonpurchase money loans from the preemption 269-- and FHLBB interpretations,
opinions, and regulations. ' ° The court also found that this interpretation
"advances one of Congress's stated purposes for enacting § 501-increasing
266. Id.
267. Id. at *19. In making its decision the court was forced to address the impact of
a Federal Home Loan Bank Board official interpretation, which provided that the DIDMCA
preemption applied to a new first-lien loan which refinanced an old first-lien loan at a higher rate
of interest. Id. The court found this interpretation to have "no force on the instant facts" because
the debtors "were not seeking to refinance their homes but were seeking to purchase used cars."
Id. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Stapleton opined that DIDMCA clearly preempted state usury
limits in the loans in question:
The courtinexplicably concludes that Congress could
not have intended to preempt the application of state
usury laws to transactions involving a first lien on
residential real estate if the consumer intends to apply
the proceeds towards the purchase of a used car. This
purportedly narrow exception to § 501 is unsupported
by anything in the text of DIDMCA, its legislative
history, or the interpretive rulings of the FHLBB.
Id. at *21. Judge Stapleton believed that the court's decision made it impossible for lenders to
know which loans might be covered by the DIDMCA preemption. Id.
268. Smith, 898 F.2d 907.
269. Id. at 912. Interestingly, the court seems to imply that Congress consciously
rejected limiting the preemption to purchase money loans:
Congress could have provided for the preemption of
state usury laws with respect to any loan "secured by
a first lien on residential real property used to finance
the acquisition of such property." We think its failure
to do so in this context can hardly have been
inadvertent. In short, we believe that if Congress had
intended to limit the preemptive effect of§ 501 in this
manner, it "would have so stated in the language of
the provision."
Id. (citations and emphasis omitted). This assessment probably gave Congress too much credit
for considering the full effects of the preemption.
270. Id. at 913-14. The court referred to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
InterpretationNo. 590-2,45 Fed. Reg. 6165,6166 (1980); Opinion ofOffice ofGeneral Counsel,
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, No. S. 5 (Dec. 30, 1980); Opinion of Office of General
Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, No. S. 6 (June 2, 1980); see also FirstSouth F.A. v.
Lawson Square, Inc. (In re Lawson Square, Inc.), 61 B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986)
(referring to federal statute and state constitutional amendment).
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the ability of financial institutions to pay market rates of interest to
depositors."271
Most courts that have subsequently addressed the issue have agreed that
nonpurchase money lenders who take a first-lien position are entitled to the
DIDMCA preemption.272 However, at least one early decision under DIDMCA
avoided this issue, basing its decision on the lender's failure to produce strict
proof that the lender was a covered lender under DIDMCA.273 Many other
courts have similarly required lenders claiming entitlement to the DIDMCA
preemption to prove that they are a covered lender under the statute,274 or that
271. Smith, 898 F.2d at 914. The court obviously ignored the fact that the lender in
this case was not a depository lender. Id.
272. See, e.g., Brown v. Investors Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 1997); Gora
v. Bane One Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 95C2542, 1995 WL 613131 (N.D. 111. Oct 17, 1995) (citing
to the Smith decision extensively and criticizing the court's opinion in Fidelity Financial
Services, Inc. v. Hicks, 574 N.E.2d 15,21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)); L.G.H. Enters., Inc. v. Kadilac
Mortgage Bankers, Ltd. (In re L.G.H. Enters., 146 B.R. 612, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); see also
FirstSouth F.A. v. Lawson Square, Inc. (In re Lawson Square, Inc.), 61 B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr.
W.D. Ark. 1986), (holding that the DIDMCA preemption applied to a business loan made to a
commercial developer that was secured by a first lien on property being developed by the debtor
for residential use); Bank of N.Y. v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D.R.I. 1985) (holding that
the DIDMCA preemption applied to a residential condominium property construction loan
secured by a first lien on the property).
273. Russell v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co. (In re Russell), 72 B.R. 855, 868-69
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). In that case the lender provided the debtor in bankruptcy with a home
equity loan at an annual interest rate of 33.7%, and the borrower paid 17 points up front in
origination fees. Id. at 859. The lender submitted an affidavit of its president that stated that the
lender "makes or invests in real property loans that aggregate more than $1,000,000.00 per
year." Id. at 860. The court held that the lender was not entitled to the DIDMCA preemption
because the lender failed to prove that it made more than the required $1 million in mortgage
loans, making its interest and points charges usurious under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 860-861,
868. The borrower in Russell paid over $5,000 on her loan with a principal balance (after
subtracting fees that went to the lender and others) ofjust over $5,000. Nevertheless, when she
filed for bankruptcy four years after taking the loan, her principal balance had gone up from the
original principal balance. Id. at 860. But see Brown v. Investors Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472,
477 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the lender's affidavit was enough to establish that it made $1
million in loans).
274. McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Ark. 1981)
(finding that lender/developer had sufficiently demonstrated that it was a lender covered by the
DIDMCA first-lien preemption.); Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v.Hicks,574N.E.2d 15,21 (11. App
Ct.. 1991); Pacific Mortgage & Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Horn, 641 A.2d 913,922 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994); Mitchell v. Trustees of U.S. Mut. Real Estate Inv. Trust, 375 N. W. 2d 424,431 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1985). For other cases in which the creditor was charged with the burden of proving
that it was entitled to the DIDMCA preemption because of its loan activity, see Grant v. General
Elec. Credit Corp., 764 F.2d 1404, 1406 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Quiller v. Barclays
American/Credit, Inc., 727F.2d 1067,1071-72 (1 th Cir. 1984), reinstated, 764 F.2d 1400 (1 lth
Cir. 1985) (enbanc); Overton Constr., Inc. v. First State Bank, Springdale, 662 S.W.2d 470, 471
(Ark. 1984); First Amer. Bank & Trust v. Windjammer Time Sharing Resort, Inc., 483 So.2d
732,737-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). In contrast, the court inMoyer v. Citicorp Homeowners,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1445 (11 th Cir. 1986) held that the lender was entitled to the DIDMCA
preemption on a mobile home purchase, where the lender had complied with the DIDMCA
regulation (12 C.F.R. § 590.4(d) (1985)) requirement that right to prepay notice be in "type
larger than that used for the body of the documenf' by printing the notice in boldface type-even
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the loan was in fact a first lien.275 Other cases have stated in dicta that pursuant
to congressional policy and legislative history, the first-lien language should be
interpreted to apply only to purchase money mortgages.276 Nonetheless, there
has been almost no recent litigation asserting that the DIDMCA preemption
applies only to purchase money first liens; indeed, the opposite conclusion now
seems to be taken as a given.277 It is this conclusion that has paved the way for
the subprime home equity market that exists today.
V. MARKET DEVELOPMENTS SINCE TiE ADOPTION OF DIDMCA: Tm RISE
OF FIRST LIEN HOME EQUITY LENDING AND THE SUBPRIME MARKET
Several market factors developed in the 1980s and 1990s that combined by
the mid-1990s to create a large nonpurchase money subprime home equity
lending industry. These factors included increased home equity lending, the
growth of nondepository lenders, increased subprime lending, and the
development of a market for pooled loan securities. The following Sections will
describe these market forces and the subprime home equity industry that
though the typeface was not larger than the rest of the document-and where the notice did not
clearly inform borrowers they would have 30 days notice before foreclosure or acceleration of
the debt. Id. at 1448-49.
275. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co. (In re Grigsby), 119 B.R.
479, 490-91 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the lender was not entitled to the DIDMCA
preemption because the lender's miscalculation of the payoffon the first lien left it in second lien
position, even though lender and borrower may have intended for the lender to have first-lien
position); Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 574 N.E.2d at 21 (finding that the lender was not entitled to
the DIDMCA preemption where in one filing by lender, lender claimed it had a first-lien
position, and in other filing by lender, lender claimed it had second lien position).
276. Mitchell, 375 N.W.2d at 431. In addressing this issue, the court noted:
Section 501 of the act seems to reflect a
congressional effort to stimulate the housing industry
by assuring the availability of home loans, albeit at
potentially high interest rates. It follows, then, that a
construction of § 501's "first-lien" language should
be limited to those mortgages which secure purchase
money loans and not extended to nonpurchase-money
wraparound transactions aimed at refinancing and
debt consolidation. Refinancing transactions, such as
that in the instant case, do nothing to further federal
housing policies. In our opinion, it was not the intent
of Congress in enacting § 501 to include junior
mortgages executed for refinancing purposes among
the loan transactions exempted from state usury laws.
Id. Regarding the main issue in that case, the court found that a "wraparound mortgage," a
mortgage in which the first lender maintains a security in the property, was not a first-lien
mortgage under DIDMCA. Id. at 431-32; see also Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 574 N.E.2d at 21.
In Fidelity Financial, the court held that the evidence supported a finding that the loan was
subordinate to the original purchase money loan, but also stated that the 'first lien on residential
real property' language should be interpreted to apply only to purchase-money mortgages." Id
277. But see Brown v. Investors Mortgage Co., 121 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing limiting the statute to purchase money mortgages).
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developed from 1990 to 1999.
A. The Rise of Home Equity Lending As an Accepted and Encouraged
Method of Consumer Lending
Several things happened during 1979 and 1980-around the time
DIDMCA was passed-which led to massive increases in home equity lending.
First, by the time DIDMCA was adopted the same inflation that had pushed
interest rates up had also pushed up property values."' This led to a large
untapped security pool for lenders, and lending secured by home equity became
more popular.27 9 However, as interest rates soared in the early 1980s and the
country experienced a recession, consumer borrowing-including mortgage
borrowing-dropped significantly.28 Perhaps as a result of this, home equity
borrowing did not increase significantly between 1980 and 1986.28 '
278. Seiders, Recent Developments, supra note 78, at 177 ("The capital gains
associated with the rapid appreciation in home prices... have generated collateral for mortgage
credit that may be used for other purposes."). A Federal Reserve report in 1978 indicated that
the median selling price of existing homes approximately doubled between 1970 and 1977.
Seiders & Luckett, Household Borrowing, supra note 165, at 155. By late 1979 this "upward
trend of average homeprices slowed markedly." Luckett, RecentFinancialBehavior, supra note
135, at 439.
279. By 1978 the Federal Reserve estimated that there was over $900 billion in
available housing equity to serve as collateral for loans-double the amount available in 1970.
Seiders &Luckett, HouseholdBorrowing, supranote 165, at 155. By 1986 one article estimated
that there was $3 trillion dollars in untapped home equity. Bill Sing, Tax Code Changes Spur
Plans to Cope: Home EquityLoans Could Replace Consumer, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1986, at 1;
see also Walt Bogdanich, Second Thoughts: Home-Equity Loans Grow in Popularity--And in
Their Problems, WALL ST. J., January 29, 1986, at Al (stating that "second mortgage
indebtedness has more than doubled since 1982 to a record high of $150 billion."); Glenn B.
Canner & Charles A. Luckett, Mortgage Refinancing, 76 FED. REs. BULL. 604, 607 (1990)
[hereinafter Canner & Luckett, Mortgage Refinancing] (discussing the increase in available
home equity); Glenn B. Canner & Charles A. Luckett, Home Equity Lending: Evidence From
Recent Surveys, 80 FED. REs. BULL. 571, 572 (1994) [hereinafter Canner & Luckett, Recent
Surveys] (indicating that in the article's references to second mortgages it is referring to
traditional home equity loans, including those in which the lender technically has a first-lien
position).
280. Charles Luckett, Recent Developments in the Mortgage and Consumer Credit
Markets, 68 FED. RES. BULL. 281 (1982) [hereinafter Luckett, Recent Developments]; Robert B.
Avery etal., Changes in ConsumerlnstallmentDebt: Evidencefrom the 1983 and 1986 Surveys
of Consumer Finance, 73 FED. REs. BULL. 761 (1987) [hereinafter Avery, Changes in Consumer
Installment Debt].
281. Avery, Changes in Consumer Installment Debt, supra note 280. For example,
a Federal Reserve Board study showed that in 1977 only 5.4% of all homeowners had a home
equity loan. Canner& LuckettHome EquityLending, supra note 195, at 333; Canner& Luckett,
Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 572. An earlier study by the Federal Reserve showed that only
6% of households in 1977 with first mortgage debt also had ajunior mortgage, and only 7% of
households had refinanced their first mortgage in order to raise new funds. Seiders & Luckett,
Household Borrowing, supra note 165, at 156. By 1983 "this proportion had risen only slightly,
to 6.8%." Canner & Luckett, Home Equity Lending, supra note 195, at 333-34. One Federal
Reserve Board Report concluded that between 1983 and 1986 borrowers had not yet begun
substituting mortgage debt for consumer credit. Avery, Changes in ConsumerInstallment Debt,
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In 1986 Congress adopted the Tax Reform Act of 1986,28 which
disallowed the deductibility of consumer interest 83 but permitted taxpayers to
deduct interest paid on loans secured by the taxpayer's principal and one other
residence.' This deductibility encouraged increased home equity lending as
the preferred method of consumer borrowing.28
These tax changes, coupled with untapped equity that could be used to
secure loans and aggressive promotion by home equity lenders, spurred a
tremendous increase in consumer home equity borrowing in the mid-to-late
1980s.286 Thus by the second part of 1988, 11% of homeowners (about 6.5
million households) had a home equity loan, a percentage that was up from
6.8% in 1983.287 Of these home equity loans in 1988, 64% of traditional home
equity loans had been made since 1986.8 In dollar amounts, this meant that
home equity loans grew from "virtually nothing" in 1983 to "about $40 billion"
by the end of 1986.289 At around the same time, second mortgage indebtedness
more than doubled to a record high of about $150 billion in 1986.2' By the end
supra note 280, at 761.
282. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the I.R.C.)
283. § 511(b), 100 Stat. at 2246 (codified at I.R.C. § 163(h)(1), (2) (1993)). Prior to
the adoption of this act, most types of interest paid by individuals were deductible. Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 163, 68A Stat. 46,46 (repealed 1986).
284. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511 (b), 100 Stat. 2085,2247-49.
This ability to deduct interest paid on ahome equity loan was capped at $100,000 one yearlater.
Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X, § 10102, 101 Stat. 1330-84 to 1330-87
(codified at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1993)).
285. Two STEPs BACK, supra note 1, at 15; Glenn B. Canner, et al., Recent
Developments in HomeEquityLending, 84 FED.RES.BULL. 241,242 (1998) [hereinafter Canner,
Recent Developments]; Forrester, supra note 261, at 410-16; Sing, supra note 279; Thomas
Watterson, Con Artists Make the Home Equity Loan Even More Dangerous, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 24, 1987, at 17.
286. Avery, Changes in ConsumerInstallment Debt, supra note 286, at 761; Canner
& Luckett, Home Equity Lending, supra note 195, at 334 (also attributing the increase in home
equity lending to aggressive promotions by financial institutions); Canner & Luckett, Recent
Surveys, supra note 279, at 571-72.
287. Canner & Luckett, Home EquityLending, supra note 195, at 333-34. The survey
found that about half of these borrowers had a traditional home equity loan, while the other half
had home equity lines of credit. Id. Home equity lines of credit are used mostly by "upscale"
borrowers, whereas lower income borrowers continue to get mostly home equity loans. Id. at
336. This Article does not discuss home equity lines of credit because they have not been a part
of the subprime home-secured lending problem.
288. Id. at334.
289. Sing, supra note 279, at 15; Seiders & Luckett, Household Borrowing, supra
note 165, at 156 (indicating that nonpurchase money home-secured borrowing was at $40 billion
by the fourth quarter of 1977).
290. Bogdanich, supra note 279, at Al; see also Sing, supra note 279, at 15
(estimating second mortgage indebtedness to be about $160 billion in 1986). It is unclear
whether this use of the term"second mortgage" refers to mortgages in which the lender has taken
a second lien, or simply to nonpurchase mortgage loans. Canner & Luckett, Home Equity
Lending, supra note 195, at 344 n.2 (noting that "[t]raditional home equity loans are sometime
called second mortgages, although legally they may involve a first lien.").
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of 1988 home equity loans were between $135 billion and $190 billion.29'
By 1989 one survey estimated that 15% of mortgage debt holders held a
home equity loan.' That year also saw the beginning of a disturbing trend
whereby homeowners began to pay off existing mortgages by borrowing
additional funds. In some cases the additional loan carried a higher rate than the
original mortgage.2 93 Generally, home equity loans in the 1980s, which were
being made mostly to prime borrowers, were still cast mostly as second
mortgages and tended to have lower balances, shorter maturities, and low
combined loan to value ratios (that is, the combined loan-to-value ratio of both
the first and second mortgages).'
By 1994, 12.9% of homeowners (about 8.2 million households) had home
equity debt,295 totaling about $255 billion in home equity debt by the end of
1993.296 Of these, 8.3% had a home equity line of credit, while 4.9% (worth
about $145 billion)2 had traditional home equity loans.298 Although this may
give the impression that there was little increase in home equity lending
between 1988 (when 11% of households had home equity debt)299 and 1994,
Federal Reserve reports indicate that the 12.9% figure does not include home
equity lending rolled into a refinancing of the borrower's first mortgage.300 The
291. Canner& Luckett, Home Equity Lending, supra note 195, at 339. The authors
of the Federal Reserve study stated that it was difficult to isolate the amount of home mortgage
debt attributable to home equity lending on the books of depository lenders because they were
not required to report this separately. Id. at 340. Home equity lines of credit were at about $75
billion by the end of 1988, putting the total home equity debt to between $210 billion and $265
billion, and making up between 10% and 12% of all home mortgage debt. Id.
292. Canner & Luckett, Mortgage Refinancing, supra note 279, at 607. Even with
this growth in home equity lending, the purpose for which home equity loans were used in the
1980s remained fairly consistent with earlier loan uses, with 45% of traditional home equity
loans being used for home improvement, 35% used for repayment of other debts, and 16% used
for other real estate related charges in 1988. Canner & Luckett, HomeEquityLending, supra note
204, at 338. By contrast, only 5% of traditional home equity loans were used for car purchases.
Canner & Luckett, Mortgage Refinancing, supra note 296. Canner & Luckett, Recent Surveys,
supra note 279, at 577.
293. Canner & Luckett, Mortgage Refinancing, supra note 279, at 611 (finding that
60% of borrowers who refinanced home mortgage loans in 1989 also borrowed additional
funds). This arrangement, of course, generally puts the lender in first-lien position. However, the
study suggests that in 1989 home equity loans were still more prevalent than borrowing on home
equity through refinancing, with 7% of all homeowners refinancing a mortgage for more than
the original mortgage in order to liquidate equity, and 11 % of all homeowners taking out some
kind of home equity loan. Id.
294. James D. August et al., Survey ofFinance Companies, 1996,83 FED. RES. BuLL.
543, 549, n.15 (1997) [hereinafter August, Survey].
295. Canner & Luckett, Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 572.
296. Id. at 579.
297. Id.
298. Id. This percentage of households having traditional home equity loans was
actually a decrease from a rate of 5.4% in 1997. Id.
299. Canner & Luckett, Home Equity Lending, supra note 195, at 333-34.
300. Canner & Luckett, Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 572, 582. In discussions
of this phenomenon, the Federal Reserve reports focus not on subprime lending, but on the
decrease in interest rates between 1991 and 1994 that motivated homeowners to refinance and
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report also excludes data regarding loans securitized and removed from the
balance sheet of loan originators. 1 Refinancing the first mortgage while
making a home equity loan is a common feature in subprime home-secured
lending, and is in fact necessary to enable the lender to take the first-lien
position and avail itself ofthe DIDMCA preemption. Moreover, securitization
and removal of loans from a company's balance sheet is a funding technique
used by some subprime home equity lenders. Thus the 12.9% figure probably
excludes a great deal of subprime lending. Additionally, the Federal Reserve
reports are based on bank, savings and loan, and finance company data required
to be reported by those entities that do not categorize commercial and
residential information separately or designate lien position. °" Thus the report
indicates that although its home equity lending estimates by 1994 were more
accurate than in the late 1980s, the estimates from 1990 forward "should still
be viewed as subject to a fairly wide margin of error.""3 3
Another notable market development by 1994 was an increase in the
percentage of home equity loans being used to repay other debts, up
significantly from 35% in 1988304 to 68% in 1993 and 1994.05 Concurrently,
there was a decrease in the number of home equity loans being used for home
improvements. In 1988, 45% of traditional home equity loans were used for
home improvements. 3 6 By contrast, in 1993 and 1994, only 38% of home
liquidate equity by borrowing more than necessary to refinance their outstanding balances. Id.
at 582. A similar limitation was recognized by the Federal Reserve in its report of data from 1989
and 1992 surveys:
[T]he survey did not ask respondents about how the
funds from a first mortgage were used: They are
assumed to have been used to purchase a home.
However, when mortgages are refinanced, people
may extract funds from their accumulated equity
beyond what is needed to finance the balance on their
existing mortgage. The rise in refinancing noted
earlier underscores the potential importance of such
borrowing.
Arthur B. Kennickell & Martha Starr-McCluer, Changes in Family Financesfrom 1989 to 1992:
Evidence From the Survey of Consumer Finances, 80 FED. REs. BULL. 861,875 (1994). A report
by John C. Weicher, published by the Hudson Institute and funded by members of the subprime
home equity industry, recognizes the same limitation of applicability of similar 1989 Federal
Reserve reports. JOHN C. WEICHER, HUDSON INSTITUTE, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY:
REFINANCING MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 99 n.20 (1997).
301. Canner & Luckett, Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 579 n.l.
302. For example, finance company lending is reported to the Federal Reserve on a
monthly basis in terms of total real estate credit, but the finance company reports do not
distinguish between commercial and residential mortgage credit, or between first and second
mortgages. Id. at 579 ("Estimating the amount of traditional home equity debt outstanding is
somewhat more difficult, because fewer institutions provide specific data on this type of
loan ....").
303. Id.
304. Canner & Luckett, Home Equity Lending, supra note 195, at 338.
305. Canner & Luckett, Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 577.
306. Canner & Luckett, Home Equity Lending, supra note 195, at 338.
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equity loans were so used.3 7 This may have been caused by the 1986 tax
change, but may also have been an indication that lenders were aggressively
promoting debt consolidation loans secured by the borrower's residence30 8
In 1995 home equity lending grew 11% from the previous year, and in
1996 it grew another 17% to a total of $350 billion.3" By 1997 outstanding
home equity debt was at $420 billion,310 and although the percentage of
households with home equity debt stayed constant between 1993 to 1994 and
1997-at about 13% -- the number of households with home equity debt grew
about 10%, along with a growth in the number of households.311 Of those
households with home equity debt, about 9 million (roughly 5% of households)
had home equity loans, as opposed to home equity lines of credit.312 This $420
billion represented a 60% increase from 1993 home equity loan totals.
However, these figures ignored home equity borrowing tied to refinancing
314
and were based on imprecise estimates.3"'
In addition to a tremendous increase in home equity lending, during the
1990s the types of home equity loans being made also changed significantly.
The 1980s trend of making prime loans as second mortgages gave way to an
increase in First-lien subprime loans-loans with variable terms, such as
adjustable rates, nonpurchase uses, and high loan-to-value ratios.3"6 Thus the
increase in home equity lending in general eventually led to an increase in
subprime home equity lending.
307. Canner & Luckett, Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 577.
308. For a discussion of subprime home equity loan solicitation techniques, see infra
Part VI.D.2.
309. August, Survey, supra note 294, at 549; see also Arthur B. Kennickell, et al.,
Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 83 FED.
REs. BULL. 1, 16 (1997) [hereinafter Kennickell, Recent Evidence]. This report found:
The proportion of families borrowing through
mortgage loans in 1995 was up slightly from the 1989
level, but the median amount outstanding rose about
30 percent over the six-year period. Over the same
period, the median value of a primary residence rose
only 4.8 percent; the much larger rise in the size of
mortgage debt suggests that families were using more
of their home equity for purchases or investments
other than the purchase of their primary residence.
Id.
310. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 285, at 242, 248.
311. Id. at243.
312. Id.
313. Id. at251.
314. Id. at 243. But see id. at 251.
315. Id. at 251 ("Estimating the amount of traditional home equity debt outstanding
[as opposed to home equity lines of credit] is somewhat more difficult: Fewer institutions
provide specific data on this type of credit, and much of the recent growth has been among
holders for whom the data are the least precise.").
316. August, Survey, supra note 294, at 549 n.15.
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B. The Explosion ofMortgage Brokers and Nondepository Lenders
In the mid and late 1980s the home equity loan and home mortgage loan
market shifted away from traditional banks and thrift institutions, and new
players emerged in the home-secured lending market. First, the number of
home loan mortgage brokers increased significantly.3 7 Second, nondepository
mortgage lenders began to take a larger role in the market.318
In 1977 nondepository mortgage lenders, such as finance and mortgage
companies, lent only 1% of all home mortgage funds.319 In 1979 finance and
mortgage companies lent only .5% of all home mortgage funds.32 However, by
1989 nondepository lenders had a "significant market share," making 32% of
all traditional home equity loans.32 ' By 1990 real estate receivables at finance
companies, which would include purchase money loans and nonpurchase
money/home equity loans, amounted to $61.2 billion dollars, and securitized
receivables were up to $24.9 billion.3' This steady growth of finance company
participation in real estate lending is significant because these lenders are now
the most active group of subprime, nonpurchase money lenders.3u
By 1994 finance companies held about $40 billion of outstanding debt on
traditional home equity loans.3  This made finance companies the second
highest lender of traditional home equity loans.3" The character of mortgage
lenders also changed in the early '90s as the savings and loan industry declined,
and "the increase in the local presence of national mortgage lenders changed
the types of institutions that families faced when obtaining loans."326
By 1995 finance companies held 21% of all outstanding family debt,
317. Bogdanich, supra note 279, at A2 (reporting that in New York the number of
loan brokers had jumped from 54 in 1983 to 136 in 1985).
318. Two STEPs BACK, supra note 1, at 40 (stating that "[the] shift of mortgage
lending from depository institutions to mortgage companies has drastically reduced the
proportion of home lending being examined by bank and thrift regulators").
319. Seiders & Luckett, Household Borrowing, supra note 165, at 153 tbl. 1.
320. Luckett, Recent Financial Behavior, supra note 132, at 437 tbl. 1.
321. Canner & Luckett, Mortgage Refinancing, supra note 279, at 608. The lenders
included in this figure include not only finance companies, brokerage firms, and mortgage
companies, but also previous owners, contractors or developers, employers, government
agencies, and relatives. Id.
322. August, Survey, supra note 294, at 548.
323. WEICHMR, supra note 300, at 12,22. A 1994 Federal Reserve report noted that
finance companies tend to make loans to lower income borrowers. Canner & Luckett, Recent
Surveys, supra note 279, at 573; accord August, Survey, supra note 300, at 548 (finding that
home equity loans extended by finance companies were generally to borrowers "below the top
tier in credit quality.").
324. Canner and Luckett, Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 579.
325. Id.
326. Kennickell and Star-McCluer, supra note 300, at 861. This study attributes
growth in overall loan activity by finance companies to failures of savings and loans, and to a
resulting decrease in loan origination market share by savings and loans (from 23.5% in 1989
to 18.9% in 1992). Id. at 879 tbl.12. At the same time, finance companies had a 12.9% loan
origination market share in 1992, up from 9.4% in 1989. Id. at 879.
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compared with 13.5% in 1992 and 9.6% in 1989.327 By 1996 there were
approximately 1,250 nondepository financial institutions in the United States,
although market share in the industry was concentrated in the top 20 firms.328
Real estate lending by finance companies, which would include purchase
money loans and nonpurchase money/ home equity loans, amounted to almost
$104 billion by mid-1996 (including $23.5 billion in securitized real estate
loans, compared to $0 in 1990).311 Of this $104 billion inreal estate receivables,
$71 billion was to individual homeowners in one-to-four family properties, and
nearly all were home equity, nonpurchase money loans.330 This rapid growth
continued between mid-1996 and March 1997, with loans to individual
homeowners growing at a 27.2% rate, from $70.7 billion in receivables
outstanding in mid-1996 to $85.1 billion in receivables outstanding in March,
1997.331 Because these figures do not include mortgage banking companies that
finance their lending through securitization, which make many subprime home-
secured loans,332 the size of the nondepository mortgage loan industry was even
larger than these numbers reflect. By 1997 finance companies had outstanding
traditional home equity loan debt of $48 billion, not including debt outstanding
in securitized pools.
33
C. The Rise ofSubprime Lending as a DistinctIndustry and the Subprime
Home Equity Industry
Among the nondepository lenders taking a new role in the consumer
financial services market in the 1980s and 1990s were lenders that specialized
inlendingto borrowers who were previously unable to get credit. These lenders
became known as "subprime lenders," a term that referred to the supposed
credit quality of the customers to whom they were making loans.
The subprime lending industry experienced tremendous growth in the
1980s and 1990s. In 1983, for example, subprime lending made up only 1.4%
of all loans. 334 By 1998 subprime loans made up 10.2 % of all loans.335 The
industry experienced its most rapid and most significant growth in the home
equity lending market.
While it is difficult to determine with precision just how big the subprime
327. Kennickell, Recent Evidence, supra note 309, at 20 tbl.13.
328. August, Survey, supra note 294, at 548 (finding that the top 20 firms owned
71% of total industry receivables in 1996).
329. Id. at 548, 547 tbl 1. This was a 9.2% increase between 1990 and 1996. Id.
330. Id. at 548. The report estimates that this made up about one-fifth of the entire
home equity market Id.
331. Id. at 550-51 thl. 6.
332. Id. at548 n.12.
333. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 285, at 251.
334. Fred Faust, Minorities Likely to Pay More for Loans, Report Says, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Oct 22, 1999, at C8.
335. Id.
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home equity market really iS,336 the subprime home equity lending market
clearly expanded rapidly during the early 1990s, with "over 90% of all
subprime mortgage loans made in or after 1993." 337
This growth increased even more during the last half of the 1990s, with a
tremendous increase in the number of subprime home equity loans being
made.338 For example, in 1990 subprime home equity loan origination volume
was at $7 billion. 39 By contrast, in 1996 subprime loan origination volume was
between $100 billion and $150 billion-most of which was home equity
lending.3' By 1997 home equity subprime origination generated around $125
billion.3"' This made up about "11.5% of the total home equity lending market
336. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 285, at 250. This report found:
The volume of subprime home equity credit cannot
be estimated with much precision, in large part
because definitional distinctions among different
types of loans are not clear. With much of subprime
home equity credit funded by securitization, an
approximate measure of the volume of subprime
credit can be derived from securitization volumes.
But the loan pools designated as "home equity" pools
frequently contain subprime purchase-money
mortgages or refinanced loans as well; they may also
mix some higher-quality home equity loans with the
subprime paper. Conversely, not all subprime home
equity loans are securitized.
Id. The same report found that "the rapid development ofsecuritization ofhome equity loans and
the expanding role of mortgage companies and specialized home equity lenders, for whom data
reporting is fragmentary" had "introduced new sources of imprecision into the estimates" of
home equity loans. Id. at 251; see also PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 10
(explaining that because of reporting requirements and mixed prime and subprime lending by
some lenders "determining the subprime market is not straightforward.").
337. Home Equity Lending Abuses in the Subprime Mortgage Industry: Hearings
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. at 63 (1998) (statement of Jodie
Bernstein, Dir. of Consumer Protection of the FTC) [hereinafter Home Equity Lending Abuses,
Hearings]; see also Matt Murray, Ford's Loan Unit Draws Criticism at a Hearing, WALLST.J.,
Mar. 17, 1998, at A4 ("Soaring profits fueled rapid growth in the business in the early 1990s,
attracting numerous new players but leading to a credit glut.").
338. The Weicher report estimated that ten years earlier the industry was "perhaps
one-half to one-tenth its current size." WEICHER, supra note 300, at 22.
339. Liz Pulliam,'Sub-Prime'Lenders in Credit Crunch, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998,
at Cl.
340. Jesus Sanchez, Sub-Prime Time Finance: Faced With Thinning Profit Margins,
Big Mortgage Lenders are Moving into High Risk Territory, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1997, at Dl.
In the same year there was about $800 billion in conventional mortgage origination. Id. Based
on these figures, this meant that in 1996 the volume of subprime loans grew twice as fast as the
volume of conventional loans. Id.
341. Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337. The Weicher report
gave much lower numbers, showing subprime home equity lending at $65 billion in 1995, $43
billion in 1996, and $60 billion in 1997. WEicHER, supra note 300, at 33, 97 n.1.
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in 1996" and 15.5% of the market in 1997.342 By another estimate, between
1995 and 1997 "subprime lenders more than tripled their market share of the
total mortgage market... originat[ing] a full 15% of all mortgages, up from
4% in 1995."343 By a third estimate, the number ofsubprime nonpurchase loans
increased by 890% between 1993 and 1998.34 In 1999 subprime loans are
expected to make up more than 10% of the mortgage market and account for
more than $150 billion in loan originations.
A recent study ofsubprime mortgage lending in Chicago also demonstrates
the tremendous growth of subprime lending. In 1997 there were 50,953
subprime home equity loans made in the Chicago area, compared with 3,137
in 1991.346 This was a 1,524% increase.347 During the same time, nonsubprime
loan origination volume grew by only 20,194 loans, a 14.6% increase.3 48
Subprime market share in the Chicago area rose from 2.6% of all loan
originations in 1991 to 24.3% in 1997.349 According to the same study one
subprime lender, The Money Store, made 584 subprime home equity loans in
the Chicago area in 1994 and 2,906 of those loans in 1997-a 400%
increase.350 Thus, as one 1998 Federal Reserve Report observed, "a new
element has given a sharp boost to overall growth in home equity lending over
the past couple of years, and that is the vigorous marketing by nonbank lenders
to the 'subprime' segment of the market-homeowners with relatively low
incomes, limited equity, or tarnished credit histories. 351
During the 1990s the number of lenders making subprime home equity
loans also increased dramatically. This growth included some conventional
mortgage lenders who ventured into the subprime market in the mid-1990s to
find new customers and tap into market profits, 3 2 as well as other types of
342. Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337. The Weicher report
estimated that subprime mortgage lending, including purchase money and nonpurchase money
lending, grew at an annual rate of 25% between 1996 and 1997. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 37.
The same report estimated that by 1997 subprime, nonpurchase money first-lien lending
accounted for "5 to 10 percent of total mortgage originations in the U.S." Id. at 11, 22, 97 n.1.
343. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 6.
344. Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 5.
345. Christine B. Whelan, FTC Cracks Down on Lending Abuses in Subprime Area,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 1999, at CIO.
346. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 4; Unregulated Subprime Loans
Cause Chicago-Area Foreclosure Rates to Double, NTIC Study Finds, PRNEwsWvRE, Sept. 20,
1999, at 1, available in LEXIS News Library, PR Newswire File [hereinafter Unregulated
Subprime Loans].
347. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at4; Unregulated Subprime Loans,
supra note 366, at 1.
348. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 17.
349. Id. at 16; Unregulated Subprime Loans, supra note 347, at 1.
350. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 6. The study also found thatmost
of these loans were made in "lower-income neighborhoods." Id.
351. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 285, at 249.
352. For example, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., which had previously done only
prime lending, moved into the subprime market in March 1997 with a division called Full
Spectrum. Sanchez, supra note 340, at DI. Countrywide's reason for entering into the market
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consumer companies that bought subprime mortgage companies." After a
shortage of funds in late 1998, and after what some have described as a crash
in subprime lender stocks during the first week of October 1998,314 the industry
seemed to experience some consolidation, and some market participants filed
forbankrupty.11 Consumer lawsuits and government investigations may have
also contributed to these business failures.356 Since that time, there seems to
was the size of the subprime borrower pool, and the fact that it could tap into this pool by
directing to its new division the borrowers that were turned down by its prime division. Id.; see
also 1998 Year in Review and 1999 Outlook, Home Equity Asset-Backed Securities: To HEL in
a Handbasket 6, MOODY's STRUCTURED FINANCE SPECIAL REPORT (Moody's Investors Service,
New York, N.Y.), Jan. 8,1999 [hereinafter 1998 Year in Review]; James S. Granelli, California:
Another Subprime Lender, New Century, Files for IPO, L.A. TIMES, April 22, 1997, at D2
(stating that the "hot" subprime mortgage market had "spurred mergers and acquisitions" and
pushed the traditional loan companies to join the subprime market). For an examination of bank
movement into the subprime home equity market, see Evan M. Gilreath, Note, The Entrance of
Banks into Subprime Lending: First Union and The Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149
(1999).
353. For example, in April 1997 H&R Block acquired Option One Mortgage Corp.
for $190 Million. Granelli, supra note 352, at D2. This sudden growth in the number and type
of market participants caused one commentator to state that "[a] lot of new entrants are going
to have their heads handed to them." Sanchez, supra note 340, at DI. In 1998 First Union Corp.,
the nation's then sixth largest bank, bought The Money Store, a company that started out as a
subprime home equity loan lender and has since diversified into other financial services. 1998
Year in Review, supra note 352, at 6; Murray, supra note 337, at A4.
354. In the second week of October 1998 some stocks fell as much as 70%. Pulliam,
supra note 339, at Cl. This article indicated that "[t]he Wall Street funding that provided much
of the capital for these loans is drying up, as recent severe losses in foreign financial markets and
in the U.S. stock market have caused major banks and brokerages to shrink from risk-taking,"
and that investors instead invested in U.S. Treasury securities and other safer investments. Id.;
see also Liz Pulliam, 'Sub-Prime'Lender Merger Deals Collapse, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1998,
at Cl [hereinafterPulliam, 'Sub-Prime 'LenderMergerDeals] (giving as an example of the stock
crash in October 1998 the value of stock in FirstPlus Financial Group, Inc., which made many
125% loan-to-value loans, and whose stock fell from about $40 per share in March 1998 to $2.56
in October 1998); 1998 Year in Review, supra note 352, at 4.
355. Bankruptcies have included Southern Pacific Funding Corp. (Oct. 1, 1998),
Criimi Mae Inc. (Oct. 5, 1998), and Cityscape Financial Corp. (Oct. 7, 1998). Pulliam, supra
note 339, at Cl; Pulliam, Sub-Prime Lender Merger Deals, supra note 354, at Cl. Other
companies experienced financial problems. For example, in October 1998 Dylan Mortgage
started to "go under" when it couldn't sell $46 million in loans to other mortgage holding
companies. Cory Reiss, Bank in Court to Halt Lender's Building Sale, MORNING STAR
(Wilmington, N.C.), Aug. 24, 1999, at 2B. Between then and August 1999, Dylan laid offmore
than 250 employees-about 95% of its work force. Id.
356. For example, several consumer plaintiffs prevailed in lawsuits against United
Companies Financial Corp. and/or its home equity loan subsidiary, United Companies Lending
Corp. In one case, United unsuccessfully attempted to get declaratory relief invalidating the
Massachusetts Attorney General's regulation prohibiting unconscionable points. United Cos.
Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 209-10 (D. Mass. 1998). The regulation was
upheld, and United ultimately settled with an agreement to pay substantial refunds of points to
Massachusetts borrowers. Id.; see also Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp.2d 444
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that United withheld required disclosures from plaintiffs and
overcharged in loan origination fees and finance charges); Autrey v. United Cos. Lending Corp.,
872 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Ala. 1995); Autrey v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 723 So.2d 617, 624
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have been a concentration of market share in a smaller number of stronger
market participants." 7 However, analysts do not expect the business to go
away. "Instead, it is likely to shift to larger, better-financed companies that can
provide their own funding," such as Associates and Household International."'
There are several reasons why the subprime home equity market grew so
rapidly in the 1990s.359 First, subprime lending has been viewed as risky but
quite profitable.360 Second, success in expanding the number of lower income
individuals who own their own homes has provided a new market for subprime
lenders to target.361' Third, the easy availability of unsecured credit, such as
credit cards, and the lack of health insurance have caused some families to
resort to tapping into their home equity to pay their bills.362 Finally,
securitization and an increased number of mortgage brokers have played a large
role in the growth of the subprime market.
D. The Increased Use of Securitization to Fund Loans
Yet another market development that now plays a large role in subprime
home-secured lending is the increased reliance on securitization of loan pools
(Ala. 1998)(holding that United was prohibited from charging points in excess of that amount
set forth under Alabama law); United Cos. Lending Corp. v. McGehee, 686 So. 2d 1171, 1173-
74 (Ala. 1996) (alleging that United made false representations to plaintiffs in connection with
a loan transaction); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1998)
(finding that arbitration clauses contained in loan documents were unconscionable and
invalidating them). In March 1999, United filed for bankruptcy. Troubled LenderFiles Chapter
11, AP Online, March 1, 1999, available in WESTLAW 1999 WL12934492 (1999) (mentioning
United's plans to file for bankruptcy).
Dylan Mortgage in North Carolina, which had serious financial problems in October
1998, had been the target of an investigation by North Carolina's Attorney General. Reiss, supra
note 355, at 2B. After the Attorney General began its investigation, Dylan changed its name to
Chase Mortgage and began brokering rather than funding mortgages. Id. In another example,
shares of First Alliance Corp. fell 83% in 1998. Pulliam, supra note 339, at C1. At the time, they
were under investigation by state and federal regulators in regard to their lending practices. Id.
357. Some larger market participants have acquired other market participants. For
example, Aames Financial Corp. acquired One Stop Mortgage. Sanchez, supra note 352, at D 1.
Other companies have indicated that they were open to takeovers. See, e.g., Murray, supra note
337, at A4 (explaining that in March 1998 Beneficial Corporation had put itself "on the block"
looking for a purchaser).
358. Pulliam, supra note 339, at Cl. Indeed, the FTC cites the growth of subprime
lending by large nationwide corporations as a "dramatic change" in the subprime market. Home
Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337, at 63. Some people believe that if, as
expected, banks and other large firms take over the subprime market, this will lower the costs
of making and servicing subprime loans. Karen Thomas, Regulators Say RESPA and HOEPA
Need Better Enforcement, 9 ORIGINATION NEws, Oct. 1, 1999, at 43. Some, though not all, also
think that this decrease in cost will be passed on to consumers. Id.; see generally 1998 Year in
Review, supra note 352, at 9 (discussing the outlook for subprime loans in 1999).
359. For a flow chart entitled "The Causes of Increased Predatory Lending in
Minority and Lower-Income Communities", see Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 13.
360. Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337.
361. TWo STEPs BACK, supra note 1, at 12.
362. Id. at 12, 14.
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to provide funds to lenders. Securitization involves grouping loans into loan
pools. Securities are sold in the pools by various investment banking firms."
Any given securities offering in a pool of subprime loans will have several
classes of investments available for purchase by investors.364 Investors are
compensated through interest paid based on the class of securities purchased
by the investor. There is always a spread between the interest paid to investors
and the interest charged to borrowers on loans in the pool. The difference
between the amount paid by the borrowers and the amounts paid to investors
is meant to cover the lender's risk of loss and any servicing costs. After such
costs, any money left from this difference in interest in usually paid to the
lender.365 The pools of loans are sometimes insured or credit-enhanced, and
they are rated by the various major bond rating agencies.
3"
Subprime lenders began to securitize pools of loans in earnest by the mid
1990's. In 1994 subprime lenders securitized approximately $10 billion worth
of home equity loans.3" By the end of 1997 "the amount of home equity credit
in securitized pools was about $90 billion... much of it believed to be
subprime in quality. '3 6 This was about one-fifth of all the outstanding home
equity credit at the end of 1997.369 In 1998 there was a 30% increase in
securitization of subprime home equity loans, with a total 1998 volume of
around $85 billion, despite a slight drop in securitizations during the end of
1998.370 This led the Federal Reserve to comment, "[m]ost subprime lenders
place heavy reliance on securitization oftheir loans to fund their operations."37'
VI. CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN SUBPRJMENONPURCHASE MONEY HOME-
SECURED LENDING
A. What is a Subprime Home Equity Loan?
A subprime home equity loan is a loan made to a borrower who, according
to a particular lender's underwriting standards and the lender's assessment and
categorization of the borrower, does not qualify for a loan at a conventional
363. August, Survey, supra note 294, at 543-44.
364. WEICHmR, supra note 300, at 33.
365. When loans in a securitized pool go into default, the lender may repurchase the
loan out of the pool, thereby decreasing the loss to investors and decreasing the spread paid to
the lender. 1998 Year in Review, supra note 352, at 8.
366. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 33.
367. TWo STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 12.
368. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 285, at 250.
369. Id.
370. 1998 Year in Review, supra note 352, at 1-2; see also Two STEPS BACK, supra
note I, at 12 (statingthatin 1998, "theissuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) forhome equity
loans ... [was approximately] $80 billion").
371. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 285, at 249.
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mortgage rate.372 Each subprime lender sets its own underwriting standards
through funding matrices. These matrices set certain criteria that define a
borrower as subprime, and further grade the borrower into a subprime category
(A, B, C, or D).373 Within the funding matrices, the minimum costs of the loan
go up with each credit downgrade.374 Thus if a lender designates a particular
borrower as a "C borrower" the minimum interest rate that borrower will get
is higher than if the same borrower were categorized as a "B borrower." These
funding matrices purportedly categorize borrowers based on their credit history,
property loan-to-value ratios and, sometimes, on the borrowers' credit
scores-a number assigned to borrowers based on a credit scoring system
developed by the lender itself or by the Fair, Isaacs & Company (FICO) credit
scoring system. The matrices then set a loan rate based on the lender's
categorization of the borrower.375
Because each subprime lender maintains its own underwriting standards,
there is tremendous diversity in funding standards across the subprime
industry.376 Furthermore, any given company's funding standards change
periodically.
377
Despite the appearance from the matrices of uniform application of funding
standards, it is well known in the industry that subprime lenders do not strictly
follow their underwriting guidelines. As the Weicher report found, "[subprime
home equity lender funding] matrices are themselves only general
guidelines .... 'Underwriting to the matrix is an art, not a science.' ' 378 Thus,
372. As explained by the Federal Reserve, "Subprime loans include those with more
lenient underwriting standards (such as high loan-to-value ratios), those made to borrowers with
blemished credit histories, and those with both characteristics." August, Survey, supra note 294,
at 549; see generally WEICHER, supra note 300, at 34,56-57 (noting that subprime borrowers are
further categorized by lenders in funding subcategories usually designated as A-, B, C, or D, with
A- being the best of these categorizations and D being the worst).
373. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 34-35.
374. Id. at 57 tbl.4-1.
375. For a description of the Fair, Isaacs Credit Scoring system see WEICHER, supra
note 300, at 36-37. For example, the Weicher report, published by the Hudson Institute and
funded by members of the subprime home equity industry, found that the range of credit histories
that put a borrower in a B-rated category ranged from two to four thirty-day delinquencies, or
three thirty-and one sixty-day delinquency. Id. at 34; August, Survey, supra note 294, at 549. For
some companies, the funding matrix sets the rate that can be charged to borrowers placed in that
category, but then allows the rate to be increased by an undesignated amount in a number of
circumstances. See, e.g., United Companies Lending Corporation, Fixed and ARM Loan
Programs and Underwriting Parameters, January 1, 1996, Trial Exhibit U1-33, 16-17, Newton
v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
376. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 13, 34-37 (finding that "[t]here is general
agreement in the industry that [funding and credit] standards vary across firms."). For an
example of subprime grades, see Sanchez, supra note 340, at DI.
377. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 35.
378. WEicHER, supra note 300, at 35 (quoting Rudy Orman, Originating and
Marketing Techniques for B/C Mortgages Through Wholesale & Correspondent Channels,
Presentation at the Non-Conforming Credit Lending Canference of the Mortgage Bankers
Association of America (Jan. 13,1997); see also Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (recognizing that
United set its underwriting standards based on "what it was already doing in terms of evaluating
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in many cases, rates and points may be assigned to an individual borrower with
no reference to the funding matrix at all. This tendency toward nonuniform
application of underwriting standards is probably exacerbated by the various
types of agents that originate subprime home equity loans on behalf of
subprime lenders. Some subprime lenders maintain retail offices, making loans
directly to borrowers through these offices. 79 Other loans are made by
"correspondent lenders" with borrowed funds from another lender. 8 However,
other loans are made by mortgage brokers who then sell the loans to subprime
companies after taking a fee out of the disbursed loan funds.3 ' In this case the
larger the loan, and the worse the credit categorization, the higher the broker's
fee, thereby providing incentive for brokers to write larger loans and give
borrowers poorer credit categorizations than they might deserve."2 The same
incentive may be present in retail and correspondent lending structures, with
employee commissions serving as the impetus for overcharging borrowers.383
Whether the borrower deserves to be categorized as subprime or not, and
whether the lender even attempts to categorize the borrower as subprime or
within credit grades, one thing is certain: a subprime loan involves higher
interest rates and fees than the borrower would pay if the borrower were made
a conventional loan.
84
the ability of low-income households to repay loans" and not based on "any research or study,"
and finding that United had not followed these underwriting standards in making the loans that
were the subject of the case) (citations omitted); 1998 Year in Review, supra note 352, at 6
(mentioning Freddie Mac's "'A-minus' quality subprime loans).
379. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 13, 32. The Weicher report estimated that this
makes up approximately one-sixth of the market. Id. It also found that in 1996 retail operations
accounted for 17% of subprime loan originations. Id.
380. This practice sometimes is referred to as "table funding," and the line of credit
issued by the backup lender to the initial lender is called a "warehouse line of credit." 24 C.F.R.
§ 3500.2 (1999) (defining table funding). The Weicher report found that in 1996 correspondents
accounted for approximately 47% of subprime loan originations. WEICHER, supra note 300, at
32.
381. WEICHE, supra note 300, at 13, 32. The Weicher report found that in 1996
mortgagebrokers accounted for36% ofsubprime loan originations. Id. Recently, borrowers have
sued mortgage brokers and others over broker fees and how such fees are disclosed. See, e.g,
Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 132 F.3d 692, 694 (11th Cir. 1998). This yield spread
premium issue is outside the scope of this Article.
382. The Woodstock Institute Study recognizes that lenders have an "incentive to
refinance all outstanding debt even if the rate of the new loan is higher than the existing
mortgage" because this brings the loan principal up and thus generates higher points and fees
for the lender and/or broker. Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 19.
383. See generallyNewton, 24 F. Supp. 2d at449-50 (recognizing that the loan officer
had acted dishonestly in order to protect his commission).
384. Canner, RecentDevelopments, supra note 302, at 249 ("Loans in this higher-risk
segment carry interest rates several percentage points higher than those on 'A-quality' home
equity loans ...."); Pulliam, supra note 339, at CI ("Subprime lenders make their money by
charging higher rates and fees. While a traditional home equity loan to someone with good credit
might carry a 9% rate, subprime lenders typically charge 11% to 14%, plus up to 10% of the loan
amount in additional fees.").
Vol. 51: 473
62
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss3/4
THE SUBPRIm HOME EQUITY MARKET
B. Subprime Home Equity Loan Price Terms: Rates, Points, and Other
Charges
The hallmark of a subprime loan is a high interest rate and high points or
fees charged at the time the loan is closed."' Although it is clear that subprime
pricing is higher than conventional lending, it is impossible to determine or
describe with accuracy the rates, points, and fees charged by the subprime
home equity industry as a whole, because pricing information is neither
collectedby anypublic source nor advertised with specificityby the industry. 86
Nevertheless, it is still possible to make some general conclusions about the
subprime home lending industry and market from the information that is
available.
1. Interest Rates
Because lenders do not set interest rates based on any common factors,
even within their own company, 7 it is impossible to determine average interest
rates for subprime borrowers with any amount of certainty. Each loan made by
a subprime company is made on an individual basis, and interest rates for each
loan are disclosed in loan documents that are not recorded or reported
anywhere. However, as described earlier, many subprime loans are grouped
with other loans in loan pools, and securities are then sold in the pools-a
process known as securitization.388 When a lender sells securities in the pool of
loans, the lender must issue a prospectus that is filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Each prospectus describes the pool of loans in a given
securities offering. These prospectuses taken together provide the only public
source of rate information for subprime loans. Although not comprehensive,
and not necessarily representative of loans that are not securitized, the
information from these prospectuses provides a good picture of loan rates being
385. Points are fees to the lender that are paid up front and are usually a percentage
of the principal amount of the loan. Because high interest rates and/or points and fees are the
hallmarks of a subprime loan, the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)-an act to
protect homeowners in some high cost home equity loans--covers loans that have an annual
percentage rate of more than 10% above the yield on comparable-length treasury securities, and
loans in which the "total points and fees payable by the consumer at or before closing will
exceed the greater of(i) 8 percent ofthe total loan amount; or (ii) $400." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)
(1994). A full discussion of HOEPA can be found at infra Part VII.A. of this Article.
386. For expressions of fi-astration over the difficulty of analyzing the industry given
the unavailability of pricing information, PREYING ON NEGI-BO HOODS, supra note 1, at 11
(concluding that "[u]nless and until all lenders directly report, in a timely and accurate fashion,
such data as interest, Annual Percentage Rate[APR], fees, and the like, it will be impossible to
get a more accurate picture ofsubprime lending practices than that provided here."); id. at 37-38
(advocating that subprime lenders, mortgage brokers and home improvement contractors be
required to report interest rates, fees, and APRs as well as the terms of loans made and the broker
or home improvement contractor involved in the loan).
387. See supra Part VI.A.
388. See supra Part V.D.
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charged in a large portion of the subprime home equity market.389
In order to get a sense of interest rates in the subprime home equity market,
the author examined the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form
424(b)(5) Filings390 by the fourteen top subprime home equity lenders (chosen
based on their ranking by the National Mortgage News Quarterly Data report
in the fourth Quarter of 1998).391 These fourteen lenders together originated just
over 50% of the subprime home equity loans generated by the top 100
subprime lenders in the fourth quarter of 1998."9
Only six of these fourteen lenders393 had made regular filings with the SEC.
Furthermore, it is likely that not all of these six lenders securitize all of the
loans they originate. Nevertheless, the SEC filings allow a look at loan rates for
1,065,753 loans that were placed in securitized pools between 1995 and
1999.391 While this is most certainly not a statistical sampling, it is surely a
significant one.
The rate range for these subprime loans increased between 1995 and 1999,
ranging in 1995 between 5.00% and 17.99%, and between 3.00% and 19.99%
in 1999.' 9' For Green Tree Financial, the range of rates in 1999 alone was
between 4.00% and 19.99%. 3"6 By contrast, the range of rates in the
conventional market was never more than two percentage points.3"
The median interest rate for the subprime loans was between 10% and
10.99% in 1996 and 1997, and between 11% and 11.99% in 1995, 1998, and
389. In this regard, the NTIC study found that subprime loans in the Chicago area
frequently were adjustable rate mortgages in which the interest rate adjusted up every six
months. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 6. Adjustable rate mortgages are
permitted in these loans because of AMTPA.
390. These filings describe the loans in securitized loan pools.
391. National MortgageNews, TopSubprimeLenders in Q498(visited Oct. 10,1999)
<http://www.mortgagestats.com/demos/qdr/BCOrig.htm>. The list ranks subprime lenders based
on loan origination volume. The lenders are Associates, Household Financial, ContiMortgage
Corporation, Green Tree Financial, The Money Store, Commercial Credit/Travelers, Advanta
Mortgage USA, Equicredit Corporation, Amresco, Option One Mortgage Corporation, New
Century Financial, Impac, Long Beach Mortgage, and Residential Funding/GMAC. Id.
392. Id.
393. Green Tree Financial, Equicredit Corporation, Amresco, Option One Mortgage
Corporation, Impac, and Residential Funding/GMAC. These six lenders originatedjust over 18%
of the subprime home equity loans originated by the top 100 subprime lenders. Id.
394. Of these loans, 168,485 were in pools in 1995; 247,609 were in pools in 1996;
217,637 were in pools in 1997; 214,844 were in pools in 1998; and 216,178 were in pools in
1999.
395. The range during 1996, 1997, and 1998 was between 4.00-4.99% and 19.00-
19.99%.
396. See infra Appendix 1 at tbl. 6.
397. 1995 rates on conventional thirty-year fixed rate mortgages ranged between
7.2% and 9.15%.; 1996 rates on conventional thirty-year fixed rate mortgages ranged between
7.03% and 8.32%; 1997 rates on conventional thirty-year fixed rate mortgages ranged between
7.10% and 8.14%; 1998 rates on conventional thirty-year fixed rate mortgages ranged between
6.71% and 7.14%; 1999 rates on conventional thirty-year fixed rate mortgages ranged between
6.79% and 7.91%. Federal Reserve Board, 30-year ConventionalMorgages,fixed-rate (visited
Jan. 4,2000) <http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data/m/cm.txt>.
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1999.39' During those same years, the annualized rate on conventional thirty-
yearmortgages was 7.95% (1995), 7.80% (1996), 7.60% (1997), 6.94% (1998),
and 7.43% (1999)."" Therefore, the median interest rate for the subprime loans
was at least 2.2 percentage points-and as much as 4.06 percentage
points-higher than the conventional annualized mte.'
The full rate distribution on these loans is shown in Table 1, set forth
below and reprinted in Appendix 1 to this Article.
Table 1: Rate Distribution for Subprime Loans
Rate 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
3.00-3.99 - - - - 1
4.00-4.99 - 2 20 16 23
5.00-5.99 3 597 1,332 1,876 2,009
6.00-6.99 33 1,860 2,681 5,218 9,544
7.00-7.99 2,432 12,527 14,339 11,138 8,024
8.00-8.99 12,032 38,226 30,312 17,739 17,367
9.00-9.99 13,715 39,602 36,192 31,193 29,361
10.00-10.99 40,114 62,220 41,763 34,796 29,004
11.00-11.99 50,144 47,866 36,692 30,517 26,132
12.00-12.99 29,716 27,588 23,758 26,856 28,274
13.00-13.99 12,217 8,564 16,202 22,499 31,116
14.00-14.99 3,890 4,519 8,515 16,331 18,104
15.00-15.99 4,365 3,517 4,212 10,184 7,139
16.00-16.99 789 441 1,349 4,464 6,846
17.00-17.99 35 71 245 1,995 2,765
18.00-18.99 - 8 22 16 425
19.00-19.99 - 1 3 6 44
# of Loans 169,485 247,609 217,637 214,844 216,178
398. See tbl. 1.
399. Federal Reserve Board, 30-year Conventional Mortgages,fixed-rate (visited
Jan. 4, 2000) <http:/www.federalreserve.gov/releaseslH15/data/mlcm.txt>.
400. These numbers were computed by taking the lowest of the median range for each
year (e.g. 11% in 1995) and subtracting the annualized rate (e.g., 7.95% in 1995).
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Appendix 1 shows the rate distribution for all of the examined loans by
year in both tabular and graphical format. Graphs 2-6 show the rate distribution
for each year between 1995 and 1999 in graphical format, while Tables 2-6
display the same data in tabular format (divided by lender)."
Recent studies have also examined nonstatistical samplings of interest
rates. For example, the Chicago study' 2 looked at the records for 2,074
properties sold at a foreclosure sale in 1993, and for 3,964 properties sold at a
foreclosure sale in 19980 °3 Based on the rate information available in that
group of loans' the study determined that the average interest rate on
foreclosed loans began to move up after the advent of subprime lending, rising
higher and higher above the thirty-year Treasury rate. Before the emergence of
subprime lending the average rate on foreclosed loans had stayed in relative
step with thirty-year Treasury rates."~ The study also determined that of the
loans foreclosed in 1993 and 1998, there was a 43.4% rise in loans with a rate
of zero to two points above the thirty-year Treasury rate, an 8.7% rise in loans
with a rate of two to four points above the thirty-year Treasury rate, a 521.1%
rise in loans with a rate of four to six points above the thirty-year Treasury rate,
a 316.3% rise in loans with a rate of six to eight points above the thirty-year
Treasury rate, and a 56% rise in loans with a rate of more than eight points
above the thirty-year Treasury rate.' Loans with rates of four to eight points
over the thirty-year Treasury rate made up 6.5% of foreclosures in 1993, and
22% of foreclosures in 1998.' ° Based on unpublished data from the Mortgage
Information Corporation, the Weicher report disclosed mean subprime interest
401. Individual company data for these companies maybe obtained from the author.
402. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1.
403. Id. at 10.
404. Interest rate information was available for 1,641 of the 1993 foreclosures and
2,579 of the 1998 foreclosures. Id. at 10.
405. Id. at 18. The study found that:
As can be seen in Figure 5, the interest rate on
Chicago foreclosed properties ran steadily between
one and two percentage points above the Treasury
rate from 1977 to 1993 at their origination. In other
words, interest rates on foreclosed properties
mimicked the Treasury rate's peaks and descents
until 1993. After 1994, in a new trend, interest rates
on foreclosed properties began to diverge from the
Treasury rate. The divergence that began in 1994
corresponds to the expansion of the subprime lending
market in Chicagoland. The increase in interest rate
on loans that went into foreclosure strongly suggests
that the advent of subprime lending, which is
responsible for most loans at higher interest rates,
plays an important role in the foreclosure increase.
Id.
406. Id. at 20.
407. Id. at 21-22.
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rates of 11.04%.408 The same study showed average mortgage rates for five
subprime lenders at a range between 10.54% and 14.04%. 409
It would appear, then, that rates at which subprime loans are made are on
the rise.4 10 By contrast, conventional thirty-year mortgage rates have stayed
between 6.71% and 8.32% since the end of 1996 and did not go above 7.94%
in 1998 or 1999.
411
High rates have real consequences for borrowers. While the difference
between a 12% subprime and an 8% prime mortgage rate may seem small, the
cost to a low or moderate income homeowner is great. On a typical $50,000
mortgage, for example, over thirty years the interest payments at 8% would be
$82,079.97, while at 12% they would be $135,138.78-a difference of
$53,058.81. The monthly payment would be $366.88 at 8% and $514.31 at
12%. These payments would represent 31% ofa $1,200 monthly income at the
conventional interest rate, but over 43% of the same income at the subprime
rate. Thus, for the homeowner-borrower, the costs of being steered to a
subprime loan are large (even without regard to the points and fees). Moreover,
the higher rate increases the risk of default because it increases the burden on
the homeowner's budget.
The high rates and fees charged by subprime lenders purportedly serve to
cover the risk of default associated with making loans to borrowers with poor
credit or limited income. Various industry-related materials and industry
representatives broadcast this justification.412 With these statements and
408. See WEICHR, supra note 300, at 58-59.
409. Id. at 60 (showing average mortgage rates for GE at 10.54%, Conti at 11.66%,
Equicredit at 12.30%, Advanta at 13.39%, and Alliance at 14.04%).
410. By contrast, the subprime home equity industry's Weicher report concluded that
"[i]nvestors' willingness to buy the [securities backed by pools of subprime home mortgages]
has in turn translated into lower interest rates on the underlying mortgages." Id. at 45. Similarly,
one newspaper article reported that "[m]any lenders ... have cut their fees and their fat profits
as the competition for the most credit-worthy borrowers in the sub-prime field has intensified."
Sanchez, supra note 340, at Dl; see also 1998 Year in Review, supra note 352, at 1, 3 (reporting
a drop in whole loan prices at the end of 1998).
411. Federal Reserve Board, 30-year Conventional Mortgages, fixed-rate (visited
Jan. 4, 2000) <http:llwww.federalreserve.gov/releaseslHl5/datalm/cm.txt>.
412. For example, the Weicher report repeatedly asserts that subprime rates are
justified and required by the risk involved in making subprime loans. WEIC-ER,supra note 300,
at 15-16 (stating that "[i]nterest rates in the subprime home equity loan market are higher than
the rates on prime loans, because subprime lenders face higher servicing costs and assume more
risk"; that "lenders charge higher rates on loans expected to be riskier"; and that "rates are
higher, and terms less generous, onriskierloans."). Various subprime lenders have also indicated
that their rates relate to risk. See, e.g., Pulliam, supra note 339, at Cl (reporting that the Chief
Operating Officer of IndyMae Mortgage Holdings, Inc. had announced a rate increase "to help
cover its risks."); Carol Frey, A Home Buyer Takes on His Lender, RALEIGHNEws & OBSERVER,
Jan. 13,1999, atDl [hereinafter Frey, Home Buyer](reporting that "United Companies and other
mortgage lenders argue that high fees and low-cost complaint arbitration cover their risk of
making loans to the poor and others with flawed credit records," and that United said it had to
"charge higher rates and fees to offset the risk of making loans to someone who doesn't have
stellar credit").
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materials, subprime lenders seek to paint a picture of an industry that carefully
places borrowers into well-researched categories based on their credit histories,
risk of delinquency, default, and nonpayment. Under this model, high subprime
rates are merely devices through which lenders cover their costs and make an
acceptable profit. However, the reality of the subprime home equity market is
quite different.
First, subprime home equity lending generally has been a very profitable
business and continues to be so for most lenders. 3 For example, in testimony
before Congress during consideration of the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA), Fleet Funding testified that in 1992 it lost
approximately $8 million on foreclosures, 414 but nonetheless generally makes
about $30 million dollars annually.41 5
Recent earnings figures also show that this type of lending has been very
profitable for some lenders. 6 For example, Associates, Household,
ContiMortgage, Green Tree/Conseco, The Money Store/First Union, Advanta,
Amresco, and Impac each had positive earnings per share during the first three
quarters of 1999.411 This general profitability suggests that pricing is not tied
to risk very tightly. If pricing were largely based on risk, one would not expect
to see such profits.
Second, if pricing of individual loans were tied to risk one would expect
to see fairly uniform underwriting standards, correlative pricing, and obedience
to loan origination standards. Instead, the industry as a whole engages in ad hoc
413. Sanchez, supra note 340, at Dl (stating that "Wall Street has responded
enthusiastically to the public stock offerings ofseveral sub-prime lenders, such as Aames, which
outperformed the shares of many traditional banks" and quoting an industry analyst as saying
that subprime lending's growth and profitability outweighed the potential risks for newcomers);
see also Murray, supra note 337, at A4 (referring to subprime profitability in the early 1990s as
"soaring"); Pulliam, supra note 339, at CI (quoting an industry analyst as saying that "[tihe sub-
prime market is not going to go away .... It's too profitable."); Bernard Trujillo, Bankruptcy
Reform: Who ShouldDecide Creditworthiness, CHi. TRiB., Sept. 13, 1999, § 1, at 21 (stating in
regard to high risk lending in general that "lenders have been taking bigger risks with their
money and demanding higher returns. This has translated into a relaxation of lending criteria,
along with huge gains for lenders.").
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Determining profitability in the subprime home equity loan market is difficult
for many reasons. First, very few of the top subprime lenders are pure home equity lenders, so
their earnings figures reflect profit and loss across other subprime consumer markets, and in
some cases profits across prime and subprime markets. Second, not all subprime home equity
companies are publicly traded. The earnings information for these companies is sometimes not
available. Finally, it must be acknowledged here that subprime home equity lending has not
been, in the long run, profitable for some companies, like United, which have ended up in
bankruptcy. Troubled Lender Files Chapter 11, AP Online, Mar. 1, 1999, available in
WESTLAW, 1999 WL12934492 (1999).
417. See infra Appendix 3. These lenders were ranked first, second, third, fourth,
fifth, seventh, ninth, and twelfth, respectively, in subprime home equity loan origination volume
in the fourth quarter of 1998. National Mortgage News Quarterly Data Report, Top Subprime
Lenders in Q498 (visited Oct. 1 0, 1999)
<http://www.mortgagestats.com/demos/qdr/BCOrig.htm>.
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underwriting and pricing,"' undermining any claim that the price an individual
borrower gets is somehow carefully tied to the risk affiliated with the
borrower's credit history or credit score. Furthermore, one would expect to see
lower rates for borrowers with loans that have risk averse features, such as
loans that are fully secured and have low loan-to-value ratios.4 1 9
Third, the risk of loss on individual loans is spread across loan pools for
securitized loans, and across all loans held by a company in its portfolio. Thus,
while the risk of loss on an individual loan may be high, the risk of loss for the
lending company, or for investors in a pool of subprime loans, is determined
by the performance of a whole group of loans. Furthermore, risk to investors
on securitized loans is further diluted through third party insurance, guarantees,
credit enhancements, and, on other loans, through sale in the secondary
market.
420
Fourth, the notion of risk is a complicated idea in itself. The industry treats
risk as though it were a static factor in existence before the loan is made and
constant after the loan is made. However, this concept of risk fails to consider
whether the loan creates risk that did not exist prior to the loan's origination.42
When an expensive or high loan-to-value loan is made to a borrower who can
barely afford it, the loan itself creates its own risk of default. In other words,
someone who is only marginally able to make payments on existing debt before
taking out a home equity loan may be pushed over the limit by a loan that
reflects a high debt-to-income ratio. This phenomenon is probably most clearly
418. See supra Part VI.A.
419. Tvo STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that "[u]nder appropriate risk-
based [pricing] schemes, for example, loans with lower loan-to-value ratios, other things being
equal, are made at lower rates.").
420. Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Risk, Credit Scoring, and the Performance of
Home Mortgages, 82 FED. REs. BuLL. 621 n.l (1996) (stating that [i]nstitutions that originate
mortgages do not necessarily bear the credit risk of the loans; the risk is often borne, at least in
part, by a mortgage insurer or by an institution that purchases mortgages."); see also Canner,
Recent Developments, supra note 287, at 249. Canner notes:
Through such means as third-party insurance
guarantees or senior/subordinate debt structures,
investors in the securities are largely insulated from
credit losses; and the securities receive triple-A
ratings, yielding returns ofonly 50 to 150 basis points
above Treasury securities of comparable maturity.
Ultimately, the home equity lenders bear the bulk of
the credit risk, designed to be covered by the sizable
margin between the interest rates paid by the
subprime borrowers and the yield to the security
holders.
Id.
421. The Woodstock Institute study recognizes and describes how high-cost home
equity lending creates risk by moving unsophisticated borrowers into loans they cannot afford
that are secured by a residence, and traps them into refinancing and paying fees over and over.
Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 9-10. The study also points out that the credit risk for a given
borrower can appear to increase after the borrower becomes a victim of such predatory lending.
Id. atll.
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demonstrated by the cases of senior citizens who have lived in the same home
for a long time-sometimes decades--only to lose their home after beginning
a relationship with a subprime lender.4'
Thus, it does not appear that pricing is closely tied to actual risk or any
other objective factors. Nonetheless, because of DIDMCA and an imperfect
distribution of information in the subprime loan market, lenders can charge
whatever rate they choose.
DIDMCA preempted state usury caps on loans secured by a first lien, and
early decisions under DIDMCA concluded that this first-lien preemption
applied to nonpurchase money loans as long as the lender was in first-lien
position.4 Despite these early decisions applying DIDMCA to nonpurchase
money loans, the practice of taking first-lien position and charging unregulated
interest rates did not really catch on until the mid-1990s. Thus, while first-lien
loans accounted for only about 50% of subprime home equity loans in 1993,
by 1996 first-lien loans accounted for about 80% of subprime home equity
loans.424 Similarly, one investment banking company study showed that
Equicredit, which was ranked by origination volume as the eighth largest
subprime lender by the National Mortgage News Quarterly Data Report for the
fourth quarter of 1998,' took first liens in more than 70% of its loan
originations in 1995, compared with taking a first lien in only about 50% of its
loan originations in 1989.416
Subprime lenders now take advantage of DIDMCA and early
interpretations of DIDMCA to charge unlimited interest rates on nonpurchase
money loans secured by the borrower's residence-regardless of the purpose
for which the loan was made-and often through the concurrent refinancing of
the existing mortgage loan. The refinanced loan is sometimes the purchase
money loan used by the borrower to purchase the home, and in many cases the
refinanced loan bears a greater interest rate than the loan it is replacing.42 ' As
a result, nothing now regulates the maximum interest rate for loans such as debt
consolidation loans, home improvement loans, refinance loans, and loans made
for the purpose of obtaining consumer goods and services, provided the lender
secures a first-lien position on the consumer's residential real estate.428
DIDMCA also set up a system in which the only possible control on rates
422. See, e.g., JeffBailey, A Man and His Loan: WhyBennie Roberts Refinanced Ten
Times, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, at Al (recounting the story of a borrower who fell victim to
repeated and unnecessary refinancings).
423. See infra Parts lI.B and IV.B.
424. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 31-32.
425. National MortgageNews Quarterly Data Report, Top SubprimeLenders in Q498
(visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.mortgagestats.com/demos/qdr/BCOrig.htm>.
426. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 32.
427. See, e.g., Forrester, supra note 240, at 375-76; PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS,
supra note 1, at 31 (reporting on a borrower whose refinance loan with an annual percentage rate
of 14.18% paid off the borrower's FHA mortgage, which was at 9.5% and was in foreclosure).
428. This general rule does not apply to the states that opted out of DIDMCA during
the first three years after it was passed. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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was the market itself. In a working market, this would mean that home equity
lenders whose rates or terms were out of step with competitors would be forced
out of the market. One might also expect to see home equity loan rates and
terms more closely correlated to the perceived risk involved in a given
mortgage transaction. Competing lenders would be unwilling to go below a rate
designed to reflect the borrower's risk of default, but would likewise resist
going too far above that rate for fear of losing market share.
To make a market like this work, borrowers need enough information to
choose between more expensive or abusive lenders and lenders who offer
reasonable terms. To this end, Congress has made legislative attempts to
increase information flow into the consumer market. In the home equity
market, the relevant disclosure statutes are (1) the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), adopted in 1968, which requires mortgage lenders to disclose interest
rates and the cost of credit to potential borrowers,429 and (2) the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), which requires lenders to provide
borrowers with a standard statement of settlement costs.43 The theory behind
the Truth in Lending Act was that borrowers, who would now be given
comparable disclosures by potential lenders, would be able to "shop around"
for the best credit deal.43" ' This in turn would mean less business for less
competitive lenders, and would ultimately force them out of the market.43 The
theory behind RESPA was to provide borrowers with "greater and more timely
information on the nature and costs of the [real estate] settlement process,"
which it was hoped would protect consumers from high costs and abusive
practices.433
These statutes demonstrate a preference for regulatory models that do not
interfere directly with the transaction being regulated, but merely enhance
efficient information flow in the marketplace.434 However, both statutes have
429. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
430. 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (1994).
431. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
432. Indeed, when the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
reported out its 1979 bill simplifying Truth in Lending compliance, it indicated that "[s]ince
1969 [when the Truth in Lending Act was first adopted], those creditors who charge the highest
rates have experienced a substantial reduction in their share of the consumer credit market.
While no conclusive proof of the act's role in this exists, some experts believe truth in lending
is a principal cause of this market shift." S. REP. No. 96-73, at 2 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 208, 281. For a discussion of this see Eskridge, supra note 135, at 1098
("Theoretically, if there is uniform disclosure of credit charges and terms, buyers. . . will flock
to the best credit opportunities, thus eliminating bad deals and making the mortgage market even
more competitive.").
433. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (1994).
434. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys. AND THE DEP'TOFHOUS. AND
URBAN DEv., JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING
ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT, 160 (1998) [hereinafter JOINT
REPORT]; Eskridge, supra note 135, at 1098 ("The growth of a nationally competitive mortgage
market has also fostered the view that regulations most helpful to the consumer are those that
improve the mortgage market's competitiveness. Disclosure rules are therefore preferable to
usury ceilings."). RESPA does contain some transaction regulations. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
2000
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two essential flaws. First, the information required to be disclosed by TILA and
RESPA is complex and probably incomprehensible to most subprime
borrowers. Moreover, the information is not given to the borrower until the
loan closing.45 Thus the information that is required to be disclosed to the
individual borrower is not always usable by the individual borrower. Second,
pricing information in the subprime market does not have to be disclosed on a
marketwide basis, and indeed is not readily available to anyone.436 In contrast,
prime mortgage market rates and points are in the news on a regular basis.43
Probably as a result of this, there is very little variance in pricing in the prime
market.
Thus, although TILA and RESPA increase information in the market, these
essential flaws in both statutes prevent borrowers from making informed
choices.438 As a result, competition is not limiting prices.439 Lenders will not
carefully correlate price to risk when they can just as easily charge whatever
rate they choose.
It was clearly an unintended consequence of DIDMCA for lenders to gain
the power to set prices so much higher than an efficiently working market
would allow. This disjunction between subprime loan rates and market forces
cannot be observed in the conventional mortgage market. In that market, rates
have moved in relative step with the treasury and other market rates."0 This has
§ 2607(a) (1994) (prohibiting kickbacks and unearned fees).
435. JOINT REPORT, supra note 434; IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, ADULT LrrERACY IN AMERICA: A FIRST LOOK AT THE RESULTS OF THE
NATIONAL ADULT LrrERACY SURVEY xiv (1993).
436. See supra Part V.D.
437. See, e.g., Money Rates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2000, at C24 (reporting the yields
on thirty-year mortgage commitments posted by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae on a daily basis).
Monthly rates on mortgages current through the prior month are available on the Internet through
the Mortgage Bankers Association ofAmerica at <http://www.mbaa.org>. These are just two of
the many sources from which this information is readily available.
438. See, e.g., Two STEPS BACK, supra note I, at vi (stating that "[w]hile necessary,
consumer disclosure-the primary approach ofconsumerlending laws-is a woefully inadequate
tool.").
439. See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192,203-04 (D.
Mass. 1998) (finding that "informed consumer choice is the most effective mechanism for
regulating the market," but that this control was not working in the subprime mortgage market,
whichjustifies regulatory control); Frey, Home Buyer, supra note 412, at D1 (recognizing that
"lenders who take advantage of theircustomers theoretically should lose outin the marketplace"
and quoting a consumer's attorney as stating that "there are situations in which the free market
doesn't work."). But see Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending
Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 283 (1993) [hereinafter Problems in
Community Development Hearings] (statement of John Hamill, President of Fleet Bank, Mass.)
(arguing that competition in the market sets prices).
440. See infra Appendix 2 (charting the thirty-year Treasury rate and the thirty-year
conventional mortgage rate from 1980-1999). For recognition of this see Russell v. Fidelity
Consumer Discount Co., 72 B.R. 855, 867 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (observing a "Congressional
prognostication that the conditions which made the DIDMCA seem appropriate at the time [of
adoption of DIDMCA] would not be permanent," and that as interest rates declined from the
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held true even when Treasury rates declined."1 This likely means that in the
conventional mortgage market DIDMCA is having its intended effect:
allowing rates to accommodate both high interest markets and low interest
markets, and assuring a source of funds for home purchases even when market
rates rise above levels that would have been usurious prior to DIDMCA." 2 This
market control in the conventional market is aided by continued regulation of
the business practices of lenders, such as banks, that make conventional
mortgage loans." 3 The fact that conventional mortgage rates have continued to
move in step with the market suggests that DIDMCA has not harmed
conventional mortgage borrowers by keeping rates higher than the market
demands.
In contrast, it is not clear that pricing in the modem subprime home equity
market has any basis at all. At the very least, pricing does not appear to be
based on a legitimate assessment of risk and provision for an acceptable profit
for the lender. Allowing subprime lenders to set prices without any effective
controls is clearly an unintended consequence of DIDMCA.
4"
2. Points, Fees, and Loan Flipping
Another common feature of a subprime loan is very expensive points and
fees. These are charges that are immediately taken out of the loan proceeds and
paid to the lender and/or broker at closing. There is virtually no public source
for comprehensive information about points and fees charged by subprime
home equity lenders. However, at least some information about points and fees
is available from recent individual cases and studies. 445
highs they were experiencing when DIDMCA was adopted, conventional mortgage rates also
declined to about one third of Pennsylvania's usury limit).
441. For example, the thirty-year Treasury rate in October 1981 was 14.68 and the
thirty-year conventional mortgage rate was 18.45, a spread of 3.77. See infra Appendix 2. In
October 1982 the thirty-year Treasury rate had fallen to 11.17, and the 30-year conventional
mortgage rate had fallen to 14.61, a spread of 3.44. Id.
442. For example, the high conventional thirty-year rate of 16.33% in April 1980
would have been prohibited by a number of state usury laws. Id.
443. TWOSTEPSBACK, supra note 1, at47 (recommending thatregulators berequired
to scrutinize and conduct fair lending examinations of subprime lenders).
444. As the director of Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission
observed:
Critics assert, however, that the interest rates and fees
charged by some subprime lenders are excessive, and
much higher than necessary to cover increased risks,
particularly since these loans are secured by the value
of a home. Some attribute lenders' high rates on first
mortgages in part to federal deregulation of certain
state interest rate ceilings in 1980.
Prepared Statement of the FTC Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 64
(1998) (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Dir. of the Consumer Protection Bureau of the FTC).
445. See, e.g., PREYING oNNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 31 (reporting the case
of a 62-year-old widow who received a $46,278 refinance loan in 1997, was charged a 12.75%
interest rate (14.18% APR), and was required to pay fees totaling $5,071-which was just under
2000
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Points and other loan fees charged by subprime mortgage lenders have
generated considerable litigation, with consumer advocates arguing that loan
fees of 10% or more of the loan amount are unconscionable. 6 Litigation under
HOEPA 47 indicates many subprime mortgage lenders are charging more than
8% of the loan amount in points or fees, including broker fees. For example,
United Companies Lending seems to have routinely charged 10% to 20% of the
loan amount in fees."' Likewise, the New York Attorney General sued Delta
Funding for systematically charging low-income minority homeowners inNew
York fees of up to 10% of the loan amount." 9 In another suit involving Delta
Funding, three borrowers paid between $8,000 and $11,700 in loan points and
fees, resulting in a finding that their loans were covered by HOEPA.4s1 In
certifying a class action against Associates, the largest subprime mortgage
lender,45' one court noted that Associates charges up to ten points on new loans
and eight points on renewal loans.452
The purpose for charging origination fees in the conventional mortgage
market is to cover the lender's cost in originating the loan. Average points in
the conventional mortgage market are proportionate to these costs. Given the
traditional tie between points and fees and the lender's origination and
11% of the principal-S4,000 of which went to the broker); Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp.,
24 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that one of the plaintiffs paid 25% in
points and fees based on a home equity loan contract principal of $11,600, and in reality paid
almost 70% in points and fees based on the value she actually received from the loan). In some
cases, broker fees have been charged and paid to brokers who had "no involvement whatsoever
and provided no services." Id. at 449. In contrast, points and fees in a conventional loan are
usually between 1% and 2%. For conventional points history see Freddie Mac, News & Info, 30
Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages Since 1971 (visited Sept. 18, 1999)
<http://www.freddiemae.comlpmms/pmms30.htm>. The Weicher report asserts that subprime
mortgage originators charge an average of 2% to 6% of the principal amount of the loan in
points. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 67. However, this statement is not attributed to any data
source, and is contrary to the evidence that exists.
446. United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Mass. 1998);
see also Stewart v. Associates Consumer Discount Co., 183 F.R.D. 189, 192 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(holding that the lender's practices were unlawful and fraudulent).
447. See infra Part VII.A.
448. Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (indicating that one of the
plaintiff borrowers was charged 25% of the loan principal in points and fees); Sargeant, 20 F.
Supp. 2d. at 196-97 (D. Mass. 1998) (reporting that the borrower was charged 17% of the loan
principal in points and fees); United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Autrey, 723 So. 2d 617, 619 (Ala.
1998) (stating that borrowers in the class were charged 8% of their loan principal in points and
fees).
449. People v. Delta Funding Corp., No. CV99-4951 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1999)
(complaint and jury demand).
450. Lopez v. Delta Funding Corp., No. 98-7204 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1998).
451. Associates was ranked first in subprime loan origination volume in the fourth
quarterof 1998 by the National Mortgage News Quarterly Data Report and continues tohold that
position. National Mortgage News Quarterly Data Report, Top Subprime Lenders in Q498
(visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.mortgagestats.com/demos/qdr/BCOrg.htm>.
452. Stewartv. Associates Consumer Discount Co., 183 F.R.D. 189,197-98 (E.D.Pa.
1998).
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servicing costs, there have been some attempts to correlate high points and fees
to high origination and servicing costs in the subprime market." 3 Particular
assertions include that origination and servicing costs are higher for subprime
loans because they require more employee time than comparable conventional
mortgage loans. 4 However, in at least one case evidence uncovered during
litigation with a subprime lender suggested that points and fees in fact bear
very little relation to the actual costs incurred in originating a subprime loan.
In that case, Newton v. United Lending Companies,4"' United produced the
literature it used to attract mortgage broker business. One such document
makes the following statement:
Mortgage brokers make their money onpoints that customers
pay when their loan is closed. Legislation designed to protect
the consumer is continuing to put pressure on the brokerage
business. Disclosure of front-end and back-end fees is forcing
brokers to justify these fees. In the future this may lead to
brokers charging fees in accordance with the amount of
service they provide the customer.5 6
The New York Attorney General's Office appears to have also concluded
that points are not tied to costs, asserting in a complaint filed against Delta
Funding Corporation that the points Delta charged were unrelated to its costs.57
Thus, it is not at all clear that there is any correlation between points and
fees charged by subprime lenders and the amount of employee time spent
closing a loan. Even if points and fees in the subprime market were found to
correlate to cost, there is some evidence that these costs are partially caused by
aggressive promotion on the part of lenders and brokers. For example, in one
case about which the author was consulted, the broker essentially hounded the
borrower until she agreed to take the loan, personally visiting the borrower at
her home repeatedly over the course of a month. The broker was so aggressive
that the borrower avoided going home between her jobs so that she would not
have to face the loan broker, who often was waiting for her when she returned
from work.
453. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 17. The Weicher report asserted that "[o]rigination
costs appear to be substantially higher for subprime mortgages, in the range of 4 to 8 percent,
compared with an average of 2 percent for prime mortgages." The report says that included in
these origination costs are the costs of "salaries, commissions, and other personnel costs, data
processing, and related expenses. They also include advertising and other expenses incurred in
contacting borrowers, and the cost of unsuccessful leads." Id. at 67.
454. Id. at 70 (attributing higher origination costs to the "need for more intensive
staffing").
455. Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
456. United Companies Lending Corporation, Originator Orientation Manual, Trial
Exhibit U-226, Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
457. People v. Delta Funding Corp., No. CV99-4951 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1999)
(complaint and jury demand).
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There is also evidence of lender efforts to promote additional borrowing
by maintaining a personal relationship with the borrower even when the
borrower is not in default on the loan. This practice, known as "flipping,"
generally involves the lender making a series of several loans to the same
borrower in a relatively short period of time. 8 With each new loan, the lender
pays off the balance of the old loan and gives the borrower some new,
sometimes minimal, loan proceeds. With each new loan, the lender charges the
borrower points and fees all over again."
Loan flipping has benefits for the lender and for the particular salesperson
who makes the loan. First, the loan salesperson makes a commission each time
the loan is flipped; the commission is set by giving the employee half of the
fees the employee charges over a set amount. The amount of the commission
in some companies is also based on how many "extra charges," such as
insurance, are added to the loan. Through the practice of flipping, the lending
company secures the continued business of the borrower, which is extremely
important in the market that exists today-a market flooded with lenders. The
cumulative payment of fees to the lender can sometimes reach exorbitant
amounts.' On occasion, the points and fees paid to the lender might exceed
the value of the new loan proceeds." Thus both the lender as a company and
the salesperson individually have a tremendous incentive to keep the loan with
the company, and to remake or flip the loan." 2
Some have argued that there is no incentive for lenders to flip loans
458. See, e.g., Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co. of Iowa, 855 F.2d 532, 533 (8th Cir.
1988) (noting that the borrower refinanced first loan through a second loan two years later);
PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 6-7 (describing as "abusive" the predatory
lender's tactic of"flipping"); Bailey, supra note 422, at Al (describing how the borrower was
subjected to unnecessary refinancing). Loan flippingcan occurafteraborrowernmisses payments
on a loan, after which the lender talks the borrower into covering missed payments by taking out
another loan at a higher rate. Flipping can also occur when a borrower is talked into taking out
additional principal, which is then added to the outstanding balance on the existing loan and
issued as a new loan.
459. For an example of a case such as this see Rah Bickley, Lending Practices Face
Checks, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERvER, Apr. 6, 1999, at B4; Frey, Home Buyer, supra note 412,
at Dl. These articles describe two loans taken by a borrower from United Lending Companies
in 1996. The first loan was a $30,700 purchase money mortgage. The borrower paid $7,700 in
fees, or 25% of the amount loaned to him. Two years later the borrower had to make repairs to
his furnace. United made a second loan to the borrower, but charged him $2,500 in fees, which
was 5% of the loan. In addition, United added so many extra charges that by the time the loan
closed, the principal amount was up to $48,500.
460. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 422, at Al (reporting that through flipping the
lender made $19,000 in fees and the borrower received $23,000 in loan proceeds).
461. Prepared Statement of the FTC before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging,
105th Cong. 64 (1998) (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Dir. of the Consumer Protection Bureau
of the FTC).
462. The Woodstock Institute Study recognizes that lenders have an "incentive to
refinance all outstanding debt even if the rate of the new loan is higher than the existing
mortgage," because doing so raises the loan principal and thus generates higher points and fees
for the lender or broker. Two STEPs BACK, supra note 1, at 19.
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because flipping involves prepayment of a pre-existing loan." 3 It is true that in
the conventional market it does not benefit lenders when borrowers prepay
their loans. This is because conventionalborrowers generally prepay their loans
in large numbers when interest rates go down and thereafter refinance at lower
interest rates. When conventional loans prepay in a declining interest market,
lenders and investors are forced to reinvest their money at market rates lower
than the rates of return on the mortgage that has been paid off.4
However, inthe subprime market, refinancings occur whether interest rates
are falling or rising."' Furthermore, subprime refinancings generally do not
garner lower interest rates for borrowers." 6 Therefore, subprime lenders are not
forced to reinvest at lower interest rates when borrowers prepay their loans.
This fact explains why prepayments are not harmful to subprime investors and
lenders in the same way they are to investors in conventional mortgage-backed
securities.
To successfully flip loans, a lender must spend time cultivating a
relationship with the borrower. There is a certain psychology between the
lender and the borrower that enables the lender to flip the loan. The lender
earns the trust of the borrower to the extent that the borrower becomes
convinced of two things: (1) that the borrower is lucky to have found this
lender, because the lender's description of the borrower's abysmal
creditworthiness makes it clear that only a lender who truly cared about the
463. For example, the Weicher report asserts that the benefits of repeated payment
of points each time a loan is flipped is counterbalanced by the cost of early payment on a loan,
which is a cost to the investor, lowering the rate of return. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 73. The
report further states that "[t]he securitization process thus discourages flipping." Id. at 74. The
report also observes that "[s]ubprime loans prepay more rapidly," leading to higher origination
and servicing costs, and argues that subprime lenders suffer when loans are paid early. Id. at 69.
Subprime loans prepay more rapidly, the report suggests, because borrowers earn a better credit
grade and refinance at a lower rate. Id. at 72-73.
464. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 302, at 249-50.
465. Two STEPs BACK, supra note 1, at 6 (finding that subprime lending increased
during times of rising interest rates in 1994, 1995, and 1997 and concluding "[t]his suggests that
subprime refinancings are not driven by homeowners refinancing to save money during times
of declining rates and that subprime lenders are aggressively marketing loans regardless of the
rate environment.").
466. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 287, at 249-50 (finding that investors
in subprime home equity loan securities have a lower risk of prepayment when interest rates go
down than they would have if investing in other mortgage-backed securities because subprime
borrowers usually cannot obtain lower rate refinancing loans). However, there is also an
indication that
[1]ately... prepayments for some pools of subprime
home equity loans have been more rapid than
anticipated in underwriting assumptions. These
accelerated prepayments may imply that
improvements in borrowers' financial positions have
exceeded expectations or that intensified competition
among lenders has enabled some lower-quality
borrowers to refinance at rates below those they had
originally obtained.
Id. at 250 n.18.
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borrower would make the loan; and (2) that the lender is looking out for the
interests of the borrower and would not make a loan that the borrower would
be unable to pay."7 Given the relationship required to facilitate flipping, it is
not surprising that servicing subprime loans takes more time and energy than
servicing prime loans."8 However, aggressive marketing tactics and time spent
cultivating the borrower-lender relationship and soliciting loan flips cannot
justify higher origination costs.
Far from mere cost-recovery mechanisms, points are a substantial source
of income and profit for some lenders. United Companies, for example, had
close to $441 million in revenues in 1997, of which $115 million came from
origination fees." 9 United's expenses, however, were just under $315
million-resulting in a pretax profit of $126 million.470 United's annual report
for 1997 includes the following data:
Finance income, fees earned and other loan income, which
constitutes the second largest component of the Company's
revenues, was comprised of the following items for the
periods indicated:
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1997 1996 1995
(IN THOUSANDS)
Servicing fees $194,600 $135,599 $89,410
earned ..........................................
Loan origination 115,482 84,608 68,442
fees ..............................................
Loan 24,038 21,482 9,238
interest ......................................
467. For a description of a flipping relationship see Emery v. American General
Finance, Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1345-46 (7th Cir. 1995), dismissal aff'd, 134 F.3d 1321 (7th Cir.
1998);PrimegzmeLive: DebtReckoningFordMotor Company 'sLucrativeLoan Business (ABC
television broadcast, Apr. 23, 1997) (describing how a borrower was continually talked into
flipping his loan, reporting the borrower's comment: "Looked pretty good to me.").
468. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 17 (finding that servicing costs are one-third higher
for subprime loans than for other loans, "largely reflecting the need for more intensive staffing"
and that the "typical servicing employee can handle approximately half as many subprime loans
as prime mortgages."). This report also asserts that "[b]ecause of the delinquencies, they
[subprime lenders] incur higher servicing costs." Id. at 18.
469. United Companies Financial Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Form 10-K (filed March 26, 1998), at 15, 21.
470. Id. at 15.
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Otherloan
incom e .........................................
13,259
The same report gives the following income and
expense data:
Income Statement Data:
Total
revenues ................................
Total
expenses ................................
Income from continuing
operations before income
taxes ......................................
Provision for income
taxes ......................................
Income from continuing
operations .............................
Income (loss) from
discontinued operations ........
Net income ...........................
$440,811 $342,558 $252,650
314,904 208,701 149,985
125,907 133,857 102,665
45,326 47,665
80,581 86,192
37,740
64,925
(5,981) (4,532) (4,543)
$ 74,600 $81,660 $69,468471
3. Other Charges: "Packing"
Another price inflator that may be present in a subprime home equity loan
are charges for items or services that are not part of the primary loan
package.472 The most common type of charges in this category are fees for
insurance. Loan insurance generally does not benefit the borrower, and the
insurance fee is routinely financed over the life of the loan.473 Other charges
471. Id. at 21.
472. Home Equity LendingAbuses, Hearings, supra note 337; PrimeTime Live: Debt
Reckoning (interviewing former Associates employees who state they were instructed to pack
loans with as many extras as possible, that they had packing quotas, and that they often did not
tell borrowers about added charges).
473. See, e.g., PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 6 (finding that "[o]ne
egregious type of packing is when a lender sells the borrower unnecessary credit life or credit
disability insurance, and finances the premiums over the life of the loan."); see also Home Equity
Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337, at 66 (recognizing that credit insurance may not
benefit borrowers because it is high cost and claim rates are relatively low).
2000
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may include duplicative fees for services supposedly provided in order to make
or close the loan.474 These charges are usually added into the loan without the
borrower's consent, and then taken out only if the borrower objects. 75
C. Ability to Repay, Risk of Defaults, and Foreclosures
1. Ability to Pay /Debt-To-Income Ratio
A subprime home equity loan may often be a loan that the borrower has no
ability to repay.476 This problem is also referred to as asset-based lending or "in
rem financing," and can often lead to "equity stripping," whereby the borrower
loses not only the equity in her home, but also the home itself as the result of
taking out a loan that she cannot repay. 77
A borrower's inability to pay can result from taking a loan with an
unaffordable monthly payment that may exceed the borrower's monthly
income. It may also result from an affordable monthly payment followed by a
balloon payment that the borrower will never be able to afford. The existence
of the balloon payment in the contract allows the lender to focus the borrower's
attention on the low monthly payment, even though the borrower clearly will
not have any way to pay the balloon and will thus be forced to refinance the
loan.478 Finally, loans may even be issued to borrowers who have no ability to
pay based on loan applications falsified by mortgage brokers or lender
employees eager for high commissions.479
474. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 6.
475. Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337, at 67. Even when
borrowers object they may end up with such charges in their loans if the lender indicates that
changing the loan terms close to closing will delay closing. Id.
476. See, e.g., Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp.2d 444,453-54,456-57
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that United made loans in the case of the plaintiffs without regard for
the borrowers' ability to repay the loan); PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 31
(reporting on the case ofaborrower whose monthly loan payment was $558 even though she had
an income of $484 per month); Murray, supra note 337, at A4 (reporting on testimony by the
daughter of an elderly couple before the Senate Special Committee on Aging stating that her
elderly parents, whose only income was a monthly social security payment of $1,156.22, were
made a loan they could not afford and ended up in foreclosure); see also Unregulated Subprime
Loans, supra note 346, at 2. For a list of "terms that trap borrowers into unaffordable financing,"
see Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 8.
477. Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337, at 66.
478. Balloon payments are permitted because of AMTPA. See supra Part III.C. For
a discussion suggesting thesignificance ofthe monthly payment amount in persuading borrowers
to take these loans, see August, Survey, supra note 294, at 548 ("Moreover, home equity loans
also feature longer repayment periods than credit card debt. Thus finance companies have
marketed home equity loans, in part, as a means of consolidating credit card debt because doing
so can reduce the borrower's monthly payments substantially.").
479. For example, in a case examined in the NTIC study, a mortgage broker falsified
the income of a borrower, indicating on her loan application that she had a monthly income of
$9,900 when in fact her monthly income was only $1,100. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 1, at 32. The broker also wrote the loan for more than it was supposed to be for and took
$6,700 in broker fees, some of which were diverted to the brother of the mortgage broker. Id.
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In the worst cases, the loan is so blatantly unaffordable that the borrower
defaults on the very first payment duef s° Even if default does not occur quite
this soon, subprime loans still generally default earlier than nonsubprime home
equity loans,48' and high interest rate loans-most of which are subprime---end
up in foreclosure at a higher rate than nonsubprime loans.482 At least one study
attributes this trend to the borrower's inability to pay from the beginning."3
Loans that are too expensive for the borrower come from a lender focus on
the value of the collateral rather than on the borrower's ability to pay the
loan. 4' This problem was exacerbated early on by the increasing ability of
lenders to sell the loans on the secondary market,"s5 thus giving the lender, who
would be paid off early in the loan, little incentive to care if the loan could be
paid by the borrower."' In more recent years, the heavy use of securitization
of loan pools and insurance of those securitizations may have served the same
purpose.
487
2. Subprime Loan Delinquency, Default, and Foreclosure Rates
With the advent of the subprime home equity market, loan defaults and
480. The Weicher report found that, "[on some loan portfolios, 'first payment
delinquencies' may run as high as 25 percent." WEICHER, supra note 300, at 80.
481. Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (referring to expert testimony that United's
delinquency rates showed that "very young loans are going delinquent"); WEICHER, supra note
300, at 83 (finding that "[s]ubprime defaults peak in the second year of the mortgage, but FHA
defaults peak during the fourth to sixth years."). One other study suggested that FHA loan
foreclosures peak between the third and seventh year. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note
1, at23; see also id. at4 (finding thatbetween 1993 and 1998 "[floreclosures on home loans less
than 4 years old tripled"); id. at 23 (finding that loans originated within four years accounted for
39.1% of foreclosures in the Chicago area in 1993, and for 60.11% of foreclosures in 1998); id.
at 24-27 (demonstrating a correlationbetween subprime high interest loans and early foreclosure
in the Chicago area).
482. See infra Part VI.C.3.
483. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 5, 23.
484. See, e.g., id. at 6 (finding that "[o]ne of the most destructive predatory practices
victims often describe is when a lenderbases the loan on the equity the borrower has in the home
rather than the borrower's ability to repay the loan."); see also Bogdanich, supra note 279, at Al
("Spurred by banking-industry deregulation and othermarket forces, the more aggressive lenders
are seeking new customers by emphasizing the equity that secures a loan, rather than a
borrower's ability to repay. While this practice enables more people to borrow, many
homeowners borrow when they shouldn't and thus face bankruptcy or foreclosure."); Sing, supra
note 279, at 1 ("Experts also fear that the rush to home-equity loans could lead to the wider
entrance into this market of unscrupulous second-mortgage lenders and brokers, who have
preyed on less sophisticated or less credit-worthy lower-income or elderly consumers in recent
years."). Indeed, ads began appearing in the mid-1980s advertising forborrowers who had equity
in their home, even if they had significant credit problems. Bogdanich, supra note 279, at Al.
485. The secondary market for second mortgages grew from $10 billion in 1978 to
$75 billion in 1985. Wendy Swallow, "Last Resort" Lender Probed, Sued By 100 In Six
States-Bankrupt Landbank Equity Under Siege, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1985, at A20.
486. See, e.g., Bogdanich, supra note 279, at Al.
487. Avery, supra note 420, at 621 n.1.
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foreclosures appear to be increasing at an almost frightening rate. Though there
have been no nationally comprehensive studies of loan default and foreclosure
rates for subprime home equity loans, the few studies that were published in the
late 1990s suggest that there has been a marked and tragic increase in the
number of home foreclosures as the result of subprime home equity lending.
For example, a Federal Reserve report in 1998 showed average
delinquency rates on all traditional home equity loans to be around 1.25%."'
However, home equity loans in securitized pools had a delinquency rate
generally ranging between 6% and 9%.4"9 The 1999 NTIC study found that
completed foreclosures of all mortgage loans in the Chicago area went from
2,074 in 1993 to 3,964 in 1998-a 91% increase.4 ' A much more dramatic rise
in subprime loan foreclosures could be observed during the same period.
Subprime lenders foreclosed thirty loans in the Chicago region in 1993, which
was 1.4% of all loan foreclosures that year, while in 1998 they foreclosed 1,417
loans, or 35.7% of total foreclosures for the year.491 This was a 4,623% increase
in subprime foreclosures between 1993 and 1998.492 Within a defined thirty-six
block area in Chicago, seventy-three of the foreclosures filed in 1998 were on
loans originated since 1990, and sixty-nine of the loans had been originated
since 1993.' 93 Of the seventy-three loans foreclosed, forty of the seventy-three
foreclosures were initiated by subprime lenders.494 Another twenty-one loans
foreclosed were FHA insured loans, of which fourteen had been originated by
subprime lenders.495
488. Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 287, at 247.
489. Id. at 249 (graph).
490. PREYINGONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 3, 12-13; Unregulated Subprime
Loans, supra note 346, at 1 (reporting that "[h]igh interest rates and fees associated with
predatory subprime mortgage lending are pushing families in the greater Chicago area into
foreclosure at epidemic levels .... ."). The NTIC study points out that because it looked at only
completed foreclosures in which the property was sold at auction, "a large number ofproperties
on which foreclosure had been started" were excluded from these already high numbers.
PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 10.
491. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 17.
492. Id. at 4, 12-13. The NTIC study also found that foreclosures on high interest rate
loans increased more than 400% between 1993 and 1998, that this increase was "linked to
lenders and servicers who specialize in subprime loans," and that "[floreclosed loans originated
after 1994 have higher interest rates on average than loans originated before 1994 that foreclosed
during the same period." Id. at 4.
493. Id. at 28.
494. Id.
495. Id. The Weicher report asserted that at any time approximately 3% ofsubprime
loans are in foreclosure, while less than 2% of government-guaranteed loans and less than 1%
of prime loans are in foreclosure. WEICHER, supra note 300, at 26-27, 74-75, 80. The Weicher
report based its conclusions on nonpublic information about subprime loans from the Mortgage
Information Corporation and the Home Equity Lenders Leadership Organization, on publicly
available information from the Mortgage Bankers Association (mixed prime and subprime data),
and on some publicly available securities offerings. The study also concluded that 94% of
subprime home equity borrowers are current on their payments at any time, compared to a rate
of 97% on prime mortgages and 92% for government-guaranteed mortgages. Id. at 17-18, 74-75.
However, the charts used in the report show different results. Those charts show a 6.5%
delinquency rate, not including foreclosures, id. at 75 tbl. 5.2, and a foreclosure rate of3.1% or
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Thus, it appears that subprime mortgage loans have very high delinquency
rates, especially when one looks at more serious delinquencies and
foreclosures. In addition, many lenders are experiencing continual increase in
their delinquency rates as the loans get older. According to reports filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, ContiMortgage496 had delinquencies
of 2.81% and defaults (e.g., foreclosures, bankruptcies) of 7.51% as of
September 30, 1999 in its $12 billion portfolio.497 The defaults rose from 5.32%
as of September 30, 1998"98 to 7.51% as of September 30, 1999."-' Aames
Financial Corp" reported delinquencies and defaults of 16.3% as of December
1998 and predicted that "[tihe seasoning of the old portfolio without the
addition of new loans could cause delinquency rates to rise."5 1 In contrast, the
delinquency rate for residential mortgages as a whole was a little over 5%,
composed of 4.1% delinquent loans and 1.16% of mortgages in foreclosure. 2
The costs to a borrower of losing his or her home in a foreclosure are
obvious and tragic. A foreclosure becomes even more tragic in cases in which
the home had been in the family for generations before a subprime home equity
loan led to foreclosure. In these cases, but for the encounter with the subprime
lender, the borrower would most likely still own and inhabit the home.03
Another cost of high foreclosure rates is the devastation of America's
housing infiastructure. As more and more homes go into foreclosure and lay
vacant until they canbe resold, neighborhoods suffer."' For example, the NTIC
study showed that in a thirty-sixblock area of Chicago's south side, an average
3.5%, id. at 82 tbl. 5.5. This information, taken together, renders a total default/delinquency rate
of 10%. Moreover, the Weicher report is based on data from 1996. Id. at 74-85. In 1996
subprime lenders had fairly recent loan portfolios, and default and delinquency rates appear to
have increased since that time. The report does recognize that "Wall Street" estimates of
cumulative foreclosure rates show that "[a]fter six years, approximately 13 percent ofmortgages
were in default." Id. at 83. A similar rate of 11% to 12% was reported by United Lending
Companies in 10-K reports filed with the SEC. Id.
496. ContiMortgage had the third largest number of subprime originations in the
fourth quarter of 1998. National Mortgage News, supra note 391
497. Conti Fin. Corp., SEC, Form 10-Q (filed Nov. 15, 1999), at 19.
498. Conti Fin. Corp., SEC, Form 1O-Q (filed Nov. 16, 1998), at 17.
499. Conti Fin. Corp., SEC, Form 10-Q (filed Nov. 15, 1999), at 19.
500. Aames was the twentieth-largest subprime loan originator in the fourth quarter
of 1998. National Mortgage News, supra note 391
501. Aames Fin. Corp., SEC, Form 10-Q (filed Feb. 22, 1999), at 24.
502. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, MBA Survey Reports Mortgage
Delinquency Rate at its Lowest Level in Four Years (visited Jan. 4, 2000)
<http:/www.mbaa.org/news/99/ndsO 199.html>; WorkerProductivity Soars, WASH. PoST, Dec.
8, 1999, atE2.
503. See, e.g., Bill Dedman, Study Discerns Disadvantage for Blacks in Home
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1999, at 18 (reporting on a borrower who had lived in her
home for thirty years and owned it free and clear, and who, after taking a subprime loan, is faced
with foreclosure).
504. Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 39.
2000
83
Mansfield: The Road to Subprime HEL Was Paved with Good Congressional Intent
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of two properties per block were in foreclosure in 1998."'s The study further
found that "[a] third of the properties in foreclosure that were secured by loans
originated after 1990 were abandoned. Sixty-four percent of these abandoned
properties were originated by subprime lenders or were high interest rate
loans.' 's"" Oddly enough, this is the same concern that led Congress into the
home mortgage market during the Great Depression,"°7 and the opposite result
of what Congress intended when it passed DIDMCA. s08
D. Other Abusive Terms and Practices
1. Balloon Payments and Prepayment Penalties
Another feature that may be present in a subprime loan is a large balloon
payment due at the end of the repayment period."09 A balloon loan is one that
is calculated to amortize over a given period of time and is required to be paid
early through the payment of a large lump sum before the entire amortization
period runs. The converse arrangement may also be part of a subprime home
equity loan contract, wherein the borrower is prohibited from paying the loan
off early.510
Both of these arrangements, balloon payments and prepayment penalty
clauses, are generally regulated or prohibited by state law."' However, state
regulation of these terms in home equity loan transactions was preempted by
the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA).
12
2. Loan Solicitation Techniques
Early on, subprime home equity lenders began aggressively marketing their
505. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 4, 28-29; Unregulated Subprime
Loans, supra note 346, at 1.
506. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at4;see also Unregulated Subprime
Loans, supra note 346 (discussing the findings of the study).
507. See supra Part II.
508. See supra Part III.B.
509. See, e.g., PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 34 (reporting the case
of a borrower who had a rate that adjusted up every six months, ending with a balloon payment
"almost equivalent to the original loan amount" that she did not know about when she took out
the loan); PrimeTime Live: Debt Reckoning, supra note 467 (reporting on borrowers who had
large balloon payments about which they did not know).
510. Subprime borrowers are reportedly more likely to have prepayment penalty
clauses in their loan contracts, making it expensive to refinance should they qualify. Carol Frey,
How Lenders Can Sabotage Low Rates, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 1998, at Dl.
511. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3308 (West 1997) (providing consumers with
the right to refinance any balloon payment on the same terms as the rest of the loan); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 537.2509 (West 1997) (giving consumers the right to prepay the unpaid balance of any
consumer credit transaction); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.2510 (West 1997) (providing for a rebate
of unearned interest upon a consumer's prepayment).
512. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806). For a discussion of AMTPA see
supra Part III.C.
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loans as convenient ways to consolidate consumer debt with the added benefits
of tax deductibility and rates lower than credit card rates."3 Marketing
techniques currently run the gamut from relatively unobtrusive television
commercials in which athletes or actors promote home equity loans, to more
invasive techniques."' 4 The more invasive techniques include lenders culling
lien, purchase, and foreclosure information from public records and repeatedly
contacting potential borrowers with loan offers."' In between are the lenders
who send mailers and postcards promoting their loans, and lenders who send
"checks" to borrowers that really represent loan proceeds from an as yet
unmade loan." 6 Another loan solicitation technique is to tie the loan to a home
repair contract" 7 and then make the loan for more than the value of the home
repairs-and sometimes for the entire debt obligation owed on the home
513. See August, Survey, supra note 294, at 548. This report also suggests that
subprime home equity lending signifies finance companies' attempts to compete with banks,
which can issue credit cards, for subprime debt obligations. Id. at 549; see also WEICHER, supra
note 300, at 58 (discussing that subprime equity loans have lower interest rates than credit
cards); Canner, Recent Developments, supra note 285, at 249 ("Subprime home equity loans are
commonly marketed as bill-consolidation loans, particularly as a means to pay off credit card
debt."). The comparison to credit card rates rather than to other home equity loan rates was no
doubt made possible by the mass availability of credit cards to anyone without regard to credit
history, and the resulting overborrowing by consumers. Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 14.
As for claims abouttax deductibility, some lenders have been criticized lately for advertising that
loans with a loan-to-value ratio of 125% are tax deductible when in fact only a portion of the
loan is likely to be tax deductible. Carol Frey, 125 Percent Mortgage Loans May Be Taxing,
RALEIGHNEWS & OBSERVER, May 16, 1998, at Dl [hereinafter Frey, 125 Percent Mortgage].
514. See, e.g., Bill Rumbler & Alex Rodriguez, Mortgage Foreclosures Here Go
Through the Roof, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at 29A ("Some predatory lenders blanket
neighborhoods with leaflets hawking their financing programs, or even go door-to-door looking
for unsophisticated, older homeowners.").
515. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 31 (reporting a case in which the
borrower found out about the possibility of obtaining a refinance loan when the sheriff served
a foreclosure notice on her and "offered to 'help' her by directing her to a broker," and in which
the new, more expensive loan also ended up in foreclosure after the borrower had paid 12% of
the new loan principal in points and fees); Id. at 35 (telling the story of a potential borrower who
was targeted for a subprime loan when she fell behind on her chapter 13 (bankruptcy) payments,
including her FHA mortgage, and ended up paying a company $2,500 to arrange financing to
help her out of her arrearages, but the company did not find financing for her and took the fee
for its services); Bogdanich, supra note 279, at Al (indicating that home equity lenders search
land records to find recent land buyers to offer them home equity loans); Watterson, supra note
285, at 17 (recognizing that some lenders look through public land records to find impending
foreclosures and then attempt to make expensive home equity loans to those facing foreclosure);
PrimeTime Live: Debt Reckoning, supra note 467.
516. See, e.g., Frey, 125 Percent Mortgage, supra note 513, at DI (recognizing that
lenders send checks or items that appear to be checks to targeted borrowers, with a pitch by a
famous person who tells the targets that they can get a loan without a problem); Pulliam, supra
note 339, at Cl ("The lenders thrived by pitching their products through mailers that resembled
checks and through television ads that feature sports stars such as Miami Dolphins quarterback
Dan Marino.").
517. Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see
infra note 601 and accompanying text.
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through refinancing of the first mortgage 8---or to promise more money will
be available for home repairs or debt consolidation than is issued at the loan
closing.5 "9 Lenders have also been accused of advertising "teaser" interest rates
and then giving the borrower a higher rate at closing.52°
3. Borrower Understanding ofLoan Terms, Knowledge of Pricing
Information and Inability to Negotiate Terms
One loan transaction feature familiar to consumer advocates, and certainly
not unique to subprime home equity lending, is the borrower's lack of
knowledge of loan terms when entering into the loan. There can be many
causes for this, ranging from the borrower's inability to understand a complex
transaction to the lender's obscuring or misrepresenting loan terms in order to
actively mislead the borrower about aspects of the transaction."' Furthermore,
even when borrowers do understand loan terms, the loan is likely to be offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, precluding negotiation of particularly onerous
518. Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337, at 68 (indicating that
subprime loans made in connectionwith home repairs are particularly problematic because they
may lead a borrower with no mortgage loan or a low interest loan into a high interest subprime
loan, simply because the borrower sought to make a relatively inexpensive home repair);
Whelan, supra note 2, at CIO.
519. For example, a borrower discussed in the NTIC study had owned her home since
1985 when she took out a $29,000 debt consolidation loan. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 1, at 32. The borrower decided to refinance the loan and take out new proceeds in order to
make $15,000 in home improvements. When the loan actually closed, there was only $2,000 for
home improvements, and the borrower did not actually receive the loan proceeds that the
documents indicated were given to her. Id.; see also id. at 34 (reporting on a borrower who took
out a home improvement loan which, after fees were paid from the proceeds, did not cover the
home improvements that had motivated the loan). Another story in the same study involves a
borrower who did not get all of the loan proceeds represented by the documents. Id. at 33;
Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
520. PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 6.
521. See, e.g., id. at 7 (finding that subprime home equity lenders "often fail to
properly disclose the cost of the loan and the fact that the house is collateral for the loan" and
that "such lenders have rushed many unsophisticated borrowers through the loan closing,
preventing borrowers from understanding what they are signing."); FreyHomeBuyer, supra note
412, at D1 (describing a loan transaction in which the borrower could not read and claimed to
have not understood the documents); Pulliam, supra note 339, at C1 (reporting on the case of a
borrower who thought she was borrowing $140,000 from First Alliance, but wound up with a
principal amount of $161,080, in addition to a loan origination fee of $21,950); Murray, supra
note 337, at A4 (reporting on testimony by the daughter of an elderly couple before the House
Special Committee on Aging stating that her elderly parents were "lured... into a costly loan
without [the lender (Associates)] informing them it was a $75,000 mortgage on their home with
an interest rate of 17.7%," that the lender used forged documents to garner approval of her
parents' loan application, that her parents' only income was derived from Social Security
payments of $1,156.22, that the lender misrepresented the amount of the monthly payment, and
that her parents couldn't afford the loan and ended up in foreclosure).
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Lack of information about the transaction at hand is not the only
information gap relevant to subprime lending. There is also little market
information available to borrowers. Funding matrices and credit scoring
systems are not publicly available, and subprime lenders, like all lenders, are
under no obligation to divulge a borrower's credit score to the borrower.
Moreover, pricing information is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.sHl This,
combined with the diversity in underwriting standards and lenders' failure to
follow their own underwriting standards, means that borrowers often have no
idea how credit history correlates with a loan at certain rates and points, making
it hard for borrowers to know if their loan's terms are justified by their credit
blemishes. All of this taken together means that borrowers who may qualify for
conventional loans are likely entering the subprime loan market, and that some
borrowers are being funneled into rate categories in which they do not belong
(i.e., a B borrower is made a C loan with C rates and points). Indeed, a recent
study by Freddie Mac suggests that as many as 35% of borrowers in the
subprime market-including all subprime loans-would actually have qualified
for prime credit.-24
4. Disparate Impact on Minorities
While many uninformed borrowers are being made expensive loans not
justified by their credit records, not all such uninformed borrowers are treated
alike. One of the concerns that has been raised regarding subprime loans is
whether lenders are targeting minorities, the elderly, and the poor.5" This
concern is particularly legitimate regarding elderlyborrowers, who are the most
likely to have both accumulated equity in their homes and limited incomes.526
522. United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192,203-04 (D. Mass.
1998) (implying that subprime mortgage borrowers do not have the power to negotiate points
and interest rates).
523. See infra Part VII.C.
524. Karen Hube, In the Wild West of Subprime Lending, Borrowers Have to Dodge
Many Bullets, WALL ST. J., March 18, 1998, at Cl.
525. See, e.g., Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337, at 65;
PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 5-6 (finding that "many subprime lenders push
high-interest, high-fee loans on poorer homeowners, even if they have good credit records" and
that the group targeted by subprime lenders consists of "senior citizens, the working class, and
less affluent homeowners as well as homeowners with high levels of credit card debt"); Fred
Faust, Minorities Likely to Pay Morefor Loans, Report Says, ST. LoUIs POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 22,
1999, at C8, available in Knight-Ridder Trib. Bus.News Database 1999 WL 28700679; Whelan,
supra note 2, at CIO (reporting on allegations that lenders market subprime loans to minority
individuals even if they have good credit histories that would qualify them for prime loans).
526. Home Equity Lending Abuses, Hearings, supra note 337, at 65; Dedman, supra
note 530, at 18; PrimeTime Live: Debt Reckoning, supra note 494 (reporting on borrowers who
when they had almost paid off the home they had lived in for twenty-five years, then were
courted by a loan broker and took a subprime loan, and who then worried about foreclosure; and
on borrowers who, after taking a subprime loan, lost in foreclosure the home in which they had
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It is also a tremendous problem in African-American neighborhoods,
threatening to undo much of the progress generated by the Community
Reinvestment Act and other laws meant to promote fair lending. 27
There is very little comprehensive information about the group of
borrowers receiving subprime home equity loans, although in 1999 several
studies were published on the subject.52 Each of these studies looking
specifically at borrower data concluded that credit history does not appear to
be the determining factor in whether borrowers are courted and made
conventional or subprime loans. Rather, race and other such characteristics
appear to be more important.
One of those studies, published by the Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), concluded that in St. Louis the top
ten subprime lenders made 7% of all the home refinance and improvement
loans in the entire area, but they made 30% of all of those loans in areas
comprised of 80% to 100% minorities. 29
Another study published by The Woodstock Institute showed that race,
rather than income, home value, debt, the borrower's education, orthe location
or age of the home, is the strongest factor in the Chicago housing market in
determining whether a borrower is offered a prime or subprime loan.53 The
study found that "58 percent of conventional (not government guaranteed)
refinance loans inpredominantly African-American neighborhoods were made
by subprime lenders, compared to less than 10% in predominantly white
neighborhoods."53' The study further found that subprime lenders accounted for
74% of loan applications in black census tracts, but only 21% of loan
applications in white census tract areas. 32 Banks, thrifts, and bank-owned
mortgage companies did most of the lending in white areas, while independent
mortgage companies did most of the lending in black areas. 33 This
disproportionately high number of subprime loans existed even when
raised their child). A 1994 Federal Reserve Board study found that homeowners with no
mortgage debt were more likely to be elderly, and to have limited incomes compared to other
homeowners. Canner & Luckett, Recent Surveys, supra note 279, at 574.
527. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994); Two STEPS BACK, supra note I, at 10.
528. On the lack of available information about subprime borrower groups, see
WEICHER, supra note 300, at47 (stating that "[u]nfortunately, there are few sources ofsystematic
information about subprime borrowers.").
529. Faustsupra note 354, atC8; Ted Sickinger, When theDoorisBlockedloBuying
a Home-Minorities Denied Loans at Higher Rate Than Whites, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 28,
1999, at Al.
530. Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 17-38; Dedman, supra note 503, at 18.
53 1. Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at iii. The study also found that nineteen of the
top twenty lenders in white tracts were prime lenders, and fourteen of the top twenty lenders in
black tracts were subprime lenders. Id.
532. Id. Similarly, the study found that "[o]f the 20 lenders accounting for the most
conventional refinance applications inwhite tracts in 1998,17 wereprime lenders."Id. However,
in black tracts, eighteen of the top twenty lenders (based on loan applications) were subprime
lenders. Id.
533. Id.
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neighborhoods with similar incomes were compared. 34 Thus, individuals living
in middle income black neighborhoods were more likely than individuals living
in middle income white neighborhoods to have a subprime, rather than a prime,
loan.53 Furthermore, subprime loan activity increased at a much greater rate in
black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods between 1993 and 1998,
growing by almost thirty times in black neighborhoods, and only 2.5 times in
white neighborhoods.536
National Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)537 data also shows that
subprime home equity lenders generally lend disproportionately to minorities.
For example, of Aames's borrowers in 1996, 25% were black, 11% were
hispanic, 1.6% were Asians, and 58% were white.5 38 The ContiMortgage report
shows that for the same year, 16% of its borrowers were black, 3% were
hispanic, 59% were white, and 19.6% were "not provided.""5 9 Thus, the studies
indicate that subprime home equity lending is having a greater impact on the
lives of not only the poor and the elderly, but also members of minority groups.
VII. LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
As the severity of the subprime home equity lending market has come to
light, various attempts have been made to bring abuses under control through
legislative enactments. The states have been hamstrung by DIDMCA and
AMTPA; they are forced to carefully draft state proposals addressing a
significant local problem so as not to run afoul of these acts.54 It is probably
for this reason that the first major effort to curtail predatory subprime mortgage
lending was at the federal level.
534. Id. at iii, 25. By one estimate half of all middle income black individuals who
took out home-secured loans borrowed from subprime lenders. Dedman, supra note 503, at 18.
The Dedman article also reported that to test whether lenders are making subprime loans to black
individuals and others who qualify forbetter credit terms, housing advocacy groups in thirty-four
cities would be using black, white, and Hispanic testers with comparable credit scores to apply
for subprime loans to see if they are treated equally, or if minority applicants are made subprime
loans while nonminority applicants are directed to prime lenders. Id.
535. Two STEPs BACK, supra note 1, at iii.
536. Id. The study found that subprime lending had increased by 136% in
predominantly white neighborhoods and by 2,874% in predominantly black neighborhoods
between 1993 and 1998. Id. at 29.
537. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994).
538. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data for Aames Capital Corporation for 1996
(visited Jan. 4, 2000) <http://db.rtknet.org/ix-bin/hmda/nph-cgihmdab>.
539. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data for ContiMortgage Corporation for 1996
(visited Jan. 4,2000) <http://db.rtknet.org/ix-bin/hmda/nph-cgihmdab>. Failure to provide race
data is a common problem with subprime HMDA reports, making it difficult to determine the
actual racial composition of a company's borrowers.
540. For example, the North Carolina Attorney General's office expressed concern
that Office of Thrift Supervision or the OCC might try to nullify the new North Carolina
predatory lending law (discussed in Part VII.B, infra) by enacting regulations preempting the
statute. Brian Collins, Laws Raise Fears ofPreemption, ORIGINATIONNEVws, Oct. 1, 1999, at 43.
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A. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)54'
In 1994 Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
in response to the widespread abuses occurring in the home equity market.542
The legislation was designed to protect people who were the targets of "reverse
redlining," a practice that involves targeting those who are denied traditional
means of credit with high interest, high cost loans.543 The Act provides for
increased disclosures for mortgages made with an annual percentage rate of
interest greater than 10% above the yield on Treasury securities,544 or loans
with closing fees and total points in excess of 8% of the total loan or $400,
whichever is greater.545 These loan terms are sometimes referred to as the
HOEPA "triggers." The triggers can be increased or decreased by the Federal
Reserve Board every two years, provided the changes are consistent with the
consumer protection objectives of HOEPA and are warranted by the need for
credit, and as long as the Board consults with representatives of consumers
(including low-income consumers) and lenders.54
For the purposes of HOEPA, points and fees are defined as "all items
included in the finance charge, except interest or the time-price differential"; 547
compensation paid to brokers; ' and
each of the charges listed in section 1605(e) (except an
escrow for future payment of taxes) unless the charge is
reasonable, the creditor receives no direct or indirect
compensation, and the charge is paid to a third party
unaffiliated with the creditor, and such other charges as the
Board determines to be appropriate.549
The HOEPA provisions cover anyone who makes two or more high cost, high
fee loans in a twelve month period or anyone originating one or more such
541. The author wishes to acknowledge Heather Campbell forresearching and writing
the initial draft of this section of the Article.
542. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat.
2160 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
543. The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1993: Hearings on S. 924
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 1 (1993) (statement ofSen.
Donald Riegle, Jr., Chairman).
544. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)(A) (1994).
545. Id. § 1602(aa)(1)(B).
546. Id. § 1602(aa)(2). The Board is not allowed to lower the Treasury yield trigger
to below eight percentage points above the thirty-day securities yield or increase it to greater
than twelve percentage points. Id.
547. Id. § 1602(aa)(4)(A).
548. Id. § 1602(aa)(4)(B).
549. Id. § 1602(aa)(4)(C). The charges listed in § 1605(e) include fees for title
examination or title insurance, preparation of loan related documents, fees for notarizing deeds
and other documents, appraisal fees, and credit reports. Id. § 1605(e).
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mortgages through a mortgage broker."' 0 Once a lender is covered, the lender
must disclose to potential borrowers the annual percentage rate of the loan and
the monthly payment for a loan with a fixed rate of interest or, on a variable
rate loan, the percentage rate of the loan, the monthly payment obligation, and
a statement that the interest and payment might increase, accompanied by the
amount of the maximum monthly payment."' 1 The lender must also give to the
borrower a notice of the possibility of foreclosure if the borrower defaults and
a notice that the borrower is not obligated to complete the transaction on the
basis of having received disclosures or signing a loan application.5 12 These
disclosures must be made three business days prior to the consummation of the
transaction, and once these disclosures are made, the lender cannot change the
terms of the agreement as disclosed, unless the new disclosures also meet the
HOEPA requirements. s
HOEPA also provides that consumers taking covered mortgages cannotbe
charged a penalty for prepaying principal5 4 except in certain circumstances,555
and that if a borrower defaults on a covered mortgage, the lender cannot
refinance the loan at a higher rate.56 HOEPA also prohibits balloon payments
on covered mortgages with a term of less than five years,57 negative
amortizations,5 8 and prepaid payments.5 9
Perhaps one of the most significant provisions of HOEPA is its prohibition
of regularly extending credit without regard to the ability of the consumer to
pay the loan.60 In the congressional hearings on HOEPA, consumers and
advocates recounted numerous stories of abuses regarding lenders who
extended credit to homeowners who clearly had little ability to pay their
loans.561 In addition, many consumers who were being offered such loans
550. Id. § 1602(f).
551. Id. § 1639(a)(2).
552. Id. § 1639(a)(1).
553. Id. § 1639(b).
554. Id. § 1639(c)(1)(A).
555. Id. §1639(c)(2)(A)-(D). Theseprovisions allow for prepayment penalties when,
at the time the mortgage is made, the consumer is not liable for a monthly indebtedness of
greater than 50% of his gross monthly income, and the income and expenses of that consumer
are verified by a signed financial statement, credit report, and in the case of employment income,
by payment records or verification from the employer. In addition, the prepayment penalty is
allowed if it applies only to a prepayment made by means other than a refinancing by the creditor
under the mortgage, or if the penalty does not apply after five years from the date of the making
of the mortgage, or is not prohibited under any other law. Id.
556. Id. § 1639(d).
557. Id. § 1639(e).
558. Id. § 1639(f). For a description of a negative amortization, see supra note 210.
559. Id. § 1639(g) (providing that a mortgage covered under HOEPA "may not
include terms under which more than 2 periodic payments required under the loan are
consolidated and paid in advance from the loan proceeds provided to the consumer.").
560. Id. § 1639(h).
561. See, e.g., Problems in Community Development, Hearings, supra note 439, at
291-92 (statement of Eva Davis, consumer) (stating she had a monthly income of just under
$1,100 per month and was given a loan that made her monthly payments nearly $2,000 per
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initially had contacted a contractor for home improvement repairs and were
directed to lenders for refinancing of their homes to pay for these repairs.562
These homeowners frequently had very little left to pay on their initial
mortgages and needed very little money to finance the home improvement
repairs; yet, by the time a lender was through with finance charges and the like,
the consumer was essentially borrowing at 66.6% interest in some cases. 63
HOEPA now prohibits lenders from directly paying HOEPA-covered loan
proceeds to contractors by lenders, except in situations where the proceeds are
payable to the consumer or jointly to the contractor and the consumer,"64 or
where a third party escrow agent pays the contractor in accordance with terms
and conditions in a written agreement signed by the consumer, creditor, and
contractor before the date of payment. 65
Finally, HOEPA provides for civil liability in the event of violations and
for damages in the amount of all fees and finance charges paid by the consumer
unless the creditor establishes that its HOEPA violation was immaterial.566 The
act also gives state attorneys general the power to prosecute HOEPA violations
if an action is brought within three years of the date of the violation. 67
During the hearings on HOEPA, consumer advocates argued that although
HOEPA was a good start to consumer protection, more should be done in this
area-specifically, interest rate caps. 68 Industry representatives argued, on the
other hand, that reimposing interest rate caps would dry up credit for needy
borrowers who would not otherwise qualify for loans. 69 Although several
senators made comments during the HOEPA debates regarding the possible
need to regulate interest rates in the subprime mortgage industry,"' Congress
month); see also supra Part VI.C.1 (discussing debt-to-income ratio).
562. See, e.g., The Role of Community Development Banks: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation & Depositins. ofthe House Comm. on Banking,
Fin., & Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. 541-42 (1993) (statement of Kathleen Keest, National
Consumer Law Center).
563. Id. at 542.
564. 15 U.S.C. §1639(i)(1).
565. Id. §1639(i)(2).
566. Id. §1640(a)(4).
567. Id. §1640(e).
568. Community Development Banks, Hearings, supra note 562, at 547 (statement
ofKathleen Keest, National ConsumerLawCtr.); see alsoProblems in CommunityDevelopment,
Hearings, supra note 439, at 259 (statement by Terry Drent, Ann Arbor Community Dev. Dept.)
(describing local conditions when the interest rate increases and exceeds the growth rate of fixed
incomes).
569. Problems in Community Development, Hearings, supra note 439, at 282
(statement of John Hamill, Pres. of Fleet Bank of Mass.) (arguing that high interest rates are the
cost of credit for some borrowers who nevertheless still deserve access to credit, a service his
company provided).
570. Id. at 264 (statement of Sen. Riegle) (stating in regard to interest rates "I gag on
the theory that there's even one loan in 21 percent or 19 percent or 18 percent"); Id. at 277
(statement by Sen. Shelby) (stating "[b]ut perhaps, ifpeople are going to be exploited like this,
this is an area that we're going to have to look into, nationally and State by State"); Id. at 283
(statement by Sen. Boxer). Senator Boxer explained
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did not fully consider these suggestions, instead opting for the above-described
restrictions on high cost mortgages.
HOEPA is a relatively new statute. However, it already appears to be
having some success in limiting predatory lending practices, and has been used
in various predatory lending actions brought by private litigants and
governmental agencies.57 Nevertheless, critics charge that the trigger for a
high-cost loan in HOEPA is too high, 72 that high-cost loans should have
greater protections,573 and that because HOEPA is primarily a disclosure
statute, it does not adequately shield borrowers from predatory lending
I'm not a person that likes to set caps on things,
because I come from a free market economy. I was a
stockbroker. I don't like to set limits, but I think what
Mr. Shelby was getting at... is that in the face of
such outrageous behavior it's almost impossible not
to consider having the Government impose some
limits.
Id.
571. For example, the FTC announced in July 1999 that it had investigated and
charged seven lenders with violating HOEPA by defrauding homeowners into taking loans they
had no ability to repay, failing to give required disclosures, and failing to give required notices
before foreclosing. Whelan, supra note 2, at CIO. Six of the seven lenders agreed to pay a total
of $572,500 to consumers. Id. The seventh lender was out of business. Id. The FTC also
announced it would be cracking down on subprime home equity lending abuses. Id.; see also
Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451,456 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding thatthe
lender had violated HOEPA by not making required disclosures three days before the loan
closing, but that the borrower had failed to prove a pattern and practice by the lender of making
loans that borrowers could not repay). One of the effects HOEPA appears to be having is that
some lenders now make loans at a rate just under the HOEPA triggers, so as to avoid making
what are now called "HOEPA loans." Other lenders are continuing to make high-cost loans, as
defined by HOEPA, and so it is unclear if the HOEPA high-cost cutoff is having the effect of
bringing interest rates down.
572. See, e.g., PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 22 (suggesting that
"high cost loans" subject to regulation should be defined as "those with APR of Treasury rate
plus 4%"); Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at iv, 44 (suggesting that high-cost loans should be
those in which there are "fees exceeding 5 percent of the total loan amount or an annual
percentage rate (APR) exceeding the corresponding treasury rate plus 8 percentage points").
573. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at Insert 22 (recommending that
restrictions for high-cost loans include no balloon payments, no negative amortization, no
increased interest rate after default, no mandatory arbitration clauses, no lending without
homeownership counseling, no directpayments to home improvement contractors, and that there
should be a private right of action to enforce these protections, and that assignees should be held
liable for all borrower claims); Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at iv (recommending that "[t]he
restrictions on HOEPA loans should be increased, including, for example, prohibiting loan
flipping, restricting financing of fees for high- cost loans, prohibiting loans with high debt-to-
income ratios, and expanding restrictions on prepayment penalties."); see also id. at 39-40. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development also recommends lowering the HOEPA
threshold and prohibiting loan flipping, requiring lenders to account for the consumer's ability
to pay, expanding the class of prohibited prepayment penalties, and requiring education and
pretransaction counseling for certain consumers. JOINT REPORT, supra note 434, at 50.
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practices."
B. North Carolina 1999 Senate Bill 1149
Faced with subprime lending issues that "exploded over the past 18 months
or so in terms of the impact on North Carolina," North Carolina adopted state
legislation in July 1999 meant to limit predatory mortgage practices." The
legislation, S.B. 1149, which goes into effect on July 1, 2000, prohibits certain
terms and practices in high-cost home loans as defined by the statute.576
Pursuant to these limitations, a subprime lender 77 may not contract (1) for the
right to call the loan before default,"'8 (2) for a balloon payment,579 (3) for a
payment schedule that will cause the principal balance to increase (i.e. a
negative amortization),8 ' (4) for an increase in the interest rate after default,"8 '
(5) for the payment of more than two payments paid out of closing,52 or (6) for
a charge for a modification or deferral of the loan.83
The statute further prohibits high-cost lending without home-ownership
counseling;5 high-cost lending without regard for the borrower's ability to
repay;8 5 the financing of prepayment fees or penalties if the lender is
refinancing its own loan or the loan of an affiliate;586 and the financing of
points, fees, or charges payable to a third party.87 Lenders also cannot charge
"points and fees in connection with a high-cost home loan ifthe proceeds of the
high-cost home loan are used to refinance an existing high-cost home loan held
574. Collins, supra note 540, at 43 (quoting a United States Department of Justice
attorney as stating that "[flederal efforts to stop predatory lending have been ineffective. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development is not enforcing the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act and the Home Owners and Equity Protection Act is simply a disclosure law that
is a 'waste of time."); accord Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 10, 48.
575. Bickley, supra note 459, at B4 (quoting the director of the Consumer Protection
section of the North Carolina Attorney General's office).
576. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (1999). High-cost home loans are: (1) those covered
by HOEPA; (2) those in which the borrower is charged points and fees of more than 5% of the
total loan amount for loans of $20,000 or more, or 8% of the loan amount or $1,000 (whichever
is less) if the total loan amount is less than $20,000 (although the statute excludes from this
calculation certain points); and (3) those in which the "loan documents permit the lender to
charge or collect prepayment fees or penalties more than 30 months after the loan closing or
which exceed, in the aggregate, more than two percent (2%) of the amount prepaid." Id. § 24-
1.1E(6).
577. Under this statute the term "lender" includes a mortgage banker or mortgage
broker who originates a loan in a table funded transaction. Id. § 24-2.5.
578. Id. § 24-1.IE(b)(1).
579. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(2).
580. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(3).
581. Id. § 24-1.IE(b)(4).
582. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)(5).
583. Id. § 24-1.IE(b)(6).
584. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(1).
585. Id. § 24-1.IE(c)(2).
586. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(3)(a).
587. Id. § 24-LIE(c)(3)(b-c).
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by the same lender as noteholder. '588 The legislation also places restrictions on
high-cost loans used to pay home-improvement contractors;589 defines and
prohibits certain unfair and deceptive acts or practices;590 prohibits
unreasonable and phony charges for loan-related goods, products, and
services;"9 ' prohibits the financing of premiums for credit life, disability, or
unemployment insurance;592 and prohibits flipping.593
Finally, for all first-lien loans (not just high-cost loans), the legislation
provides that points can only be charged if they are "paid for the purpose of
reducing, and in fact result in a bona fide reduction of the interest rate or time-
price differential."59 4 The statute also limits other fees paid to the lender to not
more than one-fourth of 1% of the principal amount of the loan or $150,
whichever is greater;595 limits deferral fees;596 and prohibits prepayment fees
and penalties for loans secured by the borrower's principal dwelling for all
loans of $150,000 or less.
597
It did not take long for the North Carolina Attorney General's Office to
begin using the new statute. The day the statute was adopted, the Attorney
General's Office subpoenaed from Associates First Capital9 . all loan
documents generated between January 1996 and June 1999 in eleven North
Carolina counties.599 The Attorney General also subpoenaed Associates'
telephone solicitation scripts, training materials, and sales directives.6°
C. New York 1999 Senate Bill 5046, Assembly Bill 4744
In early 1999 both houses of the New York Legislature began considering
identical bills entitled the "Home Equity Fraud Act."'" In the preamble to the
bill, the legislature describes the predatory lending problem that prompted the
legislation:
588. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(4).
589. Id. § 24-1.1E(c)(5).
590. Id. § 24-1.1E(d).
591. Id. § 24-8(d).
592. Id. § 24-1.10.2(b).
593. Id. § 24-1.10.2(c-d).
594. Id. § 24-1.1A(c)(1)(b).
595. Id. § 24-1.1A(c)(1)(f).
596. Id. § 24-1.1A(g).
597. Id. § 24-1.LA(b)(1).
598. Associates First Capital, located in Irving, Texas, and formerly owned by Ford,
had the highest subprime home equity loan origination volume in the fourth quarter of 1998. See
National Mortgage News, supra note 417.
599. Carol Frey, LendingLawShowinglts Teeth, RALEIGHNEWs & OBSERVER, Sept.
10, 1999, at DI. By this time the Attorney General's Office had received over fifty complaints
about Associates' practices, including upfront fees of more than 10% of the loan. Id.
600. Id. Interestingly, after the North Carolina legislation passed, subprime lenders
in North Carolina agreed to have more meetings with consumer groups. Id.
601. S. 5046, 222nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); A. 4744, 222d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1999).
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The legislature hereby finds that many senior citizens and
minority homeowners in New York have been targeted by
unethical home improvement contractors, mortgage
companies, mortgage brokers and fiance companies who
induce these homeowners into entering into high cost high
interest rate mortgage agreements which the homeowner is
often unable to afford with the intent of foreclosing on the
home and stripping the equity.
The legislature further finds that in order to entice people
into entering into these agreements they are promised
refinancing of primary mortgages, consolidation of loans and
outstanding bills and are given cash but often are not told or
do not understand that they are securing the loan with a
mortgage lien on their home which will lead to foreclosure in
the event of default. Often these loans are documented with
false and misleading documentation provided by brokers
which could easily be determined to be false if checked by
the lender. Despite prohibitions contained in federal law
many of these loans are based on equity in the home and not
on the borrower's ability to pay. Since many of these
homeowners live on a fixed income, they are unable to make
the required payments and end up losing their homes. This
practice appears to be targeted in neighborhoods with a high
concentration of senior and minority residents.
The legislature further finds that it is in the best interest
of the citizens of this state that these unethical practices
should be prohibited by law and that unscrupulous people
should be denied the benefit of the courts of this state in
perpetrating these actions upon the senior citizens of this state
and does therefore enact this Home Equity Fraud Act.6"
The bill allows for the imposition of a fine or penalty on any mortgage
banker or broker who charges more than 3% for services performed by a
mortgage broker or charges or allows to be charged more than 6% in points and
fees (with some exclusions).: 3 Further, the bill requires that mortgage bankers
and brokers disclose either before or at the time the borrower makes a loan
application whether the loan will be sold after closing or retained by the
original lender.6" Under the bill, a licensed lender's license may be revoked or
suspended if the lender engages in various business activities with a home-
improvement contractor unless the lender fully discloses the activities and
602. N.Y. S. 5046 § 2; N.Y. A. 4744 § 2.
603. N.Y. S. 5046 § 3; N.Y. A. 4744 § 3.
604. N.Y. S. 5046 § 4; N.Y. A. 4744 § 4. The bill also prohibits the transfer of a loan
for 180 days after closing if the borrower is not told that the loan may be sold. Id.
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secures the written agreement of all parties to the transaction. 6°s Moreover,
loans secured by the borrower's home may not have a balloon payment, and the
loan-to-value ratio may not exceed 80%.' The bill also provides for an
extended notice to borrowers subject to a foreclosure action alerting them of
potential predatory lending defenses to foreclosure 7 and requires foreclosing
lenders to prove they have complied with all mortgage banker and broker
regulations. 6°
A defense to foreclosure or enforcement exists under the bill if(1) the loan
being foreclosed or collected upon was a refinance loan to a borrower who
owned the property for more than five years prior to the loan date, and (2) the
borrower did not have the ability to repay the loan and the lender knew or
should have known this. Another defense exists if the broker or banker violated
applicable mortgage banker and broker regulations. Furthermore, in a
foreclosure action, the court may consider the age, income source, and debt-to-
income ratio of the borrower at the time the loan was made. °9 The bill also
increases the time to cancel a home-improvement contract from three to fifteen
days"' and prohibits default judgments on loans that refinance a personal
residence unless the court makes a written affirmative finding that the relevant
regulations were complied with.61 1 This bill is still pending.
D. Other Legislative Proposals
Although New York and North Carolina are the only two states to have
gone so far as to introduce or adopt legislation addressing predatory home
mortgage lending, other such action appears inevitable.61 For example, the City
of Baltimore recently formed a citywide Coalition to End Predatory Real Estate
Practices. 6 3 The coalition is working to draft predatory lending legislation to
be introduced in the next session of the Maryland General Assembly.
614
Additionally, Congress has begun to recognize that a problem still exists
despite its adoption of HOEPA. In March 1998, in the wake of continued
concern about abuses in the subprime home equity market, the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, chaired by Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), held
605. N.Y. S. 5046 § 5; N.Y. A. 4744 § 5. A companion piece of the bill similarly
limits home improvement contractors. N.Y. S. 5046 § 11; N.Y. A. 4744 § 11.
606. N.Y. S. 5046 § 7; N.Y. A. 4744 § 7.
607. N.Y. S. 5046 § 8; N.Y. A. 4744 § 8.
608. N.Y. S. 5046 § 9; N.Y. A. 4744 § 9.
609. N.Y. S. 5046 § 9, 12; N.Y. A. 4744 § 9, 12.
610. N.Y.S. 5046 § 10; N.Y. A. 4744 § 10.
611. N.Y. S. 5046 § 12; N.Y. A. 4744 § 12.
612. Since North Carolina approved its law twenty-three attorneys general have
contacted the North Carolina Attorney General for information on how to enact a similar law.
State Level Most Important to Broker Regulation, 9 ORIGINATION NEWS 50, Oct. 1, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 11126684.
613. Daniel P. Henson I, City Not Silent Partner in Real Estate 'Flipping',
BALTIMoRE SuN, August 21, 1999, at 13A.
614. Id.
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hearings on abuses in the subprime market.6"5 The hearings were not meant to
spur any legislation, but only to expose the problem and educate consumers. 616
These same concerns have also played a part in proposals to reform the Truth
in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.
617
VIII. SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Clearly, legislatures and other policy makers must continue trying to find
solutions to the problem of predatory home equity lending."8 The question is,
how should regulators and others go about doing so? The remainder of this
Article makes some suggestions in this direction.
A. Better Data Collection and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(BMDA)
619
The information necessary to fully understand the problem of predatory
home equity lending is currently not collected anywhere, nor is it required to
be reported anywhere.62 Thus there are currently only inadequate and
615. Murray, supra note 337, at A4.
616. Id.
617. JOINT REPORT, supra note 434, at 50 (recommending additional substantive
consumer protections); Regulatory Burden Relief. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst.
& Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 319 (1998)
(statement of Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Ctr.) (seeking to
modify TILA and RESPA to protect consumers).
618. As one recent observer put it, "[i]t will become increasingly important for
regulators to distinguish between loans that make housing attainable for a larger segment of the
community and those that serve only to generate quick fees for lenders without consideration for
a borrower's ability to repay." Ellen Seidman, CRA in the 21st Century, MORTGAGE BANKING,
Oct. 1, 1999, at 58, 63.
619. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1994).
620. For example, the authors of the Woodstock Institute study recognized that
"HMDA data lack key information on costs and terms, do not include many second mortgage
home equity loans, and miss some lenders entirely due to exemptions in the law. Ideally, of
course, such data would be collected at the federal level." Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at v;
see also id. at 46; PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 11, 37-38 (recognizing the
difficulties of researching and of public policy enforcement where data is not sufficiently nor
timely reported); WEICHER, supra note 300, at 48 (stating that "[t]he information about
borrowers that has featured in public policy discussions has been anecdotal. This is virtually
unavoidable, given the paucity of systematic data").
The authors of the NTIC study similarly complained about the lack of data
differentiating between prime and subprime loans and the fact that not all lenders are required
to report under HMDA:
To meaningfully estimate the subprime market and its
impact NTIC attempted to overcome two problems.
The first has to do with the definition of the subprime
market. Lending data such as that provided through
HMDA do not differentiate between subprime and
other loans. Nor does federal law require all subprime
lenders to report HMDA data.
PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. at 9, 11, 37-38 (stating that the
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incomplete sources for information about rates andpoints chargedby subprime
lenders and to whom such loans are being made. Lenders have absolutely
noincentive to collect such information, and yet this information is essential to
a complete understanding of subprime home equity lending and what
regulation may be appropriate.62" '
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act already requires many mortgage
lenders to report various data about the loans they make.6" However, much
information essential to understanding predatory home equity lending is not
collected, and compliance is not adequately monitored. Amending HMDA to
require collection of essential data and better compliance and monitoring
would be an easy way to provide policy makers with the information they need
to fully understand the magnitude and severity of the problem. Therefore, this
article first recommends that HMDA be amended to cover all home equity
lenders, and to require the reporting of information such as (1) loan interest
rates and APR; (2) points and fees; (3) loan-to-value ratios; (4) the borrower's
debt-to-income ratio (determined by a national standard); (5) whether the
lender deems the loan to be subprime; (6) what category lender deems the loan
to be and why; (7) whether the loan is a refinance of an existing mortgage,
regardless of the "purpose" for the loan; (8) how many times the lender and/or
affiliated lenders have made a loan to the same borrower; (9) all fees charged
in the loan; and (10) the cost and type of any insurance included in the loan.
623
lack of data on subprime lenders makes accurate industry characterization difficult.
621. This fact was recognized by the Weicher report:
Unfortunately, there are few sources of
systematic information about subprime borrowers.
Although the demographic and economic attributes of
borrowers are important to policymakers, they have
not been of particular interest to Wall Street analysts.
Nor have individual subprime lenders found it useful
to collect and analyze such data about theirborrowers
for business purposes .... What does matter to a
lender are the credit history of the borrower, the
characteristics of the property, and the characteristics
of the loan. This information does serve important
business purposes, whereas demographic information
about the borrower is not directly relevant.
WEICHER, supra note 300, at 47-48.
622. The Act requires certain depository institutions to record and report "the number
and total dollar amount ofmortgage loans which were (A) originated (or for which the institution
received completed applications), or (B) purchased by that institution during each fiscal
year .... "12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1)(1994). Among other things, the Act further requires lenders
to indicate "the number and dollar amount of home improvement loans" and "the number and
dollar amount of mortgage loans and completed applications involving mortgagors or mortgage
applicants grouped according to census tract, income level, racial characteristics, and gender."
Id. § 2803(b).
623. The Woodstock Institute study contained a similar proposal, finding that states
should:
require licensed mortgage lenders to report data on
loans, including rates, fees, etc., and can make these
data available to the public., Home Mortgage
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As the NTIC study concluded, "[u]nless and until all lenders directly
report, in a timely and accurate fashion, such data as interest, Annual
Percentage Rate, fees, and the like, it will be impossible to get a more accurate
picture of subprime lending practices than that provided here."'624
B. Increased Information in the Market
All efforts thus far at increasing the information in the market in order to
make it work more efficiently have been at the individual level. Thus, TILA
and RESPA both dictate certain information that must be disclosed to
individual borrowers before consummation of the loan transaction. The Truth
in Lending Act does not mandate disclosure of rates and terms in the market
except through these disclosures at the individual level. The only regulation of
advertising contained in the Truth In Lending Act is set up as "trigger term"
regulation. This means that if a lender chooses to advertise one of several rate
trigger terms, it must also advertise other relevant terms.625 In this way, the
current regulation of advertising of rates and terms is woefully inadequate.
Consumers need to know what they are looking at before they decide to
buy. Therefore, lenders should be required to advertise rates and fees so that a
borrower can know long before entering into a relationship with a potential
lender whether they are truly interested in taking a loan from the lender. This
would further protect borrowers from becoming unsuspecting victims of
predatory lending practices and would also help the market work more
efficiently.
Still, increasing the information provided to borrowers probably cannot, on
its own, solve the problems faced by subprime home equity borrowers. As the
Woodstock Institute study concluded:
Ideally, [homeowners] would be equipped, either through
education or technical assistance, to judge whether the
potential advantages of a subprime loan merits the costs of
the loan as well as the risk of credit problems or even
foreclosure. Because it is not feasible to give such skills to all
Disclosure Act data has proven a powerful tool in
improving access to credit. But HMDA data lack key
information on costs and terms, do not include many
second mortgage home equity loans, and miss some
lenders entirely due to exemptions in the law. Ideally,
of course, such data would be collected at the federal
level.
TwO STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at v; see also PREYING ONNEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 37-
38 (advocating that subprime lenders, mortgage brokers, and home-improvement contractors be
required to report interest rates, fees and APRs as well as the term of loans made, and the broker
or home-improvement contractor involved in the loan).
624. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 11.
625. 12 C.F.R. § 226.24 (1999).
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homeowners and due to the scale of the problem, it is
incumbent upon public policy to reduce the opportunities for
lenders and brokers to originate predatory loans.626
C. Rate and Fee Regulation
During the process of adopting HOEPA, neither the establishment of a
federal usury limit, nor the elimination of the federal preemption contained in
DIDMCA for purposes of nonpurchase money first-lien loans, were
considered. This was a mistake.
Rate regulation has historically served-and in all areas except first-lien
mortgage lending, continues to serve-several important public functions.
First, usury limits protect the borrower from overreaching and fraud by setting
a maximum charge that can be imposed by lenders, good and bad alike. These
maximum limits also set a societal cap on the value of the use of another's
money, thereby preventing overcompensation to lenders with control over lent
assets.
Usury limits also protect the borrower from his or her own inability to
understand complex financial transactions and from making poor financial
decisions with stakes that are unacceptably high, such as eviction from and
foreclosure on the borrower's home. This protective function is served by much
of the legislation that governs our society. For example, we require the use of
seat belts because it protects the driver and occupants from serious injury in the
event of an accident.2 7 Similarly, we should protect borrowers from loss of
their homes by setting maximum rates and fees that can be charged by lenders,
and by requiring lenders to take into account a borrower's ability to pay. In
some cases, borrowers simply should not have access to credit because they
cannot pay for the credit without losing their home.
Finally, usury limits protect loan source funds, whether supplied by
depositors or Wall Street investors. Usury limits do this by recognizing that
lending beyond a certain maximum limit causes extremely high risks of loss of
the invested capital, whether the risk is generated by the borrower or caused by
the loan. This sort of protection compensates for the fact that the parties making
decisions about which individuals will get loans from a pool of assets are
sometimes more concerned with personal profit through commissions and fees
than with the security of investors' or depositors' assets.
626. Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. at 48 (noting that the debt
problems of low income borrowers may be ameliorated by increasing the capacity of
homeowners to discern unfair credit offers).
627. This concept is derived from a speech made by Ralph Nader at the Eighth
Annual National Consumer Rights Litigation Conference on November 6, 1999 in Washington,
D.C. Mr. Nader observed that even though more traffic accidents may be beneficial to the
economy in terms of increased production of new cars, increased labor requirements at hospitals
and so forth, no one thinks that we ought to have a public policy that encourages more car
accidents. He then indicated that laws protecting borrowers are no different.
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DIDMCA, quite unintentionally, left home equity borrowers with no
protections from overreaching.6' The legislative history of DIDMCA clearly
shows that Congress never imagined that in attempting to allow rates to move
with the market, and to increase the income for regulated thrift institutions, it
was also paving the way for high-rate subprime home equity lending
completely unrestrained by government regulation or by market control. The
unintended consequence of this statute has been that "most of the ways greedy
speculators take advantage of poor and unsophisticated buyers, though cruel
and immoral, are not illegal."
It is now time for Congress to recognize that there should be usury limits
on subprime home equity lending. As the executive director of NTIC
recognized after NTIC completed its study in Chicago, "[u]nless we regulate
the interest rates and fees that subprime, high-interest-rate lenders can charge,
more families are going to lose their homes and more communities in the city
and suburbs will have abandoned buildings."630 This does not necessarily mean
that Congress has to set an ironclad limit that cannot adjust to an increase in
market interest rates. Congress could just as plausibly adopt a floating
maximum rate, as it did in its definition of a high-rate loan under HOEPA.63'
There also must be regulation of points and fees that can be charged by home
equity lenders. In this regard, the NTIC study recommended a 3% cap on points
and fees on all home equity loans, not just high-cost loans.632
The next question that must be addressed is whether regulation should be
at the federal level-which would require a continuation of federal preemption
of state usury laws, but would replace deregulation with regulation-or
whether the preemption shouldbe lifted so that states can address the problems
of subprime home equity. One of the strongest arguments for regulation at the
federal level is that there is a tremendous amount of interstate loan activity.
Regulation by the various states may make compliance more difficult for
lenders and may also allow lenders to maneuver around state regulation.633 On
the other hand, the states appear eager to help resident homeowners, and there
is at least some feeling that the states would be likely to adopt more stringent
628. The NTIC study fully attributes high interest rates, points, and fees to DIDMCA,
and considers the Act one of the worst problems with subprime home equity lending because it
has legalized the charging of such rates and fees. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1,
at 7.
629. Henson, supra note 613, at 13A.
630. Unregulated Subprime Loans, supra note 346; see also Forrester, supra note
240, at 438, 447-48 (arguing that Congress should preempt state usury ceilings only for purchase
money home mortgage loans).
631. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (1994).
632. PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 36.
633. In this regard, the Woodstock Institute study raises the concern that if regulation
is permitted at the state level, lenders will simply take advantage of DIDMCA's most favored
lender provision: "[S]tate laws may be subject to preemption by national banking laws. If state
regulations improve generally, thrifts and national banks may increasingly become vehicles for
avoiding state rules." Two STEPS BACK, supra note 1, at v; see also id. at 39-40, 46 (noting that
improving state regulation of home lending laws may lead to thrifts and national banks being
used to avoid state rules).
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regulation.'
IX. CONCLUSION
Whether at the state level or at the federal level, subprime borrowers
clearly need the help of regulators in curbing abusive practices, ad hoc pricing,
and unaffordably high rates. From 1933 until 1979, mortgage loan rate abuse
was prevented by rate ceilings imposed at the federal level for some loans and
at the state level for others. Such ceilings still exist at the state level for many
kinds of consumer loans. The subprime home equity market that has developed
in the absence of mortgage loan rate regulation demonstrates thatjustifications
for rate limits still apply today, and that fees and rates in the market must be
regulated.
634. In this regard, even after expressing concerns about lenders seeking to avoid
state regulation, the Woodstock Institute study concludes that "unless the federal government
changes HOEPA to follow the North Carolina and New York models, federal preemption laws
should be modified to allow states to protect their homeowners." Two STEPS BACK, supra note
1, at v; see also id. at 39-40, 46 (recommending removal of federal preemption of the state
consumer lending laws). The NTIC study, on the other hand, concluded that, "Undoubtedly, the
most effective regulation of usurious subprime lenders for the Chicago area and the nation would
be to impose federal caps on interest rates." PREYING ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 1, at 36.
One disadvantage of setting a maximum rate cap is that borrowers may still be
funneled, or upsold, into rate categories not justified by their credit history. Freddie Mac is
currently working on setting up standard subprime underwriting credit systems that it hopes can
be used to appropriately categorize borrowers into rates. Arnold S. Kling, Get Setfor Loan-Level
Pricing (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.freddiemac.com/financesmm/July97/htmFi
riskbase.htm>. Some industry experts believe that if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac become
players in the subprime mortgage industry this might standardize rates, curb abusive practices,
and lower interest rates.
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1995-1999 DIsTRIBuTIoN OF MORTGAGE RATES BY RATE AND
LENDER
GRAPH 1: MORTGAGE RATE DISTRIBUTION 1995-1999
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TABLE 1: MORTGAGE RATE DISTRIBUTION 1995-1999
Rate 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
3.00 - 3.99 - - - - 1
4.00-4.99 - 2 20 16 23
5.00 - 5.99 3 597 1,332 1,876 2,009
6.00 - 6.99 33 1,860 2,681 5,218 9,544
7.00-7.99 2,432 12,527 14,339 11,138 8,024
8.00- 8.99 12,032 38,226 30,312 17,739 17,367
9.00 - 9.99 13,715 39,602 36,192 31,193 29,361
10.00- 10.99 40,114 62,220 41,763 34,796 29,004
11.00- 11.99 50,144 47,866 36,692 30,517 26,132
12.00 - 12.99 29,716 27,588 23,758 26,856 28,274
13.00- 13.99 12,217 8,564 16,202 22,499 31,116
14.00- 14.99 3,890 4,519 8,515 16,331 18,104
15.00 - 15.99 4,365 3,517 4,212 10,184 7,139
16.00 - 16.99 789 441 1,349 4,464 6,846
17.00 - 17.99 35 71 245 1,995 2,765
18.00- 18.99 - 8 22 16 425
19.00- 19.99 - 1 3 6 44
Totals 169,485 247,609 217,637 214,844 216,178
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GRAPH 2:1995 DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE RATES
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GRAPH 3:1996 DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE RATES
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